

A N
E S S A Y

Concerning

Self-Murther.

Wherein is endeavour'd to prove,

That it is

UNLAWFUL

According to

NATURAL PRINCIPLES.

WITH

Some Considerations upon what is pretended from the said Principles, by the Author of a Treatise, intituled, *Biathanatos*, and Others. *St. Donne*

By *J. Adams*, Rector of *St. Alban Woodstreet*, and Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty.

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Tho. Bennet*, at the *Half-Moon*, in *St. Paul's Church-Yard*, 1700.



To the Reverend
Dr. GODOLPHIN,
Provost of
ETON COLLEGE.

SIR,
THere are few Ad-
dresses of this kind,
where the Writer
considers the Reputation of
the Person he applies to, half
so much as his Own; for tho'
the Gratitude from whence
A 2 they

The Epistle

they Flow may be sincere ;
yet they are likewise very
glad that the World should
know their Friend or Pa-
tron : If something of this
should be laid to my Charge,
I could hardly acquit my
self; since 'tis not I confess,
without some Pride, that I
acknowledge thus Publickly
the great Obligations which
I have to you.

However, I must say, that
this was not the only Ground
of my applying to you :
For having undertaken the
Defence of *Humane Life*, it
would not have been suffi-
cient

Dedictory.

cient to have shewn, that
God reserves to himself the
Absolute Propriety of it, *et*
and that he imparts it to
Man, for a great and noble
End; unless I had given some
Instance how Valuable, how
Glorious it might become,
by a constant pursuit of *that*
End. Where then could I
have met with so full an
Instance to this purpose, as
in the Example of *Your*
Life? Where such strength
of Reason is guided so regu-
larly by Revelation, and e-
very Vertue improv'd and
adorn'd by Primitive Piety.

The Epistle.

Thus *Your Name* supports my Argument, at the same Time, that 'tis necessary for my Protection, who have attack'd an Error of so much Reputation, and which is set off with all the pompous Boasts of Reason, Courage, Honour and Liberty; by which Men chuse to be misled, rather then guided by Revelation; till after the loss of Health, Estate, and a Good Conscience, they are driven to seek for Ease in *Self-murder*.

Among other Pretences which have been brought to justify

Dedictory.

justify this Act, one of the most Popular is the Example of the *Romans*: I have endeavour'd to give some Account *when* it first grew in Vogue among them; and what Vices and Opinions made way for it; how from a People Naturally Religious, Brave, and Disinterested; above Corruption, as much as Cowardice; They fell first into Atheism, and from thence into Luxury, Bribery, and Treachery, Publick Poverty, and Private Extortion; which ended at last in the Slavery

The Epistle

and Ruin of that Great Nation.

I could not consider this without a melancholic Reflection upon my own Country; formerly not unlike the other in its Vertues, as its Enemies will confess for their own Credit; But, alas! now too like it in its Vices, as its best Friends must be forc'd to own: What can save it from the same Calamity, but the restoring that lost Zeal for Religion and Vertue, and Sincere Love of the Publick Good? And what one Family can contribute

Dedictory.

tribute more to this than
Your Own? Where at this
time are to be found such
excellent Qualifications for
Support and Ornament, both
of the Church and State?
May that Good Providence,
which upon all Occasions
has been so favourable to
this Nation, make you his
happy Instruments to this
Purpose.

SIR,

*Your most Humble and most
Faithful Servant,*

JOHN ADAMS.

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ER-

ERRATA

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ADDENDA:

Page 20. Line 13. after *has any right to Punish him*. add *that is as to*
those Faults which he commits against himself, as *Intemperance*, &c. ib. l. 22
 after *Destruction of it*, add *If it be a Crime as shall be prov'd*.

There are some literal Mistakes, as also in the Pointing, occasion'd
 by the Transcribing, which the Reader is desir'd to Correct or Excuse.

Lately Printed,

THE Certainty of the *Christian Revelation*,
 and the Necessity of Believing it, Esta-
 blished: In Opposition to all the Cavils and
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A N
E S S A Y
Concerning
SELF-MURTHER, &c. D

Introduction.

TO treat of this Subject, by such Arguments only as may be drawn from *Reveal'd Religion*; or to mix these and such as may be brought from *Natural Reason*, together, wou'd be to raise the greatest Prejudices in those Persons who are most concern'd: For they who undertake to defend the Lawfulness of Self-Murther, (of which there are many in this Age) proceed chiefly upon *Natural Principles*, and will not hear-
B ken

ken to any Thing from *Revelation* till these are answered: Wherefore my Design at present is, to consider this Action, according to the *Principles of Natural Reason only*.

To this purpose it might perhaps be thought necessary by some People, to prove in the first Place the *Being of a God*: But since this has been both readily allow'd, and studiously maintain'd, by the most considerable Advocates of *Self-Murther*, I shall take it to be granted; and, upon this Supposition, endeavour to prove, that *Self-Murther is naturally unlawful*.

C H A P. I.

Man considered in the Individual. The State of Nature. Of Human Life. Human What, and from whence it is. Where the absolute Propriety of it is to be plac'd.

BY Self-Murther, I mean a Man's depriving himself of Life wilfully and advisedly. For the proving this Act to be unlawful, we are to consider what Humane Life is: From whence Man receives it: Where the absolute Propriety or Dominion of it is to be plac'd: And to what End it was bestow'd.

Man consists of a Rational Soul and Body united together naturally. Humane Life is the Result of this Union. There was a Time when neither Soul, nor Body, had any Being; therefore the Soul cou'd not be the Cause of it self; much less cou'd the Body be so. But the Being of each,

and the Union of both, and the Continuation of the same Union, must be owing to that *All-wise, All-mighty, Universal Cause*, which is called *God*. This I suppose will easily be granted; and if so, it will lead us to the fixing the true Propriety or Dominion over Humane Life, the absolute and lawful Power to dispose of it.

All absolute Propriety is either Original or Derivative; each of which is twofold, of Men, or of Things. In the present Argument, the Life of a Man is the Man, and not a Thing; he that destroys the Life of a Man, destroys a Man; and he that destroys a Man, destroys the Life of a Man: However, one of these may be of use to illustrate the other; and if we know by what means Original Propriety of Things is acquired, we may the more easily discover, whether Man has any *Original Propriety* of his Life, or no.

Original Propriety of Things comes, by taking possession of that which belongs to no body; or which has been forsaken by those to whom it did belong; or else, by making or producing something out of that which is no Bodies; which last seems to give the best Title of Propriety, as being not only the possessing, but the giving a kind of new Being to the Thing: Now,

I. Man

I. Man cannot have the *Original Propriety* of himself, by any of these ways, because he could not make himself, nor can he be ever so derelinquished or forsaken by the great Cause of his Being, as to remain independent and absolute; but while he is, he must belong to the same Cause, thro' which he at first was; besides, he cou'd not take possession of himself before he was, nor cou'd he be at the same time both the Person taking possession, and the Person possessed. If Man then has not the Original Propriety of himself, no other Creature can pretend to it, and therefore it remains only that it should be in God: And in Him indeed it is in the strictest manner, not by producing him out of that which was no Bodies, but by making him out of that, which he created out of nothing; and by being independent Himself; and not only causing, but sustaining, and comprehending all Things.

II. As to any *derivative Propriety*, or Dominion which Man may be suppos'd to have of his Life; if we consider such Propriety as absolute and independent, which it must be, if it gives him a Right to dispose of his Life as he pleases; he can have no such Propriety neither, because

this is contradictory both to the Nature of God and Man.

1. This cannot be derived from any but God; but God cannot divest himself of such absolute Dominion or Propriety, because this wou'd make Man from the time in which God shou'd do this, so independent, that God would have no further Right over his Life; and therefore cou'd not in any Case threaten him with Death, nor command him any Duty under the Penalty of any Punishment: In a word, this wou'd hinder God from being Omnipotent; for he cannot be so, who has not a Power over all, whether Persons or Things.

2. Altho' we shou'd suppose that God shou'd part with his Original Propriety, and derive it to Man; yet Man is not capable of receiving it. He cou'd not by the condition of his Nature subsist alone in the absolute Propriety of his Life one moment; because he can no more conserve Life, than he can begin it; * *the Conservation of any thing, is the continuation of the Production of it*: Wherefore nothing but the same Power

* Greg. de Valent. T. 1. Dif. 8. q. Secund.

which

which began *Life* at first, can *continue it afterwards*. No Man, nay, not all Mankind can contribute the least to this purpose, by making any of those things which are necessary for the continuing of *Life*; not the meanest part of his Food, not a Grain of Corn, or a Blade of Grass; nor has any one the Art or Skill so to digest such Food when taken into the Body, as to adapt it to the support of *Life*, nor so to distribute it that it shall be turn'd into the Substance of all those parts of the Body, as Bones, Nerves, Flesh, Blood, Spirits, which are necessary for the continuation of it; nor lastly, to order the whole distribution so with relation of every part to every other, as to make up that Harmony wherein *Life* consists.

Wherefore as God cannot derive this absolute Propriety to Man in regard of his Omnipotence, so cannot Man receive it in regard of his natural dependance upon Him: But *Life continued* is as fully God's Propriety, as *Life first bestow'd*; and therefore it must be an Act of the greatest Injustice for any Man to cut it off by Self-Murder.

From hence we may clear a mistake which People may be very apt to fall into by *Life's* being so frequently call'd the Gift

of God. If by this they mean that it is of *God's Free-will* and Goodness that it is begun and continued to Man, or that it is given him *for his use only*, they are *so far in the right*: But if they think that the Word *Gift* signifies here an *actual transferring of Right to any thing*; the ceasing of Propriety in one Party, and the beginning of it in the other, as this concerns humane Life, it is a *great mistake*; because as *God can never cease giving*, so *Man can never cease receiving*; never be in full, independent possession of it the least moment; and consequently *never have the absolute Propriety of it.*

Besides, this cou'd not be such a Gift as conferr'd absolute Propriety, because the Civilians tell us, that for the making of a Gift valid, as there must be *Donatio* on the one side, so there must be *Acceptatio* on the other; for if the first should be sufficient without the last, then it might be in the Power of the Giver to undoe the Receiver. Now when God bestowed Life upon Man, there was no acceptation necessary for Man, nor could there possibly be any such acceptation; and therefore Man has no absolute Propriety of his Life deriv'd to him from God, by way of Gift.

1. No Acceptation was necessary from Man, because this was an Act of *absolute Dominion*, and Supreme Power, whereby God *has a Right* to create what he pleases *without* the Consent of the Creature: Not but that this Act of Supreme Power was also an Act of Supreme Goodness, in regard of the great Benefit which Life may be to Man if He pleases, and therefore did *not want* His Consent.

2. There cou'd not possibly be any such thing as Acceptation in this Case as the ground of absolute Propriety by Gift, because there being *no Propriety without* some Act of the *Free-will Antecedent*, as to the choice of accepting or rejecting (as has been said,) and Life being before Free-will it self, it was impossible that this Choice shou'd be made; This Argument *Aquinas* starts; and it is improv'd afterwards by † one of the most eminent of his Followers, who assures us that Man can have no absolute Propriety of his Life; because *whatever falls under Man's Dominion, must be something that may be made use of for the benefit*

† 22de. q. 64. Artic. 3. ad 3^m. Greg. de Valentia, Tom. 3. Disp. 3. Quæst. 8. punct. 2. It. qu. 10. punct. 1. Quod cadit in Humanum Dominium oportet esse aliquid quod per Liberi Arbitrii usum possit usurpari, &c.

of Man as already possess'd of Free-will, and consequently of Life; therefore Life it self, and those things which contribute naturally to the Being of Man, cannot fall under Man's Dominion: Neither can the Power of Free-will it self do so, which altho' it be after Life, yet must be before any Dominion, because it is the very Foundation of all Dominion whatsoever; and this (says he) is the true and solid Proof that no Man has any absolute Propriety or Dominion over his Life.

What then! shall we say that Man has *no Right at all*? No Power over himself or his Life? If this were so, how could he *venture* it at any time, or expose it to danger? What has been said, does not imply this. He has a Right over it in *some sense*, that is, a *Right of Use*, but *not a Right of absolute Propriety*, a Right to employ it for that end for which he receiv'd it: (which shall be shewn more at large immediately) and upon this account, has he also a Right to *hazard Life*; but this being never to be exerted, but when Life is *certainly in Danger*; it amounts to no more than a *Right of preserving it*; which is a *Duty* rather than a *Privilege*, and therefore cannot be supposed to infer, of all Things in the World, any (*Power or*) *Liberty to destroy it*.

he has the power

There

There are some Inferences which might be drawn from this Head to establish God's absolute Propriety of Life; but these depending upon the End or Design of Life, may, I believe, be brought in better, at the conclusion of the next Chapter.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the true End or Design of Humane Life.

IT having appear'd that the most wise God is the Author, and therefore the Supreme Proprietor of Life, we may be assured for the same reason that Life is directed to some End; for nothing can be more inconsistent with infinite Wisdom, than to make the least part of the Creation, much more the best, to no purpose.

Accordingly, the wisest Men of all Ages have acknowledged, and maintained that there is some such End, though they have not agreed in what it consists: Some have reckoned it to consist in * the following of Universal Reason; others in the following of Ver-

* Diog. Laert. in Zen. Antonin. L. 5. §. 8. 19. Senec. de Vita Beata. §. 8. 13. & alib. See Chap. 7. following.

tue ; others again in *the following Nature* ; or in *the following God*. Towards the Discovery of this, we may, I think, lay down these things as certain.

I. That whatever the End of humane Life is, what Disputes soever there may be concerning it; *it is not the destroying it*; since nothing can have Being given to it, only in order to the not being.

II. That the End of humane Life must be something, which *it is in every Man's Power to perform*, otherwise this wou'd detract both from the Goodness and Wisdom of God; and therefore it cannot depend upon any thing *without us*, as Wealth, Honour, or the Pleasures of Sensation, or the obtaining whatever * *seems good* to any one, or avoiding whatever *seems evil* to him, for none of these things are at the absolute command or disposal of Man; wherefore that which is the universal End of every Man's Life, must be something which depends only upon every Man's self, and which no Events or outward Circumstances can hinder him from observing, if he will.

III. The

* See Chap. 7.

III. The End of Life must be answerable to that degree of Capacity which the Creature has in respect of other Creatures. Life is common to Beasts as well as Man; the End of *their* Being, is to live, because by the Faculties which they are endowed withal, they are capable of no more, than what is proper for the promoting of this; but Man is capable of more, because endowed with nobler Faculties; and therefore must have a nobler End than they, and consequently a greater degree of Happiness.

These things being granted, the best way to discover the *True End of Man's Life* will be to consider *Humane Nature* attentively, according to that *Rank* which it bears in *Universal Nature*: To this purpose it may be of some Use to examine what may be the true meaning of that *Maxim*, which was in so much Credit among the *ancient Greeks and Romans*, viz. *The following Nature.*

The Word *Nature* is sometimes a very general Term, and then signifies *that Course* which the great Creator did put the *whole* World to act in; sometimes in a more limited sense, it signifies *that Rule* which he gave to *each* Creature to act by, for the fulfilling

fulfilling of that particular End for which it was made, in proper Harmony and Consent with the Universe. Thus not only Beasts, but Plants, even Stones and Minerals, and every Element, may be said to follow Nature: Yet since there are different Faculties appropriated to each of these, by which they excel each other accordingly; and as Beasts excel Plants by *Sensation*, so Man excels them by *Reason*: The *true sense* of the *following Nature*, and the *true End* of all created Beings is *the working according to the utmost of their Capacities, or according to that Superiour Faculty or Power wherewith they are endowed, and by which they are distinguished from one another.* To bring this particularly to Man; the *utmost Capacity of Beasts* depends upon the Faculties or Powers of *Sensation*: The *utmost Capacity of Man* depends upon the *Powers of a Rational Soul*. Now Beasts act by *necessity*, they follow directly where-ever *sense* does lead; but Man is a *voluntary Agent*, able to discover of himself what is his Duty, and to follow this of *Choice, not of Necessity*: Wherefore there must be *two principal Fountains* of Man's Actions, namely, *Knowledge and Free-will*. Again we must distinguish concerning Knowledge; for this is of various kinds, according as its Objects are; that which is
 concern'd

concern'd in the present Question is *the knowledge of those Rules and Laws by which our Actions ought to be guided, the knowledge of our Duty, as usually divided according to its three chief Objects, God, our Neighbour, and our selves: This Knowledge; so much of Reason as this implies, is easie to be attain'd unto by the meanest Capacities; for tho' there are three Objects about which Humane Actions are chiefly concern'd, yet this variety does not hinder the clearness of Man's Knowledge, as to the Fundamentals of his Duty, towards each particular Object. For instance, who can be ignorant? Or who must not consent immediately? That the Supreme Being to whom we owe Life, and all Things, ought to be honoured; or that we ought to do by others as we wou'd be done by our selves; or that we ought not to injure our Health, or act against our Knowledge, or do any thing to impair, much less to destroy those Faculties by which we excel other Creatures: These are Truths which are so plain and self-evident, that the very mention of 'em is Demonstration; and therefore no Man can plead Ignorance in this Case, or that his own Reason tells him otherwise.*

This then is the first Fountain of humane Actions, *knowledge of Duty: And such*
 Knowledge

Knowledge being to be attain'd unto by Reason alone, and yet to be attain'd easily by every Man's Reason, such Knowledge being the Perfection of that noble Faculty, I desire leave to distinguish it in the following Discourse (when I mention the End of Life) by the Word *REASON*.

But yet the easiness of this Knowledge wou'd signifie nothing unto Man, unless the *Will* did put it in Execution: It must be readily applied, and reduc'd to Action, or else our Duty wou'd remain unperform'd: Thus, *'tis not sufficient* for a Man to *know* that God must be honour'd, that his Neighbour is to be us'd as himself, or that he ought to do himself no Injury, *unless this were put in practice*, by his being pious, just, patient, temperate, &c. Wherefore *the Compliance of the Will with that which it knows to be its Duty, is the chief thing to be taken care of*. The Vices of Men come not so much from *want of Knowledge* or Reason in this Case, as from *want of such Compliance*: And the true Notion of a *weak Man*, is not so much from his *being ignorant* of his Duty, as from *his not doing* what he knows to be so. On the other side, that which makes a *good Man*, is not *greatness of Knowledge*, but the *bending of his Will vigorously in all Circumstances* what-

whatsoever to the doing what he knows is his Duty. And therefore the doing so, is that which has obtain'd the venerable Name of *VIRTUE*; for *VIRTUE* is the force and vigour of the Free Will, through which the Soul complies chearfully and gladly with what it knows to be Duty: Which force or vigour takes different Names according to its different Objects (above-mentioned) and is call'd Piety, Justice, Beneficence, Constancy, Temperance, &c.

If this is allow'd, it will not be difficult to show wherein Man's true Happiness consists; for this is the natural result of what has been said, 'tis that Rest or Ease which the Soul enjoys after it has mov'd regularly and vigorously in the doing of its Duty. 'Tis the sweet Fruition which it is blest withal upon the just sense of the proper Use of its Free Will, and its having faithfully discharged the End for which it was made; which it being impossible to do otherwise, than by Reasons showing what is Duty; and Free Will's obeying accordingly, I conclude that the true End or Design of humane Life, is THE FOLLOWING OF REASON BY VIRTUE.

I will not contend but that the following of Reason might possibly signifie as much, as the following of Reason by Virtue; be-
C
cause

cause the Word *Following* seems to imply an Act of Free-will; and if this be according to Reason, as to the *Government* of humane Actions, (which is the thing meant all along) it must be *Virtuous*; so, perhaps, *the following of Virtue* only, might include the other too: However, since these two Expressions have been us'd and taken in different Senses heretofore, and may still be liable to Exception; since it is *necessary to fix the End of Life*, which I shall have occasion to refer to so often in this Discourse, in *some particular Terms* or other: I thought it most convenient to make use of these, and *hope* that the doing so will not be look'd upon as any Affectation.

This then is that which I take to be the great End of Humane Life, which I shall * further confirm, when I come to consider the Objections which may be rais'd against it. Wherefore to apply this to our present purpose, from what has been said may be inferr'd,

1. That since there is certainly *some End or other* for which Man has Life; whether it be the same End or no which we have assign'd, thus far we may be assur'd that Self-murder is unlawful upon

this Account, because by this Act, Man *positively renounces that End*, and destroys irrecoverably the means of obtaining it.

2. If the true End of Humane Life, is Man's working according to the utmost of those Faculties by which he excels other Creatures, *the following of Reason by Virtue*; then it is impossible that any one who does so, any good Man, shou'd ever be inclin'd to destroy his Life; because the worse his Circumstances are, the nobler Compass shall his Free-will have to follow its Reason by several Virtues; and the more it does so, the more it must be satisfied with it self, and therefore cannot at the same time be inclin'd to destroy that very Satisfaction by Self-Murther.

From hence also some Inferences may be drawn for the confirming of what was said above, concerning Man's having no *absolute Propriety of his Life*. As,

1. If there be a *certain End* of Humane Life, then there must be also *certain Rules or Laws*, which Man must be bound to observe in the pursuing of that End; which Laws being founded in Nature, and not depending upon Man's Choice or Consent, oblige him whether *he will or no*. If there are such Laws as these (some of which are

above-mentioned) which Man is thus indispensably oblig'd to observe, while he has Reason left, then he cannot have such an absolute Propriety of Life, as to destroy it when he pleases.

2. If there be such Laws as these, all Laws suppose Reward and Punishment, otherwise they wou'd be to no purpose. Now when Man is in the *State of Nature*, he *cannot be made to suffer any Punishment* for transgressing any *Law of Nature*; he cannot be suppos'd to punish himself, and no body else has any Right to punish him; wherefore *there must be another State*, wherein he must be *liable to account for the use* which he has made of Life; and if so, he cannot possibly have *any absolute Propriety of that*, which he is not only accountable for every moment that he has it, but also liable to Punishment for the *misuse of it*, and much more for the *destruction of it*.

3. Supposing that Man had a *derivative Propriety* of his Life from God; yet if there be a *certain End* for which Life was bestowed, that Propriety cannot be *absolute*, because it must be *conditional*; nor can it ever become absolute by the *ceasing of the Condition*, because the Condition can never be perform'd so fully as to be *cancell'd*. The
Condition

Condition here is the same with the End of Life, *the following of Reason by Virtue*. There can be *no Circumstances of Life* where this is not absolutely necessary, A Man can never *have done* being reasonable or virtuous; never *fulfil this End so far* as to have liberty to destroy himself; unless we will say, that the *more* a Man has of Reason, the *greater Right* he would have to renounce it; and the *better use* that he can make of *Life*, the *more liberty* he would have of *not living at all*.

I shall conclude what has been said concerning *the Propriety which God has reserv'd to himself of Humane Life*, and the *End* for which Man has it from him, with observing that both these have been acknowledged by the wisest Philosophers. For Instance,

*Plato makes Socrates to say, *That the Gods have a peculiar Care of us: That Man is one of those Things of which they have reserv'd to themselves a particular Propriety*. From which he infers, *That as a Man wou'd be angry with his Slave if he shou'd kill himself without his leave, and wou'd punish him if he cou'd for so doing, so perhaps, says he, God wou'd deal with Man if he should kill himself,*

* In Phæd. Sect. 5.

*unless he himself imposes a Necessity upon him, as he does now upon me; meaning as to his drinking the Poison after that he had been condemn'd to die. * Pythagoras, to shew the Unlawfulness of destroying God's Propriety, and forsaking the End for which Life was given, lays it down for one of his Rules, That no Man ought to quit his Station, without the exprefs Command of his Superiour Officer; that is, of God, as Cicero explains it. And he also representing the Transport of young † Scipio Æmilianus, when he saw his Grandfather Africanus, and his Father Paulus, and other Roman Heroes appear to him in a Dream in a Place of Happiness and Glory, and burnt with a youthful Ardour and Impatience to come to 'em, He makes his Great Father reply to him It must not be so, unless the God, to whom belongs this vast and glorious Circumference that you behold; unless that God sets you at liberty himself from that Body which he has confin'd you to, there can be no Entrance hither; wherefore, my dear Publius, you, and all good Men, must be contented to retain your minds within your Bodies, nor remove out of humane Life, without his Command who gave it you,*

* In Caton. Maj.

† Vid. Somnum Scipionis.

lest you shou'd seem guilty of deserting the Post,
 which God has assign'd to you as you are Men:
 But follow Justice, Scipio, follow Piety, as
 this your Grandfather, and I did before you.
 Such a Life as that, is the direct way to
 Heaven, says that great Man, not the kil-
 ling of ones self, though even out of Impa-
 tience of arriving thither.

CHAP. III.

Man Consider'd as a Member of Civil Society.
 Self-Murther prov'd by several Arguments
 to be Destructive to Civil Society; from
 which, and what was said before, concluded
 to be an Act of the greatest Injustice and
 therefore unlawful.

Hitherto we have considered Man as
 Single and Independent from Hu-
 mane Laws, and shou'd that as he is so,
 Self-Murther is an Act of Injustice towards
 God, by destroying that which is his alone;
 and also both towards God and towards a
 Mans own self, by the positive and wilful
 refusal of performing that end for which he
 received Life, and in which his happiness
 truly consists. Let us in the next plate;
 for a further confirmation of the unlawfulness

ness of this Act, consider Man as a *Member of Civil Society.*

And this we ought to do with the greater attention, because, though it may be convenient in some respects to consider him in the individual, and in the state of Nature, yet this is only Notional; he cannot be so as to any part of the World which we have to do withal, nor can he be so at any time but to his great Misfortune, for as 'tis necessary *for his Security*, that he should be under some Government, so is it likewise necessary, *for the Perfection of his Nature*: for his having a larger and a nobler compass for his Reason and his Virtue; there being several Virtues which cannot be exercis'd by Man when alone, but which owe their being to Society.

If then we consider Man in this manner, his Obligations to preserve Life are still more; both as the end of Life is *enlarg'd*, (the good of *others*, as well as his own being concern'd in it) and as he has then less to do with *his Life*, (the use of it being more at others disposal) than when he was consider'd in the state of Nature: Because he has not then the same Authority to defend himself which he had before, but is bound in most Cases to have recourse to the Magistrate for this purpose. Besides,
by

by enjoying the benefit of Protection in any Government, he must be supposed either tacitly or expressly to have consented in a mutual Agreement of Offence and Defence for the maintaining of the same Protection; which being chiefly for the preservation of Life, as Self-Murder must be unlawful, so it must be absurd. But that which is most considerable and sufficient of it self to prove Self-Murder to be unlawful, is, that this may prove *destructive to the very Being of Society*, as will appear if we consider the Reasons following.

1. Because this wholly destroys the *best Measure* of mutual Kindness and Justice, that which is generally confess'd to be one of the chiefest and plainest Laws of Nature; namely *the doing to others as we would be done to our selves*: The greatest injury that can be done to another is the Murdering of him; now if a Man has the liberty to Murder himself, the measure of Justice in the most important Concerns towards others is broken; nor can it signify any thing to say, that this is done out of love to ones self; because it may be pretended that it may be done out of love to another too, yet no one sure will ever allow this as a reasonable pretence for the Murder of his Neighbour.

2. This

2. This wou'd utterly destroy *the force of Humane Laws*; Man's having a right or power to kill himself, when he thinks fitting, wou'd make void all Obligation to Humane Laws, as to the threats of Punishment, without a dread of which no Law wou'd signifie any thing: The greatest Punishment that Humane Laws can threaten is Death; now if Men have Authority to kill themselves, and be taught and perswaded that they have so, and be encouraged by the Examples of others, which will not be wanting, when Men are so perswaded; the threats of Death will be despis'd as to the disgrace or torment of it when publick, because they may bring it upon themselves with ease and privacy at home, and therefore they will not be oblig'd to any Duty, by the fear of this, much less by the fear of any thing else; but wou'd Rob, Ravish, Murther, &c.

3. Whatever the Reasons are, in relation to Civil Society, for which the Murther of another is forbidden; the *same bold and perhaps with greater force*, as to the Murthering of ones self; those Reasons are chiefly the *having no Authority*, the *depriving the Publick of a Subject*, the *impossibility of making any Equivalent Satisfaction*. The two first of these are of the same force as to the Mur-

Murthering of ones self, the third seems to be of much greater; for he that Murthers another may make some satisfaction as to publick Justice, by the forfeiture of his own Life, and he that forfeits his Life publicly upon this Account makes some amends to the State, under which he lives, by deterring others from committing the same Crime by the Example of his Punishment; whereas on the contrary, he that Murthers himself, not *only evades all satisfaction* to the Publick as to the paying Personal and Sensible Punishment; but in so doing *gives encouragement* to others to commit the same: Wherefore Self-Murder may be a greater Crime *in regard of the Publick*, especially if it be a publick Person, than the Murthering of another Man; and if so is undoubtedly forbidden by that Law of Nature, *Thou shalt not kill*: otherwise that Law would be very imperfect, and reach only to the *lesser* Crime, and permit the *greater*.

Lastly, For a Man to have a right to kill himself when ever he pleases, must be destructive to Civil Government; because this Right *must be Universal*: One Man may exercise it as well as another; and since *no publick rule* can be given to show *when, in what circumstances* of Adversity, (which
are

are more or less felt by different Men, according to their different Portions of Reason or Vertue, their Courage or Constitution) since, I say, no publick rule can be given to all Men to prescribe the *Case exactly* wherein it shall be reasonable and lawful to put this Right in Execution; every Man must be left to judge for himself, that is, to be led as his own Passions or Appetites guide him. After this rate great numbers may make themselves away, which by Example and Custom may grow still greater and greater, till the Publick is weaken'd not only by the loss of several of its Members, but also by the check and stop which there must be upon all Business, and Trade, Trust in one another; since the strictest Obligations to this purpose may be thus evaded.

Add to this the misery of the Family particularly concern'd, the horrid sense which such an Act imprints upon the best Mens Minds, the general Aversion which it causes, and consequently the shame of the Relations and Acquaintance of the Self-Murderer, and very often too the Confusion and Desolation of the forsaken Widow or Orphans; all which must be of ill Consequence to any State, especially if the Fact is frequently committed.

But

But lest this should give any colour for the plausible pretence of *Compassion* which is commonly made use of by those who are concern'd in the *Coroner's Inquest* upon such Occasions, I cannot but observe by the way, that all Kindness or Generosity towards *particular* Persons, though they be nearest Relations, is unwarrantable, which is prejudicial to that Love and Duty which is owing to the *Publick*, especially when People are *actually intrusted by the Publick*, and *sworn to report impartially*, without being mov'd by *any Passion* whatsoever, what their judgment is concerning a matter of Fact. It may be as *injurious to our Country* to elude the Design of a Law out of *Pity* as out of *Revenge*; and as to *Perjury*, if we consider it in it self, 'tis as *absurd* to be guilty of it through *Generosity* as *Bribery*, though it may too justly be suspected, that in these Cases the *latter* generally has a greater Influence than the *former*. But of this more hereafter. *

These are the Reasons which make me conclude that Self-Murther is unlawful, if Man be considered as a Member of any Civil State; which are all of 'em of *greater* force, if it be also *positively forbidden by the*

* Chap. 8.

Laws of the State, which I take to be of great Consideration in this part of the Argument. As for the Exceptions or Objections, that are made to this third Division, * they also shall be considered in their turn.

* See Chapt. 8.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Rise and Obligation of Self-Preservation. Some Objections against it remov'd. How far Humane Life may be justly Valu'd or Despis'd.

er **B**Y what has been said has been shewn, the Absolute Propriety which God has of Humane Life, the end for which Man receives it, both in regard to himself, and in regard to those with whom he is joyn'd in Civil Society. In the next place we should enquire *by what means* God secures this Propriety to himself, for Man's observing of this end.

This he does by fixing in him the Principle of Self-Preservation. This is the most Universal Law of Nature, it running through every part of the Creation, as is confest by the

the Stoicks * especially, who are our chiefest opposers in the present Argument; but it belongeth particularly to *Man*, for as the end of Humane Life is of the noblest kind, and Gods Propriety of it of the greatest value. As *Man* is furnish'd with better means to preserve his Life, so must he be more strictly bound to do it than any other Creature. Yet some People by imputing too much to this Principle, or by observing it without due regard to the end of Life, have caus'd it to be run down and despis'd as the *base pretence of Knavery and Cowardice*; whereas there wou'd not be any danger of either of these, if they wou'd but carefully distinguish between *the means* and *the end of Humane Life*. *Self-Preservation is the chief means by which God secures his Propriety of Humane Life, for Man's obtaining of the great end for which he received it.*

Though Self-preservation is the first Principle by which *Man* does act, (because Life must first be, before any use can be made of it) yet this is not the *only measure* of *Man's* Actions, but as soon as he comes to the Knowledge of the End of Life, his Actions are to be guided by that

* Diog. Laert. in Zen. Τὸ δ' ἀρχαῖον ὁρμητικόν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ζῆν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ. Cicer. de finib. lib. 3. de Offic. 1. 1. Sen. Ep. 121.

Knowledge. Thus tho' Infants endeavour to preserve themselves before they have any use of Reason ; yet afterwards when they come to have this, and to follow it by *Virtue*, then this great end of Life takes place according to its dignity, and is to be chiefly regarded ; and Self-preservation remains of force only as 'tis *subservient to this end and consistent with it*.

Wherefore since I suppose this end to be *the following Reason by Virtue*, and make this Precedent in dignity, and more to be regarded than Self-preservation, which is only the means subservient to it ; there can be no fear of *encouraging* either Cowardice or Knavery upon account of it ; because he that preserves Life *only to this very end*, that he may follow *Reason by Virtue*, can never do any thing *contrary to Reason or Virtue*, upon the account of *Self-preservation*.

Indeed that unbounded Authority which Mr. *Hobbs* * gives to what he calls Right of Nature, under which Self-preservation is included, opens a very wide door to the worst consequences of Knavery or Cowardice ; For, he says, *that this is the Liberty each Man hath to use his own Power as he will him-*

* Leviath. Part 1. Chap. 14.

self for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently of doing any thing, which in his own Judgment and Reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. This Latitude of Right of Nature in order to Self-preservation seems to be the ground of most of his Errors concerning Civil Society, and may well be the occasion of the basest Actions.

But we do not value Life at that rate: For Life is but a thing indifferent in its own Nature; wherefore to love or hate it merely upon its own account, is equally unreasonable: The just value or contempt of it depends upon the use that is made of it, in the fulfilling or neglecting the end of it.

If a Wise Man has a Summ of Money lent him, he will use it (without any injury to his Benefactor's right) to his own and his Friend's Advantage; so will the same Man do with Life; yet such a summ may be misused two ways, either through Covetousness, which will cause a Man to do all the foulest things imaginable to encrease or secure it; or else through Prodigality, which will make him throw it away with the greatest Rashness: Cowardice is the Covetousness of Life, (consider'd only

for itself without the End of it;) *Self-murder is the extreme act of Prodigality of it*, but with this Aggravation, the Prodigality of what was graciously lent to Man, to the most noble and most glorious *End*; by the best and greatest of all *Benefactors*, even *God himself*.

To return then to the Objection above-mention'd; as it would be unreasonable to say, that the affirming, a *Man ought not to be a Prodigal* did infer, that he ought to be *Covetous*: So 'tis full as unreasonable to pretend, that because we affirm that *Self-preservation ought to be observ'd*, we would have Men turn Knaves or Cowards in order to the doing so. By no means; for as it was said before, The true end of Life is the following of *Reason by Virtue*, Life may be *hazarded* in order to this end, and Death may be *suffer'd*, rather than act against it; but suffer'd always from others, never from one's self.

Moreover, as People strive to disgrace *Self-preservation*, by the Imputations above-mentioned; so they cry up the *Contempt of Life*, on the other side, as the *greatest Courage and Magnanimity*: But he that knows what the *right end of Living* is, will keep this in his Eye in all Events, and therefore will *neither value nor despise Life*, but

but only as it is more or less consistent with his Duty: And this is true Magnanimity; this will make him scorn to do an ill Thing to save Life; because this would be to destroy the very end for which he had Life: the doing well. On the other side, this will hinder him from throwing away Life, by Self-murder; because whatever his Condition is; the performing of the end of Life, can never be out of his Power.

Wherefore nothing can be more absurd, than that Contempt of Life, which is so very much affected by some People; which injudicious Poets very much contribute too: What than to have a Hero strutting and ranting against Life; when either he has made it miserable by his Folly, or is incapable of making a proper Use of it by his Ignorance: Not to know what to do with Life, is not to know what to do with Reason. There are a great many Men in the World, who despise the Slavery of Reflection and Forecast, and depend only upon the gross Enjoyment of the present Moment. And then whenever they meet with opposition or disappointment, (which they must needs do often) they quarrel with Life, and are for parting with it immediately; whereas it is not Life, but they who are in Fault. Life is always pleasing,
D 2 when

when Reason is faithfully obey'd ; when this is forsaken, Life indeed is worth nothing : But then who is it that makes it so ? Yet still, after all, when it is become so worthless, Self-murder is not necessary ; because the Cause of its being worthless may be remedied, if the Person concern'd pleases ; and he can no sooner understand for what Reason Life is despicable, but that he may make it quite otherwise, by pursuing the true end of it.

Furthermore, to confirm this Contempt of Life, they plead the Examples of *Regulus*, and others, who have suffer'd Death with all Calmness and Magnanimity. But will any Man venture to say seriously, that these great Men behav'd themselves as they did out of Contempt of Life, or despising, or neglecting Self-preservation. *This would be the greatest Detraction.*

There seems to be always a poorness and meanness of Spirit in such Insinuations and Reflections as these ; *Life is a Thing of no Value : That Death is the way to Ease ; and the Pain not great, nor lasting, &c.* How much greater would it be for a Man to acknowledge, that he is not *insensible* of

* See [more Chap. 15.

the Terrors of Death, and yet to shew at the same time, that *he is ready to suffer all, rather than transgress against that end for which Life was given him, by committing any one Crime.* Wherefore when we consider the settled and calm Resolution of any great and innocent Man, at the point of violent Death, *let it not be said, that he was glad to die out of any Contempt of Life: But allow him to have had a natural regard to Life, and then his parting with it upon the Account of Vertue, will be truly Glorious.*

By what has been said may appear the Unreasonableness of several Passages which are frequently to be met withal in the Writings of *the Stoicks and † Epicureans*, and which have been received with much applause by some People; who are pleas'd to see Life represen-

† See *Lucretius*, lib. 3. thus speaking in the Person of Nature.

— *Si grata fuit Tibi vita antea a priorq;
Cur non ut plenus vitæ conviva recedis?
Sin ea qua fructus cunq; es periere profusa
Vitaq; inoffensu est, cur amplius addere quæris?
Nec potius vitæ finem facis atq; laboris?
Nam tibi præterea quod machiner inveniamq;
Quod placeat nihil est, eadem sunt omnia semper.
Si tibi non annis corpus jam marcet & artus
Confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant.*

ted as a *dull Business*, not worth a Man's Care, where the *same Thing* comes over and over again: Because their own is so. || *Seneca* has a remarkable Passage to this purpose; where, speaking of one *Marcellinus's* voluntary Death: He tells us, He was perswaded to it by a Friend of his, a *Stoick*, a very extraordinary Person, especially as to his Courage, who talk'd to him to this purpose: *Be not concern'd, dear Marcellinus, as if you were consulting about a Matter of any great importance; Life is no such mighty Business. Your Slaves live as well as you, and so do Beasts too — Consider how long you have been doing the same Thing over and over, Eating, Sleeping, &c. This is the narrow Circle which we are always Running —* This indeed is a very dull Circle for a Philosopher to be always Running; for this is an Account of the Life of a *Beast*, and not of a *Man*: But the End of humane Life is of a *Nobler Kind*; to regulate and improve a *Man's own Actions*; to do good to *Mankind*; to be grateful and dutiful to the *gracious Author of his Being*; and for this to be exalted to a State of *unerring Reason*, and consum-

|| Vid. Epist. 77. Cogita quam diu jam idem facias; somnus, cibus, libido: per hunc circulum curritur.

mate Vertue. 'Tis true, Sensation has but a narrow Compass, its Objects are very few and very gross; and therefore not only come quickly Round, but become duller and duller the oftener they do so. But nothing can bound the noble Range of Reason; and when this is faithfully obey'd, no Satiety ever attends the sweet Applause of a good Conscience; but as the Progress of Reason is Endless, so the Pleasure of Vertue is Immortal.

I shall conclude this Chapter with the Authority of a * Person, who is very much esteem'd by the Gentlemen who are chiefly concern'd in this matter.

The Opinion which makes so little of Life is ridiculous; for 'tis our Being, 'tis all we have; Things of a nobler and more elevated Being, may indeed accuse this of ours; but it is against Nature to contemn and make little account of our selves, 'tis a Disease particular to Man, and not discern'd in any other Creature, to hate and despise it self.

* Montaign's Essays, Book 2. Chap. 3.

C H A P. V.

Who they are chiefly that maintain this Act to be Lawful : The Stoicks, the Authors of BIADEVOT® ; method propos'd : Some general Objections consider'd, which are brought against Self-preservation, as confest to be a Law of Nature,

HAVING thus laid down those natural Principles, from which Self-murder may be prov'd unlawful, from the Right which God hath reserv'd to himself over humane Life ; from the End or Design for which Man received it ; and this too, whether he be consider'd as in the State of Nature, or as a Member of Civil Society. Having also shew'd the Rise and Extent of the Principle of Self-preservation, and in what respects humane Life may be justly valued, or despised ; I come now to Enquire who those are which embrace the contrary Opinion, and have held and maintain'd Self-murder to be Lawful.

Among the Ancients, the Stoicks were the most considerable ; yet they recommended it to the World more by the *Austere* Practice of some popular *Vertues*, than by any *solid Arguments*, or indeed any remarkable

markable Attempts to prove it *Lawful*: Yet what they have offer'd * shall be considered at large, and compar'd with their other Principles.

This has been pretended to more particularly by † a Gentleman of our own Country, with much shew of Learning and Reason, in a Treatise intitl'd, *Blaſphemy*. Which, by the great Character of the Author, rais'd afterwards upon better Grounds, by the Agreeableness of the Argument to the present Age, and by its having passed some Years unanswer'd (as far as I can understand) has been highly esteem'd by *some People*.

There are some few more, both Ancient and Modern, that have scatter'd among their Writings something upon the same subject, whom I shall refer to upon Occasion. But 'tis *with these* I shall be most concern'd, and *chiefly with the latter*; not that I pretend a *particular* Answer to every Thing which he has said, they who peruse that Treatise will find that this is not necessary; I shall *only chuse out* such Arguments as *being drawn from natural Principles*, any ways oppose what I have laid

* See Chap. 10.

† Dr. Dornio, afterwards Dean of Paul's,

down, or seem otherwise to have *most weight in them*: According to the Method which I have already observ'd, I shall draw up the most considerable Objections which I have met withal, I mean in the Author above mention'd particularly under these Heads.

1. Such as are made against *Self-preservation*, as *confess'd* to be a *Law of Nature*, in general.

2. Such as are brought *against it*, with relation to *God's Propriety* of Humane Life; and, either *deny* this Propriety, or else *allowing* it, suppose that Man may kill himself Lawfully, by God's *Dispensation*, *Dismission*, *Call*, or *Summons*.

3. Such as suppose *another end* of humane Life, instead of that above-mentioned, which they affirm *may cease*: And when it does so, that the Obligation of Self-preservation *may cease also*.

4. Such as relate to what has been said concerning Man, as a *Member of Civil Society*.

1. As to such Objections as are made against Self-preservation in general. † He tells us in the first Place, That *though*

* See Chap. 6, 7, 8.

† Dr. Donne's *Bia D.* p. 44. Edit. Lond. 1648.

Self-preservation is of natural Law, yet that natural Law is so general, that it extends to Beasts more than to Us; because they cannot compare Degrees of Obligation, and Distinctions of Duties and Offices, as we can.

Here in the first Place 'tis observable, that we have it acknowledged, That Self-preservation is a *Law of Nature*. The same is also confessed by the Stoicks, as we observ'd before. That this *Law extends to Beasts as well as to us, is true*; so does it to Creatures inferior to them; that they observe it *better* than we do, is *also true*: But that they *are more* obliged to observe it than we are, which I suppose is meant by its' extending to Beasts more than to us, is a *great Mistake*. The Law indeed is general, but the Obligation to observe it, is more or less, according to the *Rank* which each Creature bears in the Creation, and according as it is *qualified* to obey it: Wherefore since the end of humane Life is *to follow Reason by Virtue*; since by the same Power of Reason, Man is furnished with better means to preserve *his* Life to this *great End*; he must be *more obliged* to the Observation of this Law, than other inferior Creatures. And where the Law is plain, and *acknowledged* on all sides, as that of Self-preservation is here. As there

there can be no occasion for *comparing of Degrees of Obligation*, or of any *Distinctions of Offices and Duties*; so the making Use of these, proves always prejudicial to the Law: For when Men are thus shewing *their Parts*, they generally distinguish away *their Duty*. This also is the Argument of a prejudic'd and partial Temper; For in these Cases the Law is first broken; (*at least in Intention*) and then People raise up a Number of little Niceties and Distinctions, to escape in the Dust of them; As if Reason were given them to evade Obedience to Laws, though never so much acknowledged, and not to promote it. This it was necessary to observe, because what this Learned Author says here, is to make way for all that he says afterwards. And thus he goes on.

* *Self-Preservation does not illimitedly, rigorously, and urgently bind; but that by the Law of Nature itself, Things may, yea must, neglect themselves for others.*

|| *Rectified Reason only belonging to us, instructs us often to prefer publick and necessary Persons, by exposing our selves to inevitable Destruction; from which he concludes † That*

* Ib. p. 46. || p. 47. † p. 56.

Self-preservation is not so of particular a Law of Nature, but that it is often transgress'd Naturally.

This is attempted to be proved again, by comparing *Deserting* and *Destroying* one's self, and by showing, that they are *the same Thing*: After which he would have it; that * *Deserting one's self is Lawful in many Respects. As when a Man puts himself upon a Jury: Or when a Man may chuse to repel Force by Force: When he attends an Executioner: When he practises consuming Penances; || Or, When he stands mute at the Bar. † This latter Case, says he, seems to be justified by Church and State; and that for so low a Respect, as the saving of a Temporal Estate, or escaping the Ignominy of another Death.*

These Instances are of divers Kinds, and may be thus divided :

1. Into such as relate directly to Civil Society, which shall be consider'd hereafter.

2. Such as concern Religion ; as that a *Man may desert himself by consuming Penances.* Which is not true, if consuming to such a Degree as to destroy Life; but this does not belong to the Argument in hand.

* This he calls his chief Strength, p. 116. † p. 131.

† p. 24.

3. As for those others which remain, it cannot be proved from any of them, that *Desertion of one's self is Lawful*, or that Self-preservation may be transgress'd Naturally upon this account. For Example; whereas it is said, *That a Man may choose to repel Force with Force in the State of Nature*; this is by no means so, when Life is apparently in danger; or *that a Man deserts himself by attending an Executioner*; this cannot be, because he has forfeited his Life to the Publick, and that too by his own Consent, if he has taken his Tryal. Nor does he desert his Life who puts himself upon a Jury; but on the contrary, endeavours to preserve it, by the Privilege which that Ancient and Excellent Law allows him. Some have also brought Instances of *Soldiers and Seamen, as seeking Death lawfully*; or as hastening their Deaths upon lawful Motives; and therefore without any Breach of this Law of Self-preservation. But nothing can be more weak than this: Ask the Soldier, or the Sea-man, whether they seek Death, or no; and they will confess that, on the contrary, *they seek a Livelihood*: If not, why do the bravest of them oppose those who would bring them Death so vigorously?

But

But to shew the unreasonableness of such Pretences, *I will propose a Case much stronger* than any of these; in which, notwithstanding the Law of Self-preservation shall not be infringed, but most strictly observ'd. *Upon a Shipwreck*, many Leagues from any Land, ten Persons get into the Long-boat, who being driven backwards and forwards for many Days, and their Provision all spent; agree to cast Lots who shall be first eaten, and continue to do so, till but two are left; Was this Lawful? Yes certainly; Is not this then a *plain Breach of the Law* of Self-preservation so often mention'd? *Not at all; but rather the Observing it in the best manner:* Because if this Course had not been taken, there would have been *certain Death to them all* in a few Hours, either by Famine, or by Killing one another. In this Case, it was lawful for them not only to put their Lives upon the *Hazard* of Ten to One, but upon *equal Hazard*, as the Two last must do. Because a *Hazard of Death upon the hardest Terms*, is better than a *Certainty of it*. All this then being done, as the *using the best, the only way to preserve Life*, and consequently in each Man's *own Defence*, can be no *Breach of the Law of Self-preservation*; the same Account may be

be given of several other pretended Instances of *Desertion* of one's self. They first suppose some Case in which Man is brought into *great Hazard* of Life; but this *Hazard* they conceal, or pass over slightly: And then if he incur any danger in order to preserve it; they call *this Desertion* of one's self, and transgressing the Law of Self-preservation; Whereas the doing so, is the most faithful and diligent Observation of it that can be possibly.

As for the other *Instance of Desertion*; When any Person accused stands mute at the Bar, which is said to be *allowed by our Church and State*, and therefore brought to prove the *Reasonableness* of Destroying one's self: First, this is *truly* deserting of a Man's self; so far he is in the Right, because 'tis the refusing the means of avoiding Condemnation, or of obtaining Mercy afterwards, and running voluntarily into a *more painful* Death, than any which he can fear. But then secondly to say, That *this is justified by our Church and State* is very strange; because the Person who is thus obstinate, is condemned to suffer the greatest Punishment for this very Crime of being so.

'Tis the excellency of the Laws of *England*, above those of other Nations, that as they have the greatest *tenderness* in the Case

case of *Life*, so they have the greatest care in the case of *Propriety*. Now whereas some Men *may not* value their own Lives *so much* as their *Childrens welfare*; and whereas the *publick Good* is above all *private Considerations*: It has been thought fit by our prudent Ancestors, to deter such Persons from great Crimes, not only by the *forfeiture of their Lives*, but also by the *forfeiture of their Estates*: But then again to shew the regard which they had to *Propriety*, these could not be forfeited without *Conviction*, and *Conviction* could not be without *Pleading*, wherefore to *make them plead* a more dreadful Death(* as the Name imports; if duly put in Execution) than any which the Law requires if they should be found guilty upon *Pleading*, is threatned for their *Obstinacy*; so that the Law does not leave it to a Mans choice; thus, If you will stand Mute, and will be prest to Death, you shall save your Estate; the Estate is not under any Consideration as to the intent of the Law in this Case, but the *obstinacy of refusing to Plead*, which being punished so dreadfully, nothing can be greater detraction, than to say, That the *deserting of ones self in this manner*, is

* Peine forte & Dure.

not only *allowed* but *justified* in this Nation. These general and mixt Objections belonging to Man partly as in the state of Nature, and partly as a Member of Civil Society, not knowing how to rank under any particular Head, I thought it most convenient to bring in here, and perhaps they may not be altogether unserviceable to the illustrating of that which is to follow.

C H A P. VI.

Such Objections consider'd, as are against the Law of Self-preservation, with particular Relation to what has been said concerning God's Propriety of Humane Life; and which either directly deny this Propriety, or else allowing it; pretend that a Man may notwithstanding this kill himself lawfully, by God's Dispensation, Dismission, Call, or Summons.

WE come next to consider such Arguments as contradict the *Propriety which God has of Humane Life*: This is opposed very little *directly*, as being too manifest; yet as it is one of the chief things upon which the Controversie depends; many offers have been made to evade it.

Thus

Thus 'tis said, † that *though no body is properly Lord of his Life, though we have not Dominion we have Usurpation, and it is lawful for us to lose that when we will.* But how lose it? not sure *by destroying the thing it self; a Man may surrender any thing to the right Owner, which is lent him, and, provided it be in good Condition, be no longer accountable for it; but Self-killing is destroying Life, and destroying is certainly a very strange way of surrendering.* || Suppose a Man of Quality should lend a considerable Sum of Money to one of his Servants to whom he took a fancy, which might turn if he wou'd to his certain and very great advantage; and this Fellow should run to a Gaming-House and play it away immediately, and his Lord should expostulate with him for doing so; would it not be a very odd answer for him to say, that though he had not the *Dominium* of the Money, yet he had the *Usurpation* of it, and it was lawful for him to lose that when he would. The Application is easie.

Again he says, * *If the reason why we may not kill our selves be because we are not Lords of our own Lives, but only God: Then the State*

† *Blad.* pag. 112.

|| *Ibid.*

* see Chap. 4.

cannot take away our Life, for that is no more Lord of our Life than we are. The State is not Lord of any Mans Life, by any full Dominion over it, but *accidentally*: When the *publick Life*, the being of the Government is concerned: And then it has such a Power over each Corrupted and Disobedient Subject, as each Man has over any Corrupted Limb, and may cut it off for the Preservation of the rest, before the Contagion reaches *the Vitals* of the State: And this Power in both Cases is derived from God, who though he *reserves* to himself the *full Propriety* of Life, yet he must be suppos'd to allow Man the *means necessary to preserve Life*: Which sometimes cannot possibly be done otherwise, either in Natural or Political Bodies than by Amputation.

The next Argument is somewhat Obscure, 'tis in these Words, † *If in this Case there were any Injury done to the State, then certainly it were in the Power of the State to License a Man to do it; for this in the State were but Cedere in Re Sua, which any Man may lawfully do.*

Here two things are suppos'd if I am not mistaken.

† lb. p. 113.

1. That there can be no Injury committed, unless against Propriety; and therefore if the State has no Propriety of Man's Life, it can be no Injury to it for a Man to destroy his Life. This is not so; 'tis injurious to hinder or prevent the *use* of a thing as well as to destroy the *Propriety* of it. The State has the use of each Man's Life: The performing the End for which Life was given to every Man is of great advantage to the Publick, and to hinder it of this Advantage, or of this Use, to deprive it of it for ever is an Injury to it. Or else,

2. It is suppos'd that the Publick has a Propriety of each Man's Life, that in right of this it may give leave to any Person to kill himself, and then the doing so cannot be injurious to it; but this is also a mistake: For the Publick has no Propriety of any particular *Innocent Man's Life*: No Lawful Power over it, unless it be to defend it: Therefore for the Publick to give any Man licence to *destroy* himself; wou'd be to usurp God's Power; to grant more than it has it self;† and also to *contradict the very End* for which it has any Power at all; the great design of all Society, name-

† See more to this purpose Chap. 8.

ly the Security and Preservation of each particular Man's Life.

There is another Argument that I have * seen to this purpose. *He that has Power over his own Liberty, has Power over his own Life ; a Man has Power to sell himself for a Slave.*

1. There is a *great difference* between *Liberty* and *Life*, therefore it does not follow, that if a Man has power over the *one* he has the same over the *other* : *Liberty* is but a *Condition of Life*, a very desirable one indeed, yet not to be preferred *before Life* it self, because the *end* for which *Life* is given, may be pursued amidst the *greatest Slavery*, and no *Liberty* of the *Body* can be of equal value with the noble and unbounded *Liberty* of the *Mind*.

2. No Man can part *voluntarily* with his *Liberty*, unless for *want of Sustenance*, in extreme *Necessity*, that is in order to *preserve Life*, and then this is rather a *Duty* than a *Privilege* ; he is *bound to do so* to *preserve Life*, even at the *Pain*, the *Shame*, the *Misery of Servitude* : And if so, how can it be ever reasonably concluded, that because a Man *must* part with his *Liberty*

* Apud Balth. Gomes, de potest. in seipsum, lib. 1. cap. 3. §. 4.

to *preserve his Life*, therefore he has a *right to throw that Life away?*

Another Argument perhaps may be raised from the Celebrated Story of the two generous Friends *Damon* and *Pythias*, to this purpose. *No Man can lawfully give the security of his own Life for another Mans appearance at a certain Day, unless he has a full Propriety of his Life.* One of the two above-mentioned gave this Security for the other: And this seems to have been approved of in Ancient times, as the most Learned **Grotius* observes; but then 'tis absolutely *condemned* afterwards by him! For though this Security might have been accepted in a few Places, yet it was not so long, nor is any where at this Day; and for this Reason, because it cou'd not be lawfully given, nor reasonably taken when forfeited, nor can any Rule of strictest Friendship require a Man in the State of Nature to die *positively* for his Friend. This I mention the rather, because it is one of the Reasons the † *Stoicks* assign for the lawfulness of Self-murder: *Hazard his Life* he may in some Cases for him, as other things may be *hazarded*, of which we have

* De Jure. B. & P. l. 2. c. 21. Sect. 11.

† Vid. Diog. Laert. in Zenon.

the use only ; but destroy it positively he cannot ; because he has no absolute Propriety of it.

Lastly 'tis said, * *As I do not offend the Laws provided against Thieves, when I embezel my own Money, and cut my own Purse; nor that against Incendiaries if I burn my own Woods : So am not I under the Law of those made against Murderers for having depriv'd my self of my own Life.* Not to insist that such Actions as these are Signs of Folly or Madness, and therefore that such Persons Estates may be begg'd, or that they ought to be with-held by force from doing thus : No Man can possess his Life in such a fulness of Propriety as he may his Estate, as has been shewn || above ; the absolute Propriety of Humane Life is in God, and this Propriety is as much injur'd by a Man's destroying his own Life as another Persons.

Man as to his Life is only in the Nature of an *Usufructuary*, who has no lawful Power to *impair* the Estate he possesses, much less to *alienate* or *destroy* it. And this is one Reason why all Intemperance either of Passion or Appetite is Unlawful ; because this impairs the Faculties of the

Mind or Body; this is *committing* waste upon the Estate; How much more then must it be unlawful to *destroy* it wholly and *irrecoverably* by Self-Murther.

I cannot call to mind any other Arguments which have been brought *directly* against God's *having the Propriety* or absolute Dominion of Humane Life; 'tis more usual to *allow* it to be so in a general way, and then run to *distinctions*, pretend that God himself doth *dispen*ce with this Right, that he often *dismisses* People from their attendance upon Life, and *summons* and *calls* 'em to him. In which Cases, say they, *Self-murther* being not only permitted but requir'd, must be lawful. This the Stoicks signified by their * *reasonable Exit*: The Door being open, and their encouraging People to walk out: Kill themselves accordingly.

The same distinctions the Author of *Biathanatos* makes use of. As to *Dispensation* that Learned Gentleman grounds it upon this, † that *no Law can be squared for all Events*. *A thing*, says he, *which universally consider'd may be in it self profitable or honest, may by reason of some Event become dis-*

* εὐλογῶ ἐξαγωγή. ἢ δύναμις ἡτοιμασμένη εὐλόγως τε φασιν ὅτι σφὸν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν, &c. Diog. in Laert. Zen. See Plotinus, πρὶ Εὐλ. Εξ. Arian. in Epict. τερψισ. † p. 48.
honest

honest or hurtful, neither of which can fall within the reach, or under the command of any Law; in which Cases a Man may be the Bishop or Magistrate to himself, without an express Dispensation from God.

* When I may justly part with Life it is by Summons from God, and cannot then be imputed to any Corruption of my Will, *Velle non creditur qui obsequitur imperio*, yet I expect not a particular Inspiration or new Commission, &c.

To † Josephus's Argument, the same with Plato's || above mention'd, That a Servant which runs from his Master, though never so severe, is punished by Law, how much more if (by Self-murder) he runs away from so indulgent a Master as God: He replies, * That the Servant runs not from his Master but to him in this case, and at his Call obeys his Voice. Again, † This is not to usurp upon God's Authority, or to deal with another's Servant; if I become his Servant, his Delegate, and his Commissioner in doing this, when he can be no other way so much glorified.

|| If they say God concurs to no Evil: We say, nothing is so evil but that it becomes good if God command it, and that this (viz. Self-mur-

* Biath. p. 108. † Jos. de bel. Jud. Lib. 3. || Chap. 2. p. 21. * p. 110. † p. 112. || p. 145.

ther) is not so naturally evil, that it requires a special Commission from God, but as it becomes good if he commands it, so it becomes indifferent if he remove the Reasons with which the Precept against it is Conditioned.

There is one Passage in Cicero to the same purpose, † Cato went out of Life as one that was glad of the opportunity, for the God who rules within us forbids our departure hence without his Command; but when that God himself gives just Cause, as he did to Socrates, Cato and many others. A wise Man will certainly be glad to depart out of this State of Darkness into that of Light: Not that he may break Prison for that the Laws forbid, but walk out of it being called, and dismiss'd by God as by some lawful Magistrate.

The summ of all which is to this purpose.

1. That though it be true that God has the Absolute Propriety of Humane Life, in which Regard indeed Man cannot lawfully destroy it: Yet if God dispences with this Right of Propriety, and calls or summons him out of Life, he may depart lawfully (viz. by Self-Murther)

2. That there is no need of Particular Commission, or Extraordinary Manifestation of

† Liber i. Tuscul. Quæst.

God's Will to this purpose, but only of his removing those Reasons upon which the Obligation of preserving Life was founded.

This is that which the *Stoicks* scatter up and down their Writings to reconcile this Act with *Submission to Providence*, which they diligently maintain, and which is Collected and Improv'd by our Author in the several Places above mentioned. Before I Answer this particularly, I desire the Reader wou'd take Notice,

1. That whatever is said in any of these Places concerning the *removing the Reasons*, or the *ceasing of that End* for which Life was given, shall be debated more particularly in the next Chapter, and but just touched upon here, as not being wholly to be avoided.

2. As to what is insinuated here concerning *God's Glory*, though this does not fall under the present Argument, yet that this is always best promoted by *observing of his Laws*; that there can be no *Case* imagined, nor is there any pretended, but only glanc'd at by this Author artificially in general terms: Wherein a Man can be *irresistably forc'd to forsake his Reason and his Virtue*, and so detract from *God's Glory*: Or where, in it will *not be more for his Glory to suffer*
Death

Death from others, than from himself. But of this more perhaps hereafter.

This being premised I shall in Answer to what is said above shew these three things:

I. *That according to the Account which this Learned Gentleman gives of Dispensation, and according to the Nature of the Law of Self-preservation, there can be no need at any time of such Dispensation for this Law.*

II. *That in a Case of this Nature wherein Propriety of the greatest Importance is concern'd: Where an Error can never be recover'd; and where it is confessed, that there is a Law to secure it; no Dispensation can be sufficient but what comes from the Proprietor, the Law-giver himself; and which must evidently and undeniably appear that it did so, by some plain and positive Manifestation of his Will.*

III. *That no such natural Manifestation of God's Will is or can be assign'd, whereby Man may be fully assured that he is dismissed, call'd or summon'd by God from Life.*

As to the first, it is observable that Self-preservation is allowed to be Law of Nature: And yet affirmed that it may be dispensed

dispensed withal upon this account: † *That a thing which is universally Profitable or Honest, may by reason of some particular Event, become Dishonest or Hurtful; and when it does so, the Reason (or End) which is the Soul and Form of the Law ceases.* This can never have place in any Law of Nature, particularly *Self-preservation* grounded upon God's Propriety, and the End of Humane Life already mention'd; because as there can be no time wherein it can be *dishonest* or *hurtful* (if we mean *morally* so) to avoid doing wrong to God, to the Publick, and to our selves; so there can be no time wherein it can be destructive or hurtful (in the sense aforesaid) *to follow Reason by Virtue*; there can be no Event, I say, wherein it will not be a Man's Duty, and wherein it will not be in his Power to act thus, and therefore it can never be *necessary* that *this Law* should be *dispensed* withal.

Besides, the Word Law is *too general* as us'd here; the Law which we are speaking of is Law of Nature, and confess'd to be so; there may be Dispensations from Obedience to Humane Laws, which are limited to particular Actions, and which through the weakness of Humane Prudence cannot be fitted exactly to all Events; but then 'tis *observable*, that all such
Dif-

Dispensations are *supplemental* rather than *destructive* to that Law concern'd, tending more effectually to the same end which that Law did, *assisting* and *promoting* it in a better manner, which end is always the *Preservation* of Mankind, of each particular Person, as far as is consistent with the whole, and *not the Destruction* of any one.

If it be said, *That the very End of Life which I have assign'd is inconsistent often with this Law of Self-preservation, and destructive of God's Propriety, it frequently happening that Men endanger their Lives, - nay certainly incur Death, the more strictly and faithfully that they follow Reason by Virtue, and therefore that there must be some sort of Dispensation as to the observing of this End.*

I. To this I Answer, There is no necessity of this. That which I suppose to be the *end of Humane Life* is so excellently fitted to the Nature of Man, that it not only promotes *his happiness, his well-being*, but certainly contributes to the *prolongation of his Being* at the same time; *the following of Reason by Virtue*, including the regulating of Mens Passions and Appetites, making 'em *Temperate and Peaceful, Just and Beneficent, &c.* All which, if *Duly observed*, by
any

any number of Men, wou'd certainly *prolong Life*, as well as *Happiness*: Wherefore if Life becomes in danger upon this Account, and good Men suffer Death for the sake of their *Virtue*; this is *accidental*, not through any *natural defect in that end of Life*, nor because it *contradicts Self-preservation*, and is *destructive to God's right over it*; but through the fault of *unreasonable Men*, who will not act by the *same Rule*, but make the *indulging of their Appetites and Passions to be the only end of their Lives*; and therefore have no sense of Justice or Goodness towards others.

2. When Men suffer Death upon the account of *Virtue*, this does not prove any Dispensation *needful* as to Self-preservation, as though they brought their own Deaths upon themselves; they *wou'd live* if they *might be permitted*; but they *wou'd not forfeit their Reason and their Virtue to preserve Life*, because these were the things for whose sake alone Life was bestow'd; and the observing of which is the *most proper way which God design'd by Nature to preserve Life by*, and if it is not preserv'd accordingly, 'tis through the Crimes of such as invade it, not any of their own.

BUT

But supposing that a Dispensation might be reasonable in some particular Case; yet,

II. *When Propriety of the greatest Importance is concern'd; where the Law that secures it is confess'd and acknowledg'd; where a mistake may be easily committed, and yet can never be recover'd; no Dispensation can be sufficient but such as comes from the Proprietor; the Law-giver himself; and which evidently appears by some plain and positive Manifestation of his Will to do so.*

Propriety is of so nice and tender a Nature, that when it is to be made over; all the care imaginable is us'd, that the doing so may appear plainly and undeniably to be Voluntary; therefore not only several outward Actions, but also several Witnesses of those Actions are requir'd upon such Occasions. Now if this be so where things of *very little Importance* are concern'd, how much more reasonable must this Caution be where *God himself is the Proprietor*; so good, so gracious, so just, so powerful a Being! and where *Humane Life* is the thing in Question; in which so many Persons may be concern'd, and which may be of such *unspeakable value to him* that has it; if the end of it were *faithfully observ'd*; for

F

what

what can make Man more *Happy*, or more *Glorious*? What can exalt him higher above the rest of the Creation, or nearer to the Divine Nature, than the continual discovery of *Eternal Truth*, and the *regulating* of his Passions and Desires accordingly, than the *improving* of others by *Example* and *Information*, and being the *Help* and *Pleasure* of a great part of Mankind. Life is the opportunity of being all this; shall that then be rashly thrown away by *Self-murder*? Especially since Mistakes in other matters may be recover'd again, at least some *amends* be made for them; but here the Errour is *Irrecoverable*; the Offender is incapable of making any Satisfaction: Wherefore who that considers this can suppose, that 'tis sufficient for any Man to * think that he may *despence with himself*, or to *fantie* that God has *constituted him his Officer or Commissioner*. How does this appear? Produce the Warrant, prove the Commission by undeniable Authority, and then, but not otherwise, then let it be obey'd.

Nor is it sufficient to say in this Case, That although it shou'd be an Error to kill ones self upon such an Opinion, yet this is

* Biath. p. 43. Ib. p. 112.

such an Errour as may proceed from a good Conscience; because where the Propriety is doubtful, and yet the thing in Question *actually alienated*, it can be *no good Plea* to say, that this was done with *Integrity*: *No Mistake* can be excusable where there is *no Authority to venture*; and yet in this Case the *Propriety* is not *doubtful*, but *acknowledg'd to be Gods*; and in the *Act of Self-Murther* the same *Propriety* is not only *alienated* but *destroy'd*; and therefore there can be no just Plea for the Lawfulness of so doing, but the plain and expresse Manifestation of God's Will, and this can be had no other way than by evident Revelation; because *no Warrant*, but such as is *above Nature*, can be sufficient to *despence with Law of Nature*.

If it be said that *Natural Events* are the Manifestations of God's Will, that when such Events as *loss of Liberty* or *Senses*, *Incurable Pain*, *Poverty* or *Disgrace*, come upon a Man; any * one of these is a sufficient proof that God dismisses, calls or summons that Man from Life. This brings me to the next thing I propos'd to shew.

* So the Stoicks taught always. Diog. Laert. ut Sup. p. 195. & Lips. Manuduct. ad Stoic. Phil. lib. 3. Dissert. 22. 23. & Olympiodor.

III. That *no Natural Event is such a Manifestation of God's Will, whereby any Man can be assur'd that he is called, dismissed or summon'd from Life; or that God has chosen him himself for his Commissioner or Officer to destroy it.*

There is no Event indeed, but is a *Manifestation of God's Will*. The worst Events are so, as much as the best; but to what end are they so? that we should bear them with Patience and Humility, if not be avoided by lawful means, not that we should decline them, refuse 'em, or run away from them, by any means though never so unlawful.

And since the Manifestation of God's Will against a known Law of Nature must be clear and distinct, as has been shown; how can it be demonstrated to be so from any of the Events above mention'd? the great difficulty, or rather the impossibility of this will appear if we consider the following Reasons.

I. That many Thousand Persons have suffer'd under the same Events, and withal to such a degree, as to be very willing, very desirous to die; and yet few of these have ever thought, and none of them have been ever fully satisfy'd that these were any
signs

signs of God's dismissing, summoning, or calling them from Life: How then can any one particular Person *be assured* that they are so to *him*? Or why should *he* suppose, that *he alone* can discern farther into the Will of God against a *Confest and Establisb'd Law*, by any *occasional and natural Event*, than so many Persons (many of which may be reasonably allow'd to be greater and wiser than himself) cou'd do, by the *very same*: Especially since,

2. These *very Events*, upon which he grounds his Authority, have been frequently *chang'd* in a *short time*, and such as are directly *contrary*, as sound Health, great Riches and Honour, been long enjoyed by the *same Persons*; all which had been lost if they should have thought fitting to have Murthered themselves.

3. That which is *naturally unlawful* or evil in it self, (as Self-murder is in regard of God's Propriety, &c.) can never be supposed to become *Lawful* upon the account of any *Event* whatsoever that is *Natural*: Now all Pain, Poverty, &c. has its natural Causes, and consequently cannot be a sufficient Dispensation to destroy Life.

4. Furthermore, as to the *end of Humane Life*, no such Events as we have been speaking of can be look'd upon as *Dispensations*

sations from the pursuing of *this end*; because this is *naturally* farther'd by *these* very Events; and the greatest Calamities have been the *occasion* of waking *Reason*, and making the Soul exert it self in several *Virtues*, which otherwise it could not have practised. There is a kind of *deformity* in Storms and Tempests, and Winter comes in unpleasantly after the Warmth and Fruitfulness of the other Seasons; yet these are as *necessary to the World*, as *they* were, to Purge the Air, to destroy hurtful Weeds and Insects, and to dispose the Earth to Answer the returning Spring: Something of the *same kind* is full as *necessary to humane Nature*, to set the Soul in Motion, after the foultry Calms of Ease and Luxury; * A great Mind improves upon opposition, it *Sparkles* and *Rejoyces* under those Calamities which wou'd *oppress* others, and flames out to the World in *brighter Glory*. Wherefore to suppose that *such Events* as we have been speaking of, are *Dispensations* or *Dismissions from Life*, is to say, either that there are *no such Virtues* as *Constancy*, *Patience*, and *Fidelity*; and that God *dispenses* with us as to the *practising any*

such Duties at all: or else that he does so when we have the greatest occasion for them, when they are nearest to their highest Perfection, and may be practis'd most Gloriously.

5. But after all, the *very Being alive*; though under the worst Events that can possibly be imagin'd, is a direct *Contradiction* to any such *Call, Summons or Dispensation*, as above-mention'd: Because as our Lives were first *from God*; † so the *continuation of them* depends wholly upon him: No Man cou'd *preserve* himself one Moment without the *Concurrence* of his Providence, if he thought fitting to withdraw that *Concurrence*, there wou'd need *no other* manifestation of his *Will*; because *Life* wou'd cease immediately. Wherefore while there *is Life*, there is no room to suppose that *God gives leave* to any Man to *kill himself*; because I say, his *Being at all is nothing but the Effect of Gods Will*, and therefore while *he is*; 'tis absurd to suppose that *God Will's that he should not be*.

These Reasons I hope may be sufficient to show that no Man can have any *assurance* from any *Natural Event*, that *God does resign his Propriety of humane Life*, or

† See Chap. the 1st. pag. 6.

Call, or Summon any Man out of the World by *Self-murder*; and the *importance* of the thing in Question; the *impossibility* of recovering the *Mistake*; the great *Injustice* towards God and Man; and the sad *Consequences* that *may, nay must follow*; ought to awaken Men upon this occasion, while they have any *Reason* left, and make 'em weigh every Motive *exactly* and *impartially*: Especially since it may so *justly* be fear'd in these Cases, that every Man's *Reigning Passion*, his *Fear*, his *Pride*, his *Impatience*, &c. may be his *God*; and the *rash impulses* of these be taken for *Divine Suggestions*, *Calls* or *Dispensations*, as it has often happen'd even to such as have been great Men, in the decay of their Strength and Reason. * *Zeno*, the Father of the *Stoicks*, living to a very great Age, happen'd one day to stumble and hurt his Finger, whereupon he cry'd out to this purpose, *I acknowledge your Summons, O ye Gods, and I obey*; and immediately went home and hang'd himself. If those Events which Melancholly Men take for *God's Calls* or *Dispensations* were examin'd, they wou'd seldom be found to be *more reasonable than this*.

C H A P. VII.

Other Objections Answer'd, by which they wou'd introduce another end of Humane Life, as the measure of Self-preservation, instead of that above mention'd; and then supposing that this End does cease, whenever a Man's Reason tells him that it does so, wou'd from hence inferr, that his Obligation to preserve Life does cease also.

FROM *Exceptions, Limitations, and Dispensations* of this Law, they come at last to tell us *directly*, that there are some Cases in which it *wholly ceases*; and then a Man becomes *Master and Disposer of himself*.

* *No Law is so Primary and Simple, but that it fore-imagines a Reason upon which it was founded; and scarce any Reason so constant, but that Circumstances may alter it; in which Case a private Man is Emperour of himself, sui juris. And he whose Conscience is well temper'd and dispassion'd assures him, that the Reason of Self-Preservation ceases in him, may also presume, that the Law*

* Biath, p. 47.

ceases too, and may do that then which otherwise were against the Law.

Self-preservation which we confess to be the foundation of general natural Law, is no other thing than a natural Affection and Appetition of Good, whether true or seeming. —

Now since this Law of Self-preservation is accomplish'd in attaining that which conduces to our Ends, and is (i. e. seems) good to us. —

If I propose to myself in this Self-homicide, a greater Good, though I mistake it; I perceive not wherein I transgress the general Law of Nature, which is an Affection of Good, True or Seeming; and if that which I affect by Death be truly a greater Good, wherein is the other stricter Law of Nature, which is rectified Reason, violated?

I will first give a short Answer to every one of these Propositions in the terms here made of use; and in the same order that they lie; afterwards I will represent the strength of the Argument according to the best of my Judgment in other terms; such as seem to me more clear and plain, such as I have met withal in other Authors or Discourse; and then endeavour to answer it more fully.

1. The Reason upon which the Law of Self,

Self-preservation is founded, * has been shown to be twofold; 1. The preserving of *God's Propriety* of every Man's Life, and that 2. with regard to *the End* for which Life was given. This Reason is so *Constant*, that *no Circumstances whatever*, unless a *plain and undeniable Manifestation of God's Will*, can ever alter it.

2. Conscience, which is the *last Judgment of upright Reason*, as it considers *humane Actions* in the *State of Nature*, must be guided by what is allow'd to be the *Law of Nature*, which *Self-preservation* is allow'd to be; where there is *no Law*, Reason may *Act alone*, but where there is 'tis bound to obey it; and its doing so proves *Conscience* to be *well temper'd*, and *dispassion'd*; but it may justly be doubted whether 'tis really so or no, when it *looks out* for a Reason for the ceasing of a *confest Law*.

Moreover 'tis *impossible* that an *upright Conscience*, which acknowledges that the Reason of this Law is, the *preserving of God's Propriety* of humane Life, to the *end* above mention'd, can ever assure any Man that *such an end* is really ceased; as has been shown at large in the last Chapter.

* Chap. 4. p. 39.

Wherefore this *Learned Gentleman*, being sensible of this: Proposes *another end of this Law*, such as is very convenient indeed for his purpose, and may cease whenever any Man thinks fitting; and this is *Good, True, or Seeming*,

3. If *Self-preservation be an Appetition of Good, True or Seeming*; this must be at least of such a sort of good as is or seems proper to preserve Life. If we consider *Self-preservation* alone, without the moral end of it, this cannot be accomplish'd by attaining that which conduces to any other end, or seems good to Man in any other respect, than as it wou'd preserve Life: Wherefore it is impossible for any honest Man of very ordinary Understanding to mistake to such a Degree, as to look upon *Self-murder as such a good*; because this implies a Contradiction, and wou'd make that to be the end of a Law which is the utter destruction of it; for this wou'd be to argue in this manner, *the Law of Self-preservation is accomplish'd in attaining that which seems good to us; Self-homicide (i. e. Self-destruction) may seem good to me, therefore the Law of Self-preservation may be accomplish'd by my Self-destruction.*

4. These

4. These two Words *End* and *Good* are of too large and doubtful a Signification; that which conduces to our ends, and is good to us, does not always accomplish the Law of Self-preservation; that which conduces to the true end of Life, the following of Reason by Virtue, accomplishes indeed the Law of Self-preservation; because it not only improves the Mind, but prolongs Life, and therefore is truly good to us. But there are many other *Ends* of humane Actions, as many as we have Passions and Appetites, which become not only unworthy of our Reason, but destructive of our Life; as well by the manner of our pursuing 'em, as the measure of our enjoying them; and therefore what ever they seem, whatever Shape or Beauty our Passions give them, are so far from being Good, that they are directly certainly Evil; and being so, can never accomplish the Law of Self-preservation.

These things will appear more clear, if in the next place we suppose the Objection above mention'd, to be made in these or the like Words

To follow Nature has been allow'd to be the best rule of humane Actions by the wisest Men of all Sects. 1. To follow Nature, is to seek to be happy. 2. My happiness consists in obtaining that which seems good to me, and avoiding that

that seems evil. 3. I and no other am to be the Judge in this Case; therefore if Life by the want of any Good, in which I place my Happiness, becomes an Evil, and Death seems good to me, I do but follow Nature in killing my self, and the Law of Self-preservation is not transgressed, but gives place or ceases naturally. — For the Answering of this Argument clearly, I will make use of this Method.

1. I will show what is meant by following Nature.

2. In what Happiness or Misery, Good or Evil, as to humane Life, do really consist.

3. The unreasonableness of every particular Man's being left to himself to follow what seems Good or Evil to his private Judgment, and to dispose of Life accordingly.

1. What is meant by following Nature? Though some Account of this Maxim has been * already given, yet being very much in request at present, and the Mistakes concerning it the occasion of other Crimes as well as this of *Self-murder*, it commonly happening that they who talk loudest of *Nature* and *Reason* understand

'em least, or act against 'em most; it is requisite to say something farther of it; and if in so doing I should repeat any thing that I have said before, let the Reader think, either that I wou'd save him the trouble of turning back again, or knew not how to express my self better.

The Word *Nature* is sometimes a very general Term, and signifies that Order which the great Creator put the *whole* World to move in; sometimes, in a more limited sence, it signifies that Rule which he gave *each* Creature to follow, for the fulfilling of that *particular End* for which it was made, in proper Harmony and Consent with the Universe; so that the Word *Nature* rises in its signification according to the several Degrees of the Creation; and by following Nature must be meant, the *obeying it according to that particular Power which distinguishes one Creature from another*. This Beasts do by Sensation, this Man shou'd do by Reason: That great, that God-like Faculty which is given us to discern Good and Evil, and to regulate our Passions and Appetites by Virtue accordingly. Wherefore for *Man to follow Nature*, is the very same, with the End of Life, to which Self-preservation

tion is subservient, * as has been shown, namely *the following of Reason by Virtue.*

They who indulge their Passions and Appetites, who live only by Sensation, do not follow Nature as Men, but as Beasts, nay 'tis not near so well with 'em. Sensation in Beasts *preserves them, they obey no Appetite to excess, and therefore to term Intemperance Beastliness is no less than Detraction,* for 'tis really *Manliness, (humane Nature Corrupted)* where Reason enslav'd to Appetite is kept to the vile Drudgery of fetching in more and more of its gross and earthly Object, till Sensation it self sinks down gorg'd and suffocated under it.

Did we follow Nature as *faithfully* as Beasts do, by observing that which is *our chief Faculty*, we shou'd be happy and preserve *our Being*, as carefully and successfully as they do *theirs*; but instead of this we rashly destroy it; or fondly overlay it: And by the *Intemperance* of our *choicest Enjoyments*, act as *foolishly* against *Sensation*, as against *Reason*.

That the wisest Men of all Sects, took this to be the meaning of following Nature,

* See Chap. 2. p. 16. 17.

or living according to it, will appear to any one that consults their Writings of *Morality*; particularly the *Stoicks*. Thus they tell us.

* *That to live according to Nature, is to live according to Man's particular Nature, and the Nature of the Universe, doing nothing which that Common Law, which runs through the whole Creation, Right Reason, forbids: Which Law is the same with Jove, the disposer and manager of all things.*

† *To follow Reason and to follow Nature is one and the same thing to a Rational Creature.*

|| *To live according to Nature is to live according to Virtue, for Nature leads us to this, says Cleanthes.*

This is confirm'd by that Excellent Writer *Philo the Jew*: * *This, says he, (speaking of obeying God) is that end of humane Actions; the living according to Nature, which is so much celebrated by the greatest Philosophers, for this is done when the Mind, entering the path of Virtue, treads in the steps of Right Reason, and follows God, ever mindful of his Commands, ever observing 'em all strictly both in Word and Deed.*

* *Diog. Laer. l. 7. p. 185.* † *Antonin. lib. 7. Sect. 8.*
 || *Diog. Laer. ib.* * *Philo Περὶ ἀσκήσεως.*

Yet perhaps it may be Objected, That this account of *following Nature* is too general, * *some things are natural to the Species, and others to the particular Person*; and therefore when Cicero consulted the Oracle, he had this Answer, FOLLOW YOUR OWN NATURE. He that follows his own Reason in what appears to him Good or Evil, in embracing the first and avoiding the latter, though he may be mistaken, follows his own Nature: Accordingly if he cannot obtain that in which he places his Happiness, and his Life becomes miserable upon this Account, he follows Nature who lays it down.

To this it may be reply'd, That to follow *ones own Nature* cannot be any *Exemption* from what was said before; nor is the Account which has been given there, too general; for as to what relates to the *End of Life*; the *following of Reason by Virtue*, this belongs equally to *humane Nature in General*, forasmuch as all Men are *Rational*. Either then by this is meant, the *same* with the following of humane Nature, which is the Rule by which all Mankind is to Act; or else we must suppose that

* Dr. Donne p. 45. 41. Epist. Sen. Lip. man. ad St. Phil. l. 2. D. 17.

there is a *particular Rule or Law* given to every individual Person, *different* from the rest of the same Species, which he alone is bound to follow: But this would be more unreasonable than if we should say, That every Subject of the Emperour of *China* was not bound by the General Laws of that Country; but that he had a *particular* private Law by which he was bound to Act, and that too often in *direct opposition to the other*.

2. By following *ones own Nature* perhaps was meant the same with Zeno's Maxim, * *ζῆναι ὁμολογῶμενώς*, which I think may be rendred the *living Conformably*, or *Consistently*; i.e. the being the same in Opinion, Humour, Manners, the having ones Life *all of a Piece*, whatsoever comes to pass; which they also call'd † *Decorum*: As if a Man were of an easie and obliging Temper, that he should be the same in Adversity as well as Prosperity, Sicknels and Health, to the meanest poorest Man as to the greatest Potentate. If of a grave austere Way, which was that which they

* Or that *κλῆ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῆ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως*.
Diog. Laer. p. 185.

† *Cicero de Offic. lib. 1.*

chose; he should carry that on through the worst Events, and nothing be able to alter him; the maintaining either of these, or any other particular *Character*, may be call'd the *following of ones own Nature*; but though Men may choose different ways of Behaviour, according to their Fancy or Constitution, yet this must still be grounded upon the former Universal Maxim, the living *according to Nature*, as *Humane* and *Reasonable*; otherwise the *Character*, whatever it was, wou'd be *vicious*, and then 'twou'd be so much the worse to maintain it, and *equally absurd*, whether a Man was always *Affably* or *Surlily* the *same*; if always in the *wrong*; so that this regards only the *outside* the Dress of *Virtue*, the particular Fashion which she is to appear in: Let Men be sure of her first by *following Nature* as *Humane* in general, and then they may give her what appearance they please by *following their own Nature*. This will be further explain'd in the Answer to the next part of the Objection abovemention'd. *

3. By following *ones own Nature*, some

* See more to this purpose, Chap. 11;

will have meant the following *particular Opinion or Humour*; the indulging that *particular Appetite or Passion*, which by *Education, Example or Constitution* has got the ascendant, which brings me to the remaining part of the Objection. *To follow Nature is to seek to be Happy, Happiness consists in obtaining that which seems Good to me, and avoiding that which seems Evil; I and no other must be the Judge of this; wherefore if Life becomes an Evil, and Death a Good to me, by the want of any thing in which I place my Happiness, or by the suffering any thing in which I place my Misery, I do but follow Nature in killing my self, and the Law of Self-preservation is not transgress'd by my doing so, but ceases naturally. This was propos'd to be Answer'd by shewing these two things.*

1. *In what Happiness or Misery, Good or Evil, as to Humane Life, did really consist.*

2. *The unreasonableness of every Man's being left to himself to follow what seems Good or Evil to him, and to dispose of Life accordingly.*

As to the first, *Happiness* truly consists in the observing the *End* of Life, which has been so often mention'd: As this is

* *done* more or less Men are proportionably Happy, as 'tis omitted proportionably Miserable: But in the *common* acceptation of the Word, *Happiness* signifies the enjoyment of a Man's desires *whatever they are*; and for any one to say that he *cannot be happy* without such or such a thing, which is not in his Power; and that the Good or Evil of his *whole Life depends* upon it; signifies nothing but the *vehemence* of that Man's desires; not that there is any *real Happiness* in obtaining it, or *Misery* in failing of it; it proving most commonly *quite contrary*, that the *more* a Man enjoys what he vehemently desires, the *more miserable* he is afterwards; and then † forsooth Life seems an Evil to him, and amidst the Discontent and Vexation which comes upon him at the sense of his Folly, and the just reproof of his Reason. He tells you very Philosophically, *that he does but follow Nature in delivering himself from what is Evil*: When he has been acting *against Nature, against good Sense* (for that is humane Nature) *all the while*;

* See Chap. 2. p. 17.

† Ridiculum est ad mortem currere tadio vitæ, cum genere vitæ, ut currendum esset ad mortem effeceris. Sen. Epist. 24.

and when he has done so, instead of recovering the way which he has lost, and beginning *truly* to follow Nature, he deserts it wholly and irrecoverably, and offers the greatest and most positive Violence to it by *Self-murther*.

But the *Mistakes concerning Happiness or Misery* are grounded upon the *Mistakes concerning Good and Evil*, and therefore 'twill be necessary to take a short view of them.

As Humane Life consists of two parts, the *Soul* and *Body*; so *what is good* must be consider'd in a *twofold* manner, as it relates to the *Soul* or to the *Body*.

1. As it relates to the *Soul*, the *Regulating and Improving of the Mind*; which we suppose to be the End of humane Life: This is usually called *Moral Good*, and the contrary *Moral Evil*. Or else,

2dly. As it relates to the *Body*, the *Health or the Preservation of it*; for which End the several ways of Perception, commonly call'd *Senses*, were ordain'd; by which notice is given to Reason, what is most proper to maintain this Union and preserve *Life*, or what is most likely to destroy it; this is commonly call'd *Sensitive Good*, and the contrary *Sensitive Evil*.

To bring this to the Matter in hand, supposing that Good, True or Seeming were a proper Rule and End of humane Actions: There are but two sorts of Good, as has been shown, *Moral* or *Sensitive*; but through which of these is it, that Self-murder can appear Lawful.

If Moral Good tends not only to the *improvement of the Mind*, but also to the *prolonging of Life*; if nothing is Sensitive Good but that alone which is reported by the Senses to be *proper to preserve Life*, then it must be *absurd to destroy Life* upon the pretence of *either* of these Goods, and to do so *must be Evil*, both as to *Moral Evil*, and *Sensitive also*; and therefore *highly against Nature*.

To this let me add, that the only reason why any thing is *naturally Evil* to the *Body*, is as it contributes to the *separation of it* from the *Soul*, which is done positively and violently by *Self-murder*. *Nature* is the *Course*, the *Order* which God put the *Creature* to move in: To break off that *Course* violently must certainly be against *Nature*, and what is so cannot be *Lawful*.

But here again it may probably be Objected, That if the End of humane Life, as it has been assign'd by me, is the following of Reason by Virtue? Whose Reason must this be?

be? Must not every Man be guided by his own Reason? and consequently will not his Virtue consist in following that which seems Good to him, and avoiding that which seems Evil to him?

This brings me to consider, Lastly,

The unreasonableness of every Man's being left to himself to follow that which seems Good or Evil to him, and to dispose of Life accordingly.

There must be a certain End or Design for which Life was given, as the Rule of humane Actions, otherwise the World wou'd be in Confusion. The several things which the wisest men of Old have offer'd as this End of Life, I have endeavour'd to comprehend under these Words, *THE FOLLOWING REASON BY VIRTUE*: I hope it will not be expected that I should weigh out how much Reason, to a Scruple, will serve to this purpose; because all Men readily assent to such Principles as these, as *self-evident*; That no wrong or injury ought to be done; that a Man has no right to destroy what is not his, especially if it be allow'd him only for his Advantage and Improvement; that whatever destroys humane Society is to be avoided; that whatever contributes to the preserving and improving of the Faculties, which
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are peculiar to Man above other Creatures, ought to be embrac'd. These Principles I suppose are plain to every Rational Creature, and allow'd fit to be observ'd by the Virtues of Justice, Temperance, &c. Or should any Man be suppos'd to be ignorant of any of them in *Lapland* or new *Holland*; yet there is no danger of this in *civiliz'd* Countries, especially *this wherein we Live*; nor are they deny'd by such as are chiefly against us in this Argument, but acknowledg'd and maintain'd by 'em, and pointed out and required to be observ'd by humane Laws: Wherefore if there can be no *ignorance* as to these Fundamental Principles; and if there can be *no want of Power* to observe and practise 'em, to what purpose is it to plead for *particular Reason*, and for the privilege of *Judging for ones self*? A Man cannot *do so safely, without some Rule*, and that Rule must be *universal publick Reason*; and unless every private Man's Reason be squar'd accordingly it can never be right; but if it be squar'd accordingly, then it ought not to be contended for as private Reason.

As Man is oblig'd to follow that Nature which is *common* to him with the rest of *Mankind*, so he is oblig'd to follow that *Reason* which is so too: I mean as to the
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Fundamental Rules of humane Actions: He may make use of his *own Reason* perhaps in finding out *means to observe* these Rules, to *observe them* I say, not to *break them*; one of the *chief of which is the preserving of Life*: As in all well formed Governments *one Law extends to all*, for the common Good; so is it in the Government of the *World*, which is order'd by *Infinite Wisdom*: And therefore 'twou'd be as *absurd* to plead for *particular Reason*, as a privilege to act *against natural Principles*, as it wou'd be to desire it as a privilege to act *against just humane Laws*.

Reason when loudly boasted, and zealously contended for, by particular Men, against any *Ancient and Establish'd Rule*, shou'd always be *suspected*: It shows some uneasiness under that Rule, which if enquir'd into, and examin'd with the Person concern'd, wou'd be found to be against some *particular Interest or Inclination*, which had gotten the ascendant over him: In these Cases when every Man talks of *Reason*, he means his *own*, his *own sorry* share, and that too perhaps very much vitiated and corrupted; thus you shall see reason of all Complexions, Melancholy, Phlegmatick and Sanguine Reason; for when this is once enslav'd by any Appetite

tite or Passion it takes the Colour of it, and then whatever is the object of each Man's Desires; whatsoever is *his particular method of compassing it, or measure of enjoying it*, is call'd *Reason*. Thus this Godlike faculty is made frequently the pretence of the greatest *Absurdities* in our *Actions*, as well as *Discourse*; and it may be observ'd, that People always *plead it most that most offend it*; pretending the most faithful Duty to this Sovereign Power, and yet all the while impudently warring against it in *its own Name*.

Hence it is that *seeming Good* and *seeming Evil* are made to be the *Rule* of humane Actions, and the following of them the *End* of humane Life; the measure of its being Good or Evil, and Preserv'd or Destroy'd accordingly: Whereas to act according to *seeming Good* or *seeming Evil* can never be allow'd but in the case of *sudden* or *extream Necessity*, or *Panic Fear*, when the Soul has not the *Power* or *Leisure* to bring its Actions or Resolutions to the *Rule* of right Reason, or to examine what is really Good, or really Evil; and then we ought to observe that this is allow'd but upon *one Account* neither, and that is *the preserving of Life*, and therefore is a very strange Argument for the Destroying of it.

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But after all that can be said, *seeming* Good and *seeming* Evil are floating and *uncertain things*, and therefore can *never* be the Rule or End of Living; because as they can be no *certain* measure themselves, so they must *destroy* it as to all other things; for to suppose this, is not only to let a Man loose to any Object that he pleases, but also to hinder his obtaining of any one; while a *new seeming* Good may be starting continually, and so a warm Head shall be sure never to want Game: And Life thus employ'd wou'd be given to a very extraordinary End indeed; especially if we consider that the Event of this must prove not only *fatal* to a Man's self, but may do so by degrees to all that are near him; nay *must* do so to all *Mankind*. For if *seeming* Good is sufficient to justify our Actions, what Crime can ever be justly laid to any Man's charge? As there is no *Errour* that pleases under the notion of *Falseness*, so there is no *Wickedness* that prevails upon the Mind as it appears *Evil*; but as there is *seeming* Truth in the one, so there must be *seeming* Goodness in the other: Accordingly, he that *Robs*, *Ravishes*, *Murthers*, may plead that he did so only because it *seem'd* good to him and that in so doing he did but *follow Nature*; but
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if this be to follow *Nature*, if the ground of *General Natural Law* is nothing but the *appetition of Good, True or Seeming*, then how absurd are all *Humane Laws*, and how unnatural are all *Courts of Justice*? In a Word, to give a Man up to act by *seeming Good* and *seeming Evil*, is to let him loose to his own *Will and Pleasure*, to grant him *Wildness* instead of *Liberty*, and to make Life depend upon this, is to tell him he may destroy himself whenever he thinks fitting.

CHAP. VIII.

Examination of such Objections as are brought to invalidate what was said above concerning Man's being a Member of Civil Society, and the unlawfulness of Self-murder in this regard also: Application of what has been said to the Coroners Inquest in this Case.

Hitherto I have endeavour'd to Answer those Objections, which might seem to oppose what I had said to prove Self-murder *Unlawful*; as Man was consider'd in the *State of Nature*: I come now to examine some others which are brought against what has been said to confirm the same

same, as he is a Member of *Civil Society*.

First, I must say something to that which was * above mention'd, as an Instance of deserting ones self Lawfully.

† *Self-preservation* doth not so rigorously, and urgently, and illimitedly bind, but that by the Law of Nature it self, things may, yea must, neglect themselves for others, of which the Pelican is an Instance. Another Instance he gives of Bees too, from whence he infers, || *That as this natural Instinct in Beasts, so rectified Reason belonging only to us, instructs us often to prefer publick and necessary Persons, by exposing our selves to inevitable Destruction.*

* *We may Lawfully dispossess our selves of that, without which we can have no hopes to sustain our Lives; as in a Shipwreck a private Man may give his Plank to a Magistrate, and the Examples of Codrus, Curtius and the Decij, and the Approbation of the greentest and the wisest Nations, in the Honours which they paid to their Memory, are usually brought in upon this occasion; this is to prove that the Law of Self-preservation may be dispenc'd withal in regard of serving the Publick; and therefore that it*

* Chap. 5. p. 44. † Biath. p. 46. || p. 47. * p. 128.

may be so as reasonably in any Man's private Concern, even to the degree of Killing himself: Or thus, there is no difference (as to *Self-preservation*) between a Man's Killing himself upon account of the *Publick*, or his *own account*; now he that dispossesses himself upon the publick Account, to save a publick Person: Of that, without which he can have no hopes of saving his own Life, Kills himself.

To this may be Answer'd, 1. That the use of *Instinct*. in Beasts is to *Preserve* them. It was given them to this *End alone*, instead of *Reason*; therefore it is a Contradiction to affirm, that any Beast, Bird, or Insect *destroys* it self by *Instinct*, and the Instances here brought to prove this are *Fabulous*.

2. That the more Reason is *rectify'd* in Man, the more he will understand to what *End* he receiv'd Life, and how little Authority he has to dispose of it; and therefore the more carefully will he *obey* the Law of Self-preservation, and this particularly upon the Consideration of what *he owes the Publick*.

3. That the Law of *Self-preservation* may not be *wilfully* broken, even upon the Account of the *Publick*. No Man has *naturally* any Authority to *destroy himself* for

for his Country, *designedly* and *positively*; but to *hazard his Life* only.

As to the Instances of *Codrüs, Curtius*, and the *Decij*, what they did was grounded upon a Religious or Superstitious Perswasion; which they obey'd as *Supernatural*, and therefore cannot be us'd to prove what is *Naturally Lawful*.

The Instance of giving a *Magistrate* a Plank in a Shipwreck, implies only great hazard of Life; not *positive Destruction* of it; because there is a *possibility* of escaping left; and because the *intention* is not to die, to abandon all care of ones self, but to take care of another *first*: To make this more plain I will show,

1. What *Authority* the Publick Power, where-ever 'tis plac'd, has to require any Person to *hazard his Life*, and what Warrant that Person has to hazard it accordingly.

2. The difference between *extreme Hazard* and *Self-murther*.

1. What Authority, &c. In this Consideration I shall have no regard to any one particular State, but only enquire into the End of Government or Civil Society in General, and this with all Submission

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imaginable.

imaginable. The end of Civil Government is, I suppose, the promoting the *same* things for many Men together, upon which their true *Happiness* depended, as consider'd *singly* in the State of Nature: this is usually call'd the *Publick Good*, that is, each Man's Private Good as he is Man, consider'd collectively, and with regard to the *General Welfare*. *Private Good* being *twofold*, as hath been shown, *Moral* and *Sensitive*; the object of humane Laws must be *twofold* also, *Virtue* and *Propriety*, and the promoting and securing these in Peace from all Enemies, either from without or within any Political Body seems to be the *true natural end of Civil Society*.

Now as there is *Publick Good* to be secur'd, so in order to this, there must be *Publick Power* over every particular Subject, lodg'd in one or more Persons, according as the Form of the Government is; and lest this Power should be either Dangerous or to no Purpose, there must be also *Publick Judgment*, the Result of the Debates of Wise and Upright Men, to limit it and direct it.

Furthermore, whereas every particular State must be consider'd as one Political Person; in which respect the being of any State is to be look'd upon as the *Publick Life*,

Life, and the Well-being of the same State, the Publick Health: So it must be supposed that the Publick Power must be such, as is proper and requisite to defend these, and consequently that it must extend to *Particular Life*, whenever the *Publick Life* is any ways in danger.

Now this may be endanger'd *two* ways; either *1st*. By Enemies *within* the State, Corrupt and Vicious Men, who obstruct and break the Laws, and infect others; in which Case the Publick Power extends to the *actual* Destruction of such particular Mens Lives, as being necessary for the Preservation of all the rest. Or *2dly*. It may be endanger'd from *outward Enemies*; other Governments that would Enslave or Destroy it: In which Case the Publick Power extends to the obliging such as it thinks fitting to *hazard* their Lives, when 'tis necessary for the Publick Preservation: To *hazard*, I say, not *positively destroy* themselves, (as when a blow is made at a Man's Head, he may lift up his Arm to defend it, *venture* the breaking of it, not *positively break* it, which he has no right to do) and necessary it may be suppos'd, sufficiently to *warrant* any Man's Obedience, when the *Publick Judgment* declares that it is so.

But the chief Question is, from *whence* this Power is deriv'd to the Publick, by *whom* it was granted.

Some suppose it to be granted by *Man* himself, upon a kind of compact for Protection; but though *Protection* may be one great End of this Power; yet it is generally agreed, that this Power cannot be conferr'd on the Publick by every particular Man; because God alone has the absolute Propriety of humane Life: Man has no such Power himself, and what he has not, he cannot make over to another. Mr. *Hobbs* will have it to come from *Man*, but then to decline this Objection, and secure his darling Principle of *Self-preservation*, he says, This is not done by Man's transferring any right of his own, but by laying down the right which he has to hurt others. His own Words are these, * *The Subjects did not give their Sovereign that Right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own as he should think fit for the Preservation of them all; so that it was not given but left to him: If I take this right, this is a very odd distinction; for if a Man has any right to hurt others for his own Preserva-*

* *Leviathan* part 2. chap. 28. page 162.

tion ; then as he is bound to *Preserve* himself, so he is bound to *retain that Right* ; and yet if he *lays* it down, he *parts* with it as much as if he *actually* gave it away.

He told us just before, * *That in the making of a Common-wealth every Man gives away the Right of defending another, but not of defending himself.* In several Places † he repeats and inculcates this, that no Man can ever part with the right of defending himself ; no, not after *Lawful Tryal* and *Condemnation* : If this be so, How can he lay down the right which he has to hurt others, since by so doing he must be left in a great measure defenceless, and liable, by *his own* Consent, not only to be *hurt*, but to be *actually destroy'd*, as in all Capital Punishments.

Wherefore, notwithstanding Men chuse to struggle thus, rather than have any thing to do with *God*, while they frame their Political Systems : Yet it seems plain that such a Power as we are speaking of can be deriv'd from no other but *God*, who alone having the absolute *Propriety* of all humane Life, can alone have the right to give some Men Power over the Lives of

* Ib. p. 161. † Leviath. part 1. chap. 14.

others; and who having fram'd Man in such a manner, that Civil Society is necessary for his Security and Improvement, and yet such Society not to be preserv'd without such a Power, must upon these Considerations, and also as he is a wise and just Being; and as he who wills the End must will the Means necessary to that End; must, I say, be supposed to grant to the Magistrate such a Power; a Power to hazard Life himself, and to oblige others to do so, in defence of the Publick.

From what has been said may appear, that the Power or Authority which any Government has to require Men to *hazard their Lives* for the Publick Good is derived from God himself, that the time and manner of doing this depends upon the Publick Judgment; and that Man is thus warranted for hazarding his Life accordingly.

To return then to the Instance above-mention'd, of *a Man's giving a Magistrate his Plank in a Shipwreck*: If a Man may *hazard* his Life for the *Publick Good*, then if there be some particular Person, in whom the Publick *Power* and Publick *Judgment* is lodg'd, from whom all the Springs of Action derive their Motion, who is in effect

effect the Life, the Soul of the whole Body, and in whom the Liberty and Property (as we love to speak) of many Millions centers and may be lost; and among the rest *his Life also*, who shall be *concern'd* for this *Publick Persons* safety; then we may conclude, that any Man *may hazard* his Life even to the utmost danger to *preserve such a Person*; yet in these Cases we are to remember Life is *only hazarded* not *abandon'd*, much less *positively destroy'd*; and that for such *extreme hazard* Men may justly suppose that they have *Authority* from God himself, as they are Members of any Civil Government.

And though the danger be great, yet 'tis very seldom that Men fall into certain Death upon these Accounts, as might be shown easily.

But suppose it should be so, yet in this Case an honest good Man does not mind any thing but *to do his Duty*, to pursue *faithfully* the *End* for which Life was given; and if Life should be lost in this pursuit, this is *not his desire, nor his fault*; 'twas not his aim to die, but to do as he ought; nay gladly wou'd he have lived had Life been *consistent* with his Virtue; but when *this* came in Question, both *Death* and *Life* became *indifferent*, and

though he Chooses *neither*, he accepts readily of *either*, as they offer themselves in *his way to his Duty*.

This I find confirm'd by the School-men in a harder Case than any above-mention'd. Suppose a *powerful Tyrant* shou'd bring the last City of any State to the greatest Extremity, by all the sad Consequences of a long and prosperous Siege; as loss and weariness of Men, Famine, Contention, Corruption; and no hopes of Succour shou'd be left; suppose that after this, he shou'd refuse all Articles of Submission, and shou'd threaten Destruction by Fire and Sword, unless they deliver'd up to him some *one particular innocent Person*. This City (say they) * *may not only deliver him up, though they know him to be Innocent; but that very Person may deliver up himself, and yet without being guilty of destroying himself, because, as abovesaid, his chief end is the doing so much Good, not the Dying; his particular intention, his design that he had in view continually was to save his Country; and this being the only means which was left, he resolves to incur the greatest danger to this purpose; and yet in all this is positive*

* Gre & de Valent. Tom. 3. Disput. 5. Q. 8. Punct. 2.

only as to the doing of his Duty, and far from being positive as to the destroying of his Life. To compleat this Argument let us now see,

2. How great the difference is between this and Self-murder, and consequently how unreasonably the one is made a plea for the other.

He that hazards Life for the Publick does this in obedience to the Laws both of God and Man; he that destroys his own Life does this in disobedience to the Laws of both; the first by observing the true End of Life, does what God and Nature primarily design'd as most proper to preserve Life, and if he loses it 'tis by the violence of others; the latter neglecting the true End of Life destroys it wilfully by the most positive act of injustice to God, his Country and himself; the first only hazards Life, the latter chooses Death; if the first happens to die 'tis against his will, if the latter lives 'tis against his; and as to the Rublick, the one dies for it, the other dies against it; not only by deserting it, but by breaking its Laws, and encouraging others to do so, and also by enervating the strictest ties of Kindness, Trust and Justice, which may end at last in the total dissolution of any Government; the Comparison might be carried further,

further, but this may be sufficient to show the unreasonableness of this Conclusion, That *because a Man may give a Magistrate his Plank in a Shipwreck therefore he may Murther himself.*

The next Objection is to this purpose, That if *Self-murther is unjust in regard of the Publick, 'tis because it loses a Member; † but this may as well be said of all those who retiring themselves from Functions in the Commonwealth, defraud the State of their Assistance, and attend only their own Ends. || If the Person be of necessary use to the State, there are in it some degrees of Injustice, but yet no more than if a General of much use shou'd retire into a Monastery.* To this may be Answer'd.

1. That *one of the Reasons why Self-murther is unjust to the Publick, but not the only one; is its losing a Member.*

2. The Instance here given *does not come up to the point; for a General may not lay down his Commission without leave, when he is necessary for his Countries Service; but he may justly be punish'd if he refuses to Act.* Yet suppose a Man may retire from Publick Affairs to attend *his own Ends; Is this*

† Biath. p. 111. || Ib. p. 113.

as much damage to the Publick as Self-murther? He that attends his own Ends, (if by this be meant his particular Interest as to his Family) contributes to the Publick Good, and may do so very considerably, though never so much retir'd: However the causes of his Retirement may alter, and then he may serve the Publick again upon Necessity; or shou'd he not, he may serve and assist his particular Friends and Relations, improve his Knowledge and his Fortune, be an Example of Virtue, and in many other respects observe the end for which Life was given; and this sure cannot be the same with the putting a Man's self into an *unalterable incapacity* of doing any good at all, by the wilful and positive destruction of Life.

To this it may perhaps be reply'd, *That here Strength and Vigour is requir'd, Health of Body and Activity of Mind; but suppose a Man by * extream Age or Infirmary, by loss of some Sense or some Limb, shou'd be made incapable of serving the Publick, had not he as good be gone as stay to no purpose, may not he leave the World if he pleases when he is become good for nothing.*

* As the Stoicks. See Chap. 10.

This Supposition seems to be grounded upon a very *gross* fence of *serving the Publick*; as if States-men were to be chosen by the breadth of their Shoulders, and strong and sizeable Men were as necessary for the Council Table as the Guard Room; for if Men *be past* Reason the Dispute is at an end, but *if they are capable of using it*, why should old Age be objected, unless Maturity and Experience shou'd be disadvantages? When Reason is *lost*, no Man can be accountable for Self-murther, or any *other Action*, yet even then we preserve Life carefully in *Ideots* and *Madmen* at the Publick Expence; either in hopes of their recovery, or to learn to value Reason as we ought, or to praise the giver of it; so that there is scarce any Wretch but may be some way or other beneficial to the Publick, even by *his being alive alone*; how much more may he be so when Reason remains, and that too so highly valued and well understood, that Men will choose sooner to part with Life than remain depriv'd of the glorious advantage of it? Or if this shou'd not be allow'd, what Rule can be given? What degree of Age or Infirmary can be fix'd, when Men shall be judg'd to *be good for nothing*, and permitted to *Murder themselves*

selves accordingly? Such a thing (if possible) might prevent it indeed, since Men wou'd be apt to live in despite of all their Miseries, rather than buy the privilege of Self-murder at so dear a rate, as to be judg'd by others, and be oblig'd to acknowledge themselves, that they are good for nothing.

But while Reason remains, as I said before, this is impossible, and many Instances may be given of Persons who have done their Country the most considerable Service under all these Calamities above-mention'd, nay at the very time of Death it self. The whole Senate of Rome had once so basely degenerated as to surrender up *tamely* their Liberty and their Glory, in that *dishonourable* Peace which they had unanimously resolv'd to conclude with *Pyr- rhus*: * When *Appius Claudius* who had been absent from Publick Affairs, through extreme Age, Blindness and Lameness, for many Years, as soon as he heard of it, caus'd himself to be carried *to the House*, and bravely upbraided them with their Cowardice and *Perfidiousness* to their Country: What Man had ever such appearan-

* Vid. Plut. in Diff. Et. *apoculip* *apoculip* Et Val. Max. l. 8. c. 14.

ces of being *past serving* the Publick, or *being good for nothing*; and yet how vigorous was his Soul in so decrepit a Body? One wou'd think the Genius of *Rome*, chas'd out from the degenerate Senate, had retir'd for shelter under the Ruins of this great old Man. 'Tis certain that if he had not had so many Infirmities he wou'd have been less regarded, but the sight of these made his Zeal surprizing; rais'd their Attention with their Admiration, and gave every Word a peculiar force to restore them to their *Courage* and their *Reason* as unanimously as they had rebell'd against both before: This made * his *Infirmities* numbred in after Ages among his *Trophies*, and *Cæcus* a more glorious distinction than *Asiaticus*, *Africanus*, &c. for they who had those Titles, only added Vast and Luxurious Provinces to their Country, which prov'd the *Destruction* of it at last; but *Appius* conquer'd its most

* There is a short view of this great Man in an Inscription, which the Learned *Agostine* says is worth a Treasure. Dial. 9. Which begins thus.

APPIUS CLAUDIUS
C. F. CAECUS.

CENSOR. COS. BIS. DICT. INTERREX. II.
dreadful

dreadful Enemy, and *serv'd it*, for that time, *from it self*. † The great Father Paul a few Minutes before his Death, after he had been long weaken'd by Age and Sickneſs, had three Caſes of very great Importance ſent to him, by the Senate of Venice, to each of which he gave his Opinions, and that wiſe Aſſembly follow'd them accordingly. In theſe Inſtances there was not only a *complication* of Calamities, but *Death it ſelf*, had almoſt taken Poſſeſſion, and yet neither, made them paſt ſerving of the Publick.

What ſhall be pretended then for the loſs of *any one Senſe*? as the Stoicks do; Shall *this* be taken for a certain Sign of being paſt doing good? And conſequentially a *reaſonable Plea* for Self-murther; and ſhall *that* be acted accordingly? Had it been ſo always, how much Inſtruction and Delight wou'd Mankind have been depriv'd of, had *Homer* — Nay had *Milton* done ſo, the World had loſt that *admirable Poem*? Oh, had he made but as *good uſe* of his Eyes!

'Tis true few Perſons are qualified for ſuch great Performances, but theſe In-

† Il Senato fece tre dimande intorno un Publico importantissimo negotio. Vita del Padre Paolo.

stances may shew that such Calamities, as above-mention'd, do not make all Men *past* serving of their Country, or good for nothing; and that if *such Pretences* were allow'd for Self-murder in *one Person*, they must be so in *another*; and if so, that this may prove very hurtful to any State, nay possibly to the whole World.

But after all, it may be further Objected, *If a Man has leave from the Publick to Murder himself, he does it no Injury; this leave has frequently been granted by the Roman Senate, and at † Marseilles a Vessel of Poison was kept ready at the Publick Charge, for those to whom they gave Permission to Murder themselves.* This Custom may be of use to us so far in this Argument as to prove that these People thought that no Man who liv'd in a *Civil State* had right over his own Life, but the Publick had a claim to it, which is very true in its proper Limitation; but then this *was not such a claim* as is grounded upon *absolute Propriety*; such as gives a Power to dispose of any thing *when and how* it pleases; because the *right* which the Publick has over *particular Life* is only for security of *Publick Life*, grounded upon *Self-defence*, and never to be made

† See Valer. Max. lib. 2. cap. 1.

use of but in extreme Necessity; as for the *cutting off a corrupted part*, or for the opposing *open Violence*: Wherefore this Right being grounded only upon *this Foundation*, for any Political Body to pretend to give leave to any *Innocent Person* to kill himself, is as absurd as for any Man to give his right Hand leave to cut off his left when it ails nothing, or to wound himself in any other sound part. In a Word, this wou'd be both *Folly* and *Usurpation*, for had the Publick this absolute Right, all Complains of Tyranny and Oppression wou'd be very unreasonable.

But after all what do such Instances as *these* signifie to *Us*, or to any Nation which does not grant the same Permission: If the Matter were to be determin'd by *Humane Laws*; we of this Nation (not to mention others) are forbid it under the *strictest Penalties*.

But here our Author tells us again, * If our Law be severe in punishing of it, and that this Argument has the more strength, because more Nations concur in such Laws: It may well from hence be retorted, that every where Men are inclinable to it; which establisbeth much our Opinion, says he, considering that none of

those Laws, which prescribe Civil restraints from doing it, can make it Sin; and that Act is not much discredited if it be therefore Evil, because it is so forbidden, and binds the Conscience no further but under the general Precept of obedience to the Law or the Forfeiture. —

Here are three things advanc'd ;

1. That the *General Concurrence* of Nations in any Law proves a *General Inclination* in Mankind to the committing of the thing forbidden; and therefore that that thing is Natural. This I think is very strange! All Nations concur in severe Laws against Murthering of Princes, Husbands, Fathers, against betraying Forts, Ships, &c. Now does this prove a *General Inclination* of People to these Crimes? No certainly; but it proves a *general abhorrence* and *detestation* of 'em, and the *ill Consequences* of 'em to Mankind; and therefore is an undeniable Argument of such things being *unnatural*.

2. We are told that *none of those Laws which prescribe Civil Restraints from doing it (i. e. Self-Murder) can make it Sin, and the Act is not much discredited if it be therefore Evil because it is so forbidden.*

The Law of any Land does not make Self-murder to be a *Sin* or *Evil*, but found it

it so, 'tis really so by the Law of Nature; as I hope has been shewn; *'tis declar'd to be so by positive Laws,* to put Men in mind of it, to save 'em the trouble of reasoning it out, and to deter 'em from committing it, by the threats of *immediate Punishment*; and that which was thus founded in Nature, and afterwards commanded by Man's Law brings *a new obligation* upon the Conscience, for if † humane Laws concerning things *indifferent* in their own Nature (which forbid an Action which a Man might be otherwise free to do, or command one which he might be otherwise free to omit) do oblige us, as every one allows, then how much more must they do so when they forbid a thing which is not *indifferent* but *naturally unlawful*, and which a Man was oblig'd to forbear before; and so on the contrary: If this be so, that must also be a mistake which is affirm'd.

3. *That humane Laws which forbid Self-murder bind the Conscience no further, but under the General Precept of Obedience to the Law, or else to the Forfeiture.*

When a *Civil Punishment* is affixt to that

† Vid Sanderfon. de conscient. prælect. 5. Sect. 10.

which is a *Natural Evil*, a Man is not left at liberty to *choose* to suffer the *one* for acting the *other*; particularly in the *Case of Self-murder*; because a Man was oblig'd in Conscience before the humane Law was made, and because the Punishment (in this *Case* especially, of all others) is by no means adequate to the Crime; besides if a Man may choose the Punishment, then the Law of Man *instead of enforcing* the Law of Nature, wou'd only be the *convenience of evading it*. Wherefore as this distinction is unjust, so is it most pernicious to all Civil Governments.

Yet after all; supposing that it should be lawful to chuse the *Civil Punishment*, for the committing that which is *Naturally Evil*: How shall this reach the Offender, as to Self-murder? This can affect him no otherwise, than as to his *Dead Body*, or his *Posterity*; and therefore how false is this Pretence at the Bottom? And how base is this detestable Action? whereby a Wretch breaks the Laws of God and his Country, and exposes his best and dearest Friends, his next Relations, nay his *Children often*, to suffer the Punishment due to his Crime. If in excuse for this it shou'd be said, That such People may be suppos'd to satisfy themselves with hopes of the Punishments

ments being escapt by their Heirs, either through Friendship, Compassion, Bribery, &c. If, I say, this shou'd be alledg'd, then certainly it is very well worthy of Consideration, whether the putting of those Laws *duly and constantly in Execution*, which are provided in this Case, wou'd not be of very great force to put a stop to this Evil? The Consideration of *shame* alone † did this heretofore in the Case of the *Milesians*, and the *Romans* also under *Tarquinius Priscus*: Our Laws then may do this more effectually; which allowing but the same Burial which *other* Felons have, and requiring the *Forfeiture* of the *Personal Estate*, have not only the Natural tye of *shame*, but a much stronger, that of *tenderness* to their *Posterity*, to restrain such Rash and Melancholy Creatures by.

And this leads me to apply my self particularly to the *Coroner* and his *Inquest* upon these sad Occasions. For although somewhat of this kind has been done lately by an ingenious * Author; yet the Nature of his Design (I suppose) not suffering him to enlarge upon it, there seems to be room left for something to be added.

† Biath. p. 96. * Occasional Paper, Numb. 10.

I will first then give some Account of the *Duty* of the *Coroner* and his *Jury*, and what the *Law* directs, and upon what *Grounds*, (as I have been inform'd) in this Case: And afterwards show the *unreasonableness* of those *Prejudices* or *Pretences* which Men are apt to be sway'd by, notwithstanding *these great Obligations*.

As to the first, When the *Coroner* has notice, that any one is come to a violent and untimely Death; he is to Summon and Impanel a *Jury* out of the *Neighbourhood*, and administer this Oath to 'em.

You shall Swear, that you shall well and truly inquire, and true Presentment make of all such matters and things as shall be given you in Charge, on the behalf of our Sovereign Lord the King, touching the Death of A. B. So Help you God.

As to the *Matters* and *Things* here mention'd, these are Explain'd farther to them by the *Coroner* in his Charge; Then they are to find out the *manner* of the *Persons* Death, whether by *Drowning*, *Strangling*, *Wounds received*, or otherwise; whether by another or himself, if by *himself*, whether he was *Felo de se*, or *non Compos mentis*.

And

And to this End they are to be *directed* and *assisted* by the *Depositions* of those whom the *Coroner* Summons to give Evidence, or by the hearing of the *Council*, which is sometimes brought upon these Occasions. What is meant by being *non Compos*; the Law informs them, that it is the *deprivation of Reason or Understanding*: Such a state of the Mind wherein there is a Cessation from Exercising the Discursive Faculty. That there are four sorts of Persons which the † Law looks upon to be *non Compos*. 1. An *Idiot* or *Natural Fool*. 2. One that has been of *Good and Sound* Memory, but by the Visitation of God has lost it. 3. A *Lunatic* who has Intervals. 4. One who becomes Mad, by his own Act, through Excessive Drinking. Upon the Verdict of ~~*non Compos*~~ the Goods and Chattels of the Deceas'd are to be enquir'd after, valu'd immediately, as if they were to be sold and deliver'd to the Kings use; and the Body refus'd Christian Burial. The reason of which Punishment is said to be, * because Self-murder is an Offence *against Nature*, it being the Property of every thing to preserve it self; *against God*,

Felo de se

† 4th. Reports, 124. 6. * Plowden. 261. 6.

for that it offends his Commandment; *against the King*, for that he loses a Subject, and an ill Example is given to the rest. All which have been explain'd and enforce'd in the former part of this Treatise.

We may see here the Authority, by which the *Coroner* and his *Jury Act*, the Nature of their Duty, and the great Trust repos'd in them, as also the Laws Interpretation of *non Compos*, the Punishment that is threaten'd, and the Ground and Intent of the Law: All which every one of the Jury is oblig'd to observe by the sacred Bond of a *Solemn Oath*; and this one wou'd suppose might be sufficient to cause any honest Man to make *true Presentment*, deliver in his Verdict in such a Case *Impartially*; yet it is found to be otherwise by Experience. Wherefore,

1. I come to shew the unreasonableness of those Prejudices and Pretences by which Men are usually sway'd in this Matter; and in so doing I shall not look upon myself (being to talk with another sort of People now) to be confin'd to Natural Principles only.

2. Is a General Supposition that every one who kills himself is *non Compos*, and that no body wou'd do such an Action unless

less he were Distracted; this will be found unreasonable if we consider,

1. That if this were really so, then it wou'd be to no purpose for the Law to appoint *any enquiry* to be made in such Cases: If a Man may not be suppos'd to be in his Wits when he lays violent Hands upon himself, to what intent is the Summoning in of so many Men, the giving them a Solemn Oath, examining Witnesses, hearing Council; all this supposes the Case doubtful; but according to that Opinion all this is vain and impertinent, because they have nothing left to judge of.

2. If this were so, then our Laws are not only Impertinent but *Unjust*, by affixing a Punishment to such an Act, as the Person that commits it cannot help: He that is Distracted knows not what he does, and therefore is not Accountable for this or any other Deed; since then the Laws of this Nation, and of many others of great Reputation for Wisdom and Justice (as shall be shewn immediately) have ordain'd a Punishment for this Action, it is plain that they thought it might *possibly* be committed *Wilfully*, and *Advisedly*; and if so, 'tis Confidence and Presumption for any private Person to suppose the contrary.

3. This

3. This will appear farther if we consider the several Explications of the Words *Non Compos* above-mention'd, particularly the third concerning *Lunatics*: If a Person known to be Lunatic several Years, be also known to have had several Intervals, he shall be liable to the Law, unless it be plainly prov'd that he was distemper'd at the very time of killing himself: How much more if a Man has never been known to have been Lunatic at all. As to the 4th. sort of Madness above-mention'd, the Law does not look upon this as an Excuse for any Crime committed in that Condition; because it was the Parties own voluntary Act to bring himself into it. However this may be of Use to judge of other kinds of Madness by: Which People may be suppos'd to be affected withal in this Case; it very seldom appears that they who destroy themselves have had the same or as great signs of Distraction, as are frequently caus'd by excessive Drinking, or supposing they may have had so, yet let the Juror consider whether this may not be caus'd as much through the Parties own fault as the other; whether he did not bring upon himself, or give way to the beginning of his Discontent; whether he did

did not wilfully foment and increase it, and at last stubbornly persist in it. Let him also consider whether he wou'd have excused the *same Person* for killing *another Man*, upon those *very signs* of Madness which move him now to excuse him for killing himself: I believe this may be one *good Rule* for an *honest Juror to walk by*, especially since the killing of ones self has been shewn above, to be rather worse in regard of the Publick, than the killing of another Man.

Yet after all, how oft does it appear in these Cases, that the Person concern'd did give plain and certain Signs of a good Understanding (I mean Naturally, not Morally so) by some Circumstances of his Death or other: Some have enquir'd what was the easiest way of Dying, or where to place the Weapon best; others have us'd much cunning and contrivance to procure the Instrument, have kept it long by them, and warily chosen a proper Time and Place to make use of it; others again have made their Wills, or settled their Affairs otherways; taken leave of their Friends solemnly, sent those out of the way that might have hinder'd them; these and such like Circumstances are Arguments of *Deliberation* and *Advisedness*,

sedness, and prove sufficiently that such a Person was *Compos Mentis*.

If it be *Moral* and not *Natural Madness* that is here meant, not only he that commits any other great Crime, but he that subverts a Lawful Government, by a long train of well laid Designs, though he cannot be suspected of any Natural defect of Understanding, yet is as much Mad in this sense as any one that kills himself can be suppos'd to be; and yet sure this wou'd not be allow'd as an Excuse for so doing. But this sort of Madness does not fall under the Coroners Inquest in the present Case: *Moral Madnells* is the *misapplication* of the Understanding, not the *total* Deprivation of it, and the Question here is not whether the Understanding was *misapply'd*, but whether there was any Understanding *left at all*: This brings me to some other kind of Pretences, which are caus'd chiefly,

2. By mistaking the *Subject* of their *enquiry*, and making themselves *Judges* of that which does *not* belong to them; their Duty consists in enquiring well and truly how the Person came by his Death, if by himself, whether he was *felo de se*, or *non Compos*, and in making true Presentment accordingly. This is what they are *Sworn*

to do; but instead of this they are apt to run out beyond their Bounds, and consider what the Event of their Verdict will be, either as to the *Forfeiture*, or the *Person Deceas'd*.

I. As to the *Forfeiture*, they are sometimes mightily concern'd about this; What will *become* of it? Upon *whom* shall it be bestow'd? Upon *such* perhaps as do not want it, or among *so many* that it will do 'em little or no Good; whereas in the lump it might be of great advantage to the *next Heirs*: Why is not *Charity* due to them as much as meer *Strangers*, &c. To this may be reply'd,

1. That which is thus forfeited devolves to the Lord *Almoner*, the distributor of *His Majesties* Alms, according to *his Direction*; and therefore they ought to be satisfy'd that it will be dispos'd of *Judiciously* and *Faithfully*.

2. Supposing the *worst*, what is this to the *Coroner* or any of his *Jury*; the Law has not made *them* Judges in this matter, or given *them* Authority to consider what will be most convenient and proper to be done with that which is Forfeited, or *who* are the best Objects of *Charity*: They are call'd to Judge of matter of *Fact* by what they

Very good

they see and hear. Let 'em remember their *Oaths*, they are not Sworn to be *Charitable* but to be *Just*, to enquire *well and truly*, diligently and impartially concerning the Fact, and to give their Judgment according to their Conscience; and therefore a good Man ought to be upon his Guard against such Insinuations as these, and to take care lest his *Charity* shou'd absurdly corrupt his *Justice*; *absurdly I say*, for he that is Just, (in Criminal Causes especially,) is Charitable in the Noblest way; for whilst his Impartial Sentence deters others from committing the same Crime, his Charity extends not only to all the Innocent and Virtuous of the Present Age, but to late Posterity.

Again some run out beyond their Limits and fall into Mistakes, by considering the *Event* of their *Judgment* as to the Parties *Reputation*, and their being Guilty of *Uncharitableness* in this regard; they think that to bring him in *Felo de se*, wou'd be to pronounce him *damn'd*, therefore that they ought to Judge *Charitably*, especially, since they cou'd not see into his Heart, or discover his last thoughts.

This wou'd not need an Answer, but that Ignorant, though well meaning People are often concern'd upon these Occasions

ons, and apt to receive such Scruples from Cunning Solicitors, that are always busie about them, if the Chattels are worth the saving: Therefore something must be said to it.

1. Then the Jurors bringing in the Deceas'd *Felo de se*, does not pronounce him damn'd at all, this he leaves to God alone; whatever *his Judgment* of the Fact is, it can be neither the better nor the worse for him in the next World; his Impartial Verdict does not *alter* the Nature of the Fact: If he thinks him Guilty, yet he does not contribute to his being so, and what he thinks; he is oblig'd to declare by Lawful Authority; and if he does not so, is Guilty himself of Breach of Trust towards his Country, and of Perjury towards his God.

2. As to the seeing into his Thoughts, the difficulty of doing so, and the Judging Charitably upon this Account: This seems very little to the purpose: In *indifferent* Actions, or such as will bear a *double* Interpretation; we ought to beware how we Judge to the disadvantage of our Neighbour, especially when *not call'd* by Lawful Authority; but where a Man is *so call'd*; where there is a Notorious Transgression of the Law, as in the present Case, the

the Fact is so evidently Evil, that there needs no weighing of the thoughts, or searching of what kind they were; especially since, when a Person is found to have kill'd himself, the Question is not *what* his Thoughts were, but whether he had *any Thought* at all, that is whether he was *Mad* or no?

Yet after all, though I have hitherto apply'd my self to the Jury, 'tis certain that their Verdict depends much upon the Coroner, and 'tis *his* fault chiefly if the Laws which provide against Self-murder, are eluded; 'tis he that *Summons* whom he *pleases* to be of the Jury, and to these he gives *what Charge he pleases*; the Examination of the Witnesses, the Summing up the Evidence is done *by him*: So that unless there happen to be upon the Jury Men of Conscience, Courage and Understanding (which may easily be avoided if the Coroner thinks fitting) they will be apt to be led by him implicitly. And there being no Fee allow'd upon *Felo de se*, the Verdicts being for the King; and a Gratuity seldom wanting when it is for the Heirs; 'tis no wonder that the Return is generally *Non Compos*.

But if these Papers shou'd ever fall into the Hands of any of these Gentlemen;

Plain
outspoken
sense &
truth.

J.C.
I wrote
similarly
years before
I read
this excellent
book.

I intreat 'em to Consider *seriously* the *trust* that is repos'd in them, they being Chosen by the Freeholders of their several Counties, as Parliament Men are; and what the Consequence will be (even to after Ages) of the breach of such Trust: And to themselves especially, if they believe any thing of another World: For to omit the Suspensions of Corruption which I am very loath to improve; whatever the *Motive* is, through which the Design of any Law is Eluded; the Consequence will be much the *same*: If a Law be made to restrain a dreadful Sin, which is withal very pernicious to the State, and such or such a Punishment is appointed to this End; if this Law becomes of *no force* by that very Persons *Preventing* the Punishment, who is *intrusted* by his Country to see the Law *Executed*: Let this be done out of *Compassion*, *Generosity*, or what you please; all the increase of the *Sin forbidden*, so hainous in its own Nature, and so pernicious to the Publick, he will have a share in; and if he be *guilty of Perjury*, if he *betray his Country*, not only in the *Present Age*, but is *false to Posterity* also: What will it signifie that this was done *out of* Charity or Generosity to one or two Persons, who perhaps did not

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need

need it : Or if they did never somuch, how preposterous must that Charity be, which to assist a few, as to Temporal Conveniences, shall contribute to the Damnation of *many Souls*, and make a Man venture through *Treachery* and *Perjury* to hazard his *own*.

If these Considerations, and others of the like kind, should not prevail with these Persons so much as immediate Punishment : The Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench, for the time being, is, as I am told, the chief *Coroner of England*, enquiries into Failures of this kind, may be made in that Court, and this Consideration ought to terrifie every one who shall be thus concern'd, especially at this time, since that *Important Trust* was never discharg'd with more profound *Knowledge* of our Laws, and with greater *Integrity* than at *Present*.

CHAP. IX.

Transition to the remaining part of this Treatise, with a short View of it. The Authority of Examples Consider'd: Several Instances of Laws and Customs of many Nations in this Case Examin'd, particularly such as concern the Romans. That nothing can be brought from hence to prove Self-murder to be Natural.

HAVING laid down those Natural Principles upon which I suppose Self-murder to be Unlawful, and answer'd such Objections as seem'd to be of greatest strength; I once thought that my task was almost over; but there are some Persons who do not much relish those Arguments which are drawn from the Nature of Things; but are determin'd chiefly by Custom and Example, though rarely understood: And led away by mistaken Notions of Courage, Honour, Liberty, or the like. Such as these, notwithstanding all that has been said, will scarce yield that this Act is Unlawful; for say they, have not People of all Ages and Nations been inclin'd to it? Has it not been requir'd by Positive Laws, as well as allow'd by An-

cient Custom? Has not the *greatest* and *bravest Nation in the World* afforded us innumerable Examples of it? Did not the most *Wise* and *Virtuous* Sect of all the Philosophers *teach* and *practise* it; and were ever such Honours paid to any mortal Man as were to Cato upon this Account? If Cowardice, Disgrace and Slavery are to be hated and avoided; if Courage, or the love of Honour or Liberty are to be esteem'd and pursu'd: Then certainly in many Cases Self-murder may be not *only Lawful* but highly *Commendable*: This may serve for a short View of what remains to be done; and first the business of this Chapter shall be, to enquire concerning the *Authority of Examples*, particularly those which are alledg'd to prove Self-murder to be *Natural*. To return then to our Author, he tells us, that

* *Another Reason which prevails much with me, and delivers it from being against the Law of Nature, is this, That in all Ages, in all Places, upon all Occasions, Men of all Conditions have affected it, or inclined to do it.*

† *All Histories afford not so many Examples, either of cunning or subtil Devices, or*

* Biath. p. 50. Sect. 3. † p. 51.

of forcible or violent Actions, for the safeguard of Life as for destroying.

Again, * Self-homicide seems to me to escape the breach of any Law of Nature, because both express Litteral Law, and Mute Law, Custom hath Authorized it, not only by suffering and connivency, but by appointing it.

There is no way of Arguing so fallacious as that which depends upon Example, though there is none that is more Popular. They who resist Reason out of Vanity, or are not capable of it through Ignorance, are quickly taken with Examples, because they are govern'd by Inclination only; and 'tis but throwing open some History before them, and then whatever their prevailing Passion is, they may very easily fit it with an Example. But every Man of sense will quickly see how unreasonable this is; for since humane Actions must be try'd by some Rule, whereby their Goodness or Badness may be discover'd, the Example ought to be brought to this Test: The thing in Question shou'd first be prov'd to be Just and Lawful, and then Examples may be of use to illustrate it, to bring what was in Idea into Matter of Fact, and by making Reason as it were Visible, awake and stir up the Will by the

Natural Beauty of the thing, the *possibility* of performing it, and the *Applause* which has follow'd, to act accordingly; and when this is done, a well dispos'd Soul strikes in readily, and imitates and improves with Vigour and Alacrity: Wherefore, if what has been said be really true, if Self-murder has been try'd by the Law of Nature, and been shewn to be unlawful upon so many Accounts, whether Man be consider'd in the Individual, or as a Member of Civil Society; we ought not to be concern'd what Appearance soever there seems to be of Examples to the contrary; yet since whatever is apt to deceive ought to be laid open, and it has been thought fitting to insist upon this kind of Authority, I will shew more particularly, that supposing Examples, were in themselves good Arguments, yet those which are alledg'd upon this occasion, wou'd not prove Self-murder to be Natural.

As for what this Learned Gentleman says, that all Histories do not afford such Instances of Cunning or Force for the *Preserving* of Life, as for the *Destroying* of it; I must take leave to say, that this may be found otherwise by the Reading of any one History in the World, all the Remarkable Effects either of Force or
 Fraud

Fraud implying a desire of Life. The Examples which he brings are of several kinds.*

1. Such as are drawn from particular Persons, of which many are Fabulous, as that of *Homer*: Others such as *suffered* Death to *maintain their* Virtue, and for the Publick, as *Regulus*, *Codrus*; or Persons *scandalous*, as *Comas*, *Festus*: As for the *Gladiators* they did not prove any desire of Death as Natural: These were of two sorts, *Forc'd* or *Voluntary*; they who were forc'd to be *Gladiators*, (as Captives in War) fought for their *Lives* or *Liberties*; they who chose to be so, fought for *Applause*, and after all, many despis'd this *Applause*, to ask their Lives of the People; many others had theirs given for a Reward of their Skill and Courage, which they *gladly accepted*; wherefore no Instance in the World could be more improper than this to prove Self-murder Natural.

2. The next kind of Examples are more General, † such as are drawn from the Customs of whole Nations, or from the || Connivency or appointment of humane Laws. — Here I must desire that

* Biath. p. 51, 52, 53. † p. 54. || p. 73.

two things must be observ'd, 1st. That in the alledging of Examples of this kind a great difference should be made between Nations; many being so *Ignorant* and so *Savage* that it would be very strange to fetch the Principles of right Reason from among them: *Porphyrus* says, * *Some People are grown so wild and brutish that to quote their Customs would be to scandalize humane Nature*; the Instances which he gives are very proper for our Purpose. *The Massagetes*, says he, *reckon those unhappy who die a Natural Death, and therefore Eat their dearest Friends when they grow Old.* — *The Tibarenians break their Necks down a Precipice.* — *The Bactrians throw them alive to their Dogs*; and *Strafanor*, *Alexander's Lieutenant*, had almost lost that Province for endeavouring to break this Custom. — *The Scythians bury the dearest Friends of the Deceased with them alive, or slay 'em upon the Funeral Pile.* Wherefore when we quote Nations for Examples, we ought first to have a particular regard to *their Condition*, their Learning, their Wisdom and their Virtue; and should be sway'd least of all by those, who are in *either* of the wide extreams of *Luxury* or *Barbarity*.

* Περὶ ἀπρεχῆς, lib. 4. ad fin. πρὸς τὸ ἑξῆς ἐξῆς ἐκείνου.
 &c.

2. In the next place, secondly, we ought to enquire carefully into the ground and occasion of the Custom which is pleaded; whether it be founded upon some *Religious* or *Superstitious* Principle, or encouraged by some *Political* Consideration; any of which if it be, it ought not to be alledg'd as meerly Natural. By these two Rules let us examine the Instances which are here brought, and first that of the *Gauls*. Our Author says, That

* *In Cæsar's time for one who dy'd Naturally, there dy'd many by this devout Violence; there are some whom he calls Devotos and Clientes, or Soldurios which always when the Lord dy'd, Celebrated his Funeral with their own.* Cæsar says, that in the Memory of Man no one was found that ever refused it. This is not Reported Candidly; the matter was thus, upon *Adcantuannus's* Sallying with 600. Men which did great Execution: Cæsar says, That it was the Custom among the *Gauls* for People to devote themselves to some great Man upon this Condition, that on the one side they were to enjoy in Common all the Benefits of Life: On the other side if any Violence was offer'd to him, and their Defence or

* Biath. p. 53.

Assistance necessary, they were either to dye with him or save him, or if not *kill themselves* afterwards; this *alone* is that which he says, * *no one ever refused*: From whence 'tis plain,

1. That this was a League *Offensive and Defensive*, only for the *preserving of Life*, on both sides: The one for *Nourishment and Defence against Hunger*, the other for *Defence against Violence*, these Men did not *affect Death*, but *Life*: Death was the Bond of their Fidelity to their Friend and Lord; if this had not been dreadful to 'em, it could not have been any tie upon them; if it was dreadful: It could not be naturally desir'd, though they brought it upon themselves.

2. This being put in practice, not when the Lord dy'd of *any Distemper*, but only when he was *Kill'd*; and most of his Clients who were to defend him being slain with him, (as must be supposed) it cannot be true, that *many* dy'd thus, for *one* that dy'd a Natural Death.

To this may perhaps be added the Custom of the Ancient *Goths and Vandals*,

* Neq, adhuc hominum memoria repertus est quisquam qui eo interfecto, cujus amicitia se devovisset mori recusaret. lib. 3. de bello Gal.

who used to cast themselves down steep Rocks into a Bay which they call'd *Odin's Hall*: * This *Odin* or *Wodin* was their God of War, had humane Sacrifices offer'd to him, and was suppos'd to appear and invite his *Votaries* into † *Balhalden*, i. e. *Pluto's Palace*, or perhaps *Baal's Hall*; These Ignorant People supposed that this Gulph led down to *this Hall*, and that for this haste which they made they should be Feasted and Rewarded there, made themselves away out of a *Religious Principle*, and yet in no other manner than by throwing themselves down this Precipice.

The next considerable Instance is of the *Samanai*, Priests in great request among the *Indians*, who, he says, || *studied ways how to die when they were in perfect Health*; these were an *Order of Religious Men* who professed Poverty, renounc'd all Food of Flesh, or any Living Creature; liv'd in continual Retirement, and when they had purg'd their Souls in this manner, thought they might give them ease; but *this was thro a Religious Principle*, and therefore not Natural, nor put in practice

* Sir W. Temple's Miscel. p. 241. † Vid Stephan Comment in Saxon. Grammat. lib. 6. p. 55. || Vide Porphyrium de abstin. lib. 4.

by those of that Nation who *were not* of the same Order.

There are other Instances of the *Indians* in History, * *Curtius* speaks of a sort of Wise Men among them, that burnt themselves alive, for which he gives this Reason, that they reckon'd Fire (which they Worship'd perhaps for a God, as the *Persians* did) Polluted by dead Bodies; Thus *Calanus* burnt himself in the presence of *Alexander*; and † *Strabo* speaks of an *Indian* that came upon an Embassy to *Augustus*, who afterwards upon his Return at *Athens*, though in perfect Health and Prosperity, burnt himself publickly, to do Honour to his Sect and Country among the Stoicks and other Philosophers there, as is most Probable. But that which is *observable* here is *that their voluntary dying* was in but *one particular way*, namely by *Fire*, which was grounded upon a *Religious Opinion*, that the Soul was purg'd by that Element from that Pollution which it had contracted in the Body, and then conveyed by it upwards to its place of Happiness: Thus we are told by the || learned Critic

* Inquinari putant ignem nisi qui Spirantes recipit. 2.
Curtius lib. 8.

† *Strabo*, lib. 15. || Ad lib. 1. *Iliad*.

Eustatius,

Eustatius, That the Grecians burnt their Dead, to shew that the Divine part of Man being born upwards by the Fire mingled with the Heavens, and for this reason, says he, the *Gymnosophists* burnt themselves alive, as Alexander's Calanus did: * In the same way the *Samanai* dispatch'd themselves.

In some Countries it was the Custom to † kill whatever was dear to the Person Deceased, according to his Condition, as *Dogs, Horses, Slaves, Relations*. In after times, they who foresaw they should be kill'd, driven by necessity, and withal encourag'd by some *superstitious* Perswasion of being Rewarded for their Fidelity, killed themselves. From hence, and from the Opinion of the *Gymnosophists* aforesaid, came the Custom of the Womens burning themselves with their Husbands, which is very Ancient, || and was undoubtedly encou-

* Thus also *Quintilian Declam.* 10. speaking of the Soul, cum exonerata membris levi se igne lustaverit petit sedes in astra. So *Porphyrius* says of the *Samanai* above-mention'd.

† The Reason of this *Servius* gives, ad lib. 3. *Æn.* That the Soul never continuing in the Body, after the the Blood was run out, it was suppos'd that it delighted in Bloody Victims after its Separation.

|| *Servius* ad 5. *Æneid.* in hæc verba Famulæque parentis. Item. *Cicero* 5. *Tuscul.*

rag'd

rag'd by the Men in those Countries where they had several Wives, that they might be the more secure from the revengeful Jealousie of the Women, and their implacable Rage, when any one thought herself slighted; and the better attended in their Sicknes: All their Lives, depending upon their Husbands: But since the Men did not so, unless such as were acted by a superstitious Principle; since the Women that were *not* Married did *no* such thing, since no Self-murder, excepting *that by Fire*, was ever allow'd by these People; none of these Instances can prove that it is Natural.

But to come nearer home, we are told, that * *among the Ceans unprofitable old Men Poison'd themselves; among the Athenians Condemn'd Men were their own Executioners by Poyson; and among the Romans often by Blood lettings.*

As to this Custom of the *Ceans*, which is related at large by † *Val. Maximus*, who was an Eye Witness of it, and which gives occasion to || *Montaigne* to write a Chapter upon this Subject. * *Strabo* says it began upon

* *Donne*. lib. 10. † *Val. Max.* lib. 2. cap. 1. || *Mont.* lib. 2. cap. 3. * *Strabo* lib. 10.

the account of some great Famine, wherein a Law was made that the Aged of both Sexes should die in that manner, that their might be Provision for the Younger, who were more able to defend their Country.

The *Athenians* suffered Criminals to take the Cup which the Executioner prepared and brought 'em according to the Sentence of Condemnation, at a certain hour, to take it, I say, and drink it, which if they refus'd to do, the Officers stood ready to force it down; but did this wise People by this or any other way encourage Self-murder? quite contrary, there being * a Law against it, by which the Right Hand, as suppos'd acting it, was cut off, and the Body thrown out unburied; and in the same manner was it Punish'd in *Thebes* and other Cities of *Greece*; and how Contemptible soever this may seem, nothing was more *Infamous*: Such as Robbed Temples and Betrayed their Country being used in the same manner; nay this was the greatest Punishment according to the *Superstition* of those Times, they being of Opinion

* See *Aristot.* lib. 5. *Ethic.*

that
 "He who is *sole de se*, shall have the hand cut off that did the murder, which shall be buried in a place separate from the body."
Potter's Grec. Ant. p. 181.

that the *Ease* and *Happiness* of the *Soul* depended upon the *Burial* of the *Body*, as *Virgil* * *animamque sepulcro--- Condimus.*---

By what has been said hitherto, it may appear that although we should hearken to Examples in this matter, yet those which have been alledg'd here are either such as are Fabulous or Misrepresented, or such as though never so true, yet being grounded upon some Religious or Superstitious *Perswasion*, cannot be of any force to prove Self-murder to be Natural.

But that which is brought out with the greatest Pomp upon this Occasion is the Example of the *Roman* Nation: No People in the World had ever so much Courage and Honour: No Nation rose to such a height by Learning and by Arms: None had greater Men in every thing that is admirable, or more fit to be Masters of the World, and yet never did so many kill themselves of any Country as of this. This great and popular Prejudice may be lessened by considering these three things.

I. At what time the *Romans* were reckon'd to be at the height of their *Virtue*.

* See *Servius* there, lib. 3. *Æn.*

II. When

II. When Self-Murther began to be in Request among them, and the Causes of its being so :

III. What was the Judgment of their greatest Men; and what Laws they had concerning it.

i. At what time the *Romans* were reckon'd to be at the height of their Virtue. During the second *Punick* War, *Rome* improv'd in its Virtue: The Defeats they receiv'd from *Hannibal* at first increas'd the Love of their Country, and awak'd that great *Genius* to Action, which began to be enervated after the War with *Pyrrhus*, and which had been employ'd before, upon their little neighbouring States only; and while *Hannibal* himself, as well as the Savage Nations which he led, suffered under the Luxury of *Capua*; Temperance, Probity, Honour, Discipline, Courage, encreased among the *Romans*, both in the City, and the Army; 'till at last they conquered this formidable General; and brought the *Carthaginians* to what Terms they pleas'd. But immediately upon the Peace with them, the War with *Macedon* broke out, which ended not only in the Subduing of all *Greece*, but great Part of *Asia*, and then was it that the *Roman* Con-

L

quests

quests began to prove most fatal to themselves : For upon the Return of the Army from these Countries, Foreign * Luxury was first brought among them : This quickly begat Prodigality, and that made way for Bribery and for private Ambition : And this was so notorious at the Siege of *Numantia*, that *Jugurtha* learnt from his Friends there how to practise upon the Romans, and buy their Armies and their Senate afterwards : Yet notwithstanding they were thus disposed, still their Rival *Carthage* was a Check upon them ; and they durst not launch out, and be so bad as they fain would have been, for fear of this ancient Enemy : This was the Reason why that Great and Upright Statesman *Scipio Nasica*, was always against the destroying of *Carthage* ; which *Cato* urged so passionately, as to obtain at last, to the utter Ruine of the *Roman Virtue*, as *National* ; as all the Historians afterwards lament continually.

† *The first Scipio opened the Way to the Roman Power, the latter to their Luxury ; for*

* *Luxuriæ Peregrinæ Origo ab Exercitu Asiatico*, Liv. lib. 39.

*Græcia Capta ferum victorem cepit & Artes,
Intulit agresti Latio*

Horace.

† *Vel. Patere*, lib. 2.

when the Dread of Carthage was removed, and their Rival in Empire destroyed, they revolted from Virtue, and run over to Vice, not by degrees, but as down a Precipice.

And that Judicious Author *Salust*: *While the Commonwealth increased by Labour and Justice, Great Kings and Barbarous Nations were subdued: But when Carthage the Rival of the Roman Empire was once demolished, Fortune began to rage and confound all things, &c.

Now the Macedonian War was about 550 Years, *ab U. C.* and the other about 60 Years after: During these 600 Years, Self-Murther was rarely practised among the Romans; and when it was, but by Women only, or Persons of no Note, or those who were infamous: The Unhappy *Lucretia Feronia* a Vestal found with Child. *Appius Claudius*, in the Case of *Virginia*, and by some Numbers together, upon occasion of the † Slavery of building the Common Shore, under one of the *Tarquins*, and upon the Detection of the horrid Practices in the *Baccanalia*: || Yet in this Period of Time lived the most Vertuous Men, Men of the clearest Courage, and most unspotted Honour, that ever Rome had: Men whose Virtues were so great,

* *Bell. Catil.* † *Plin. lib. 36.* || *Liv. lib. 39.*

that that Empire was not only founded but raised upon them ; for tho' it was afterwards that it over-run so great a Part of the World, yet this was very little due to the Publick Virtue of those Times, but was rather the Effect of that Motion, which the Active and Noble *Genius* of this Age gave it ; and which was so *vigorous*, that neither the *Softness* of Luxury, the *Timorousness* of Ease and Interest, nor the *Blood* of the best and bravest Citizens of *Rome*, could clog or deaden it for many Years: And yet it will not (I suppose) be pretended, but that some particular Persons were liable to the same Misfortunes in those Days, which others were afterwards, tho' the Nation it self in general was not so: *Manlius Capitolinus*, *Regulus*, and others, were exposed to barbarous and disgraceful Deaths. Age, Poverty, Loss of Senses, and of Friends, extreme Pain, or whatever Pretences are made use of for this Act, were certainly as common then as ever they were afterwards ; yet none of these were looked upon in those Days as the *reasonable Causes* of Self-Murther, or as the *God's dismissing* or *calling Men out of Life*, as some of them began to talk afterwards.

2. I am to shew when, and for what Reasons this came into Request: At the very same time, that *Corruption* of all other Kinds did: For with the Vices of *Greece* and *Asia*, came in the Philosophy of the *Stoicks*, as shall be shown more at large immediately; which striking in with the Temper of the *Romans*, and being very convenient for the Misery and Cruelty of succeeding Times, was eagerly received by them; and in the Proscriptions of *Marinus*, *Sylla*, *Cinna*, how violently did it begin to work, and how many made away themselves? I do not doubt, but that *Hannibal's* killing himself gave some Credit to this manner of dying, as *Cato's* did more, afterwards: But what is particularly observable, is, that the more vicious and luxurious the *Romans* grew, the more were they inclined upon any Calamity to Self-Murder. And this *Seneca* himself confesses even in the midst of his Recommendations of it: * *I send you not to History*: (meaning for Examples of it) *Consider these Times we live in, of whose Softness and Effeminacy we complain; even now you may meet with Men of all Degrees, in all Circum-*

* Epist. 24.

stances, of all Ages, that have cut off their Evils by voluntary Death.

3. As for what the most considerable Writers among the *Romans* thought of this Matter, many of them living in such a treacherous and bloody Age as that of *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Claudius*, *Nero*, and suffering under the Tyranny of these Monsters, embraced the *Stoick* Philosophy, as the best support of their Misfortunes; and withal looking back with Sighs and Wishes upon the Time of the *Republick*, honour'd the Memory of those who they suppos'd died for it in this manner, and strove to imitate them: This was the Reason why no Man had ever more Applauders, or more Encomiums than *Cato*; and this made most of the Writers of those Days to commend this way of dying, as *Tacitus*, *Paterculus*, *Seneca*, *Lucan*, and *Valerius Maximus*. But they who liv'd sooner in a more learned and judicious Age, and who were wholly disengag'd from these Principles, or chose out of them what was really good, without thinking themselves obliged to embrace and defend every thing they taught; never recommended Self-Murder to the World, but rather condemned it, or else are silent concerning it. *Cicero*, the best Philosopher,

as

as well as the best Orator, is positively against it, upon a very Solemn Occasion, as I have shewn at large * before—— And *Macrobius* has a very Learned Discourse upon that Place, according to the Principles of *Plotinus*: But *Virgil* pursues it to the next World, and appoints a particular Place of Punishment for it there. †

And indeed his whole Inimitable Poem is against it; for if the Destruction of ones Country, if the loss of the best Friends, Banishment, Shipwreck, or any other Adversity were a reasonable Cause of Self-murder, *Aeneas* might have made use of it as justly as ever any one did; but his Piety and his Courage supported him against so great an Act of Weakness and Injustice, and in the worst Extremities the Poet furnishes him with ‖ admirable Reflections, which Preserve the Hero as carefully from himself as from his Enemies. No body in all that Incomparable Poem is brought in killing them.

* Sup. Cap 2.

† *Proxima deinde tenent maesti loca, qui sibi letum
Insontes peperere manu; lucemq; peresi;
Projicere Animas——* *Æn. lib. 6.*

‖ *O passi graviora dabit Deus his quoque; finem.*

Omnia percepi atq; animo mecum, ante peregi.

Quidquid erit superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est.

selves, but only *Dido* and *Amata*, two
 Unfortunate and Despairing Women:
 And when he picks out several of the
 most Famous *Romans*, to do Honour to
 his Country, and to make good that great
 and noble Character of it, which he
 begins at those excellent Lines, † *Ex-*
cudant alij, &c. When, I say, to this
 purpose, he mentions the *Decij*, *Drusi*,
Scipio's, *Brutus*, *Camillus*, *Torquatus*, *Fa-*
britius, *Curius*, *Cato*, *Cossus*, &c. it is ob-
 servable that there is not one of all these
 who kill'd himself: The *Decij* indeed dy'd
 voluntarily, but upon a Superstitious Per-
 swasion; they devoted themselves as a
 Sacrifice for their Countries Safety, and
 therefore come not within the present Ar-
 gument; the *Cato* mention'd here was the
 Elder, as *Servius* Judiciously remarks, ||
 to whom also as is observ'd by the same
 Critic * that Excellent Line belongs, worth
 all *Pliny's Panegyric*.

Secretosq; Pios, his dantem jura Catonem,

Wherefore if *Virgil* was a proper Judge,

† *Æn.* lib. 6. || *Æn.* 6. * *Æn.* l. 8. Ut supra dixi-
 mus *Censorium* significat non *Uticensem*. *Servius* ad lo-
 cum. Though *Montaign* misapplies it to the other, lib. 1:
 chap. 35.

who

who were the greatest of all the *Romans*, if *not one* of those whom he Celebrates as such, did *ever kill themselves*, the Examples of *others*! who did so, ought not to be of any Authority. The same Observation may be confirm'd by the choice which *Manilius* † also makes of several Great *Romans* to the same purpose; only I think he speaks of the *latter Cato*. To these I may add *Martial*, (if it be worth the while) who declares against this Act more than once.

Nor was this only Condemn'd by the Judgment of their greatest Men (for who can stand in Competition with *Cicero* and *Virgil*) but was expressly Prohibited by the Ancient *Roman* Laws. *Tarquin* punish'd those who Murther'd themselves, by exposing their Bodies Naked, as they did the most Infamous Criminals: The same *Servius*, above-mention'd, tells us upon *Amata's* || hanging herself, that they who did so were forbidden Burial by the Pontifical Books. This is also confirm'd by an ancient Inscription, which being of a very particular kind I shall insert the greatest part of it.

† *Astron. lib. 1.*

|| *Æn. lib. 12.*

*Donatio Sepulturae ex authoritate Militibus alijsq;
Quorum Memoria infamis, Sassina.*

BÆBIUS GEMELLUS
SASSINAS MUNICIPIBUS SINGULEIS
INCOLEISQUE LOCA SEPULTURAE D. S. P.
DAT EXTRA AUTHORETIS ET QUEI
SIBEI LAQUEO MANUS ATTULISSENT
ET QUEI QUÆSTUM SPURCUM PROFE
SSI ESSENT SINGULEIS IN FRONTE
P. X IN AG. P. X. INTER. PONTEM
SAPIS ET TITULUM SUPERIOREM QUEI
EST IN FINE FUNDI FAGONIANI. *

where?

By this it appears, that one *Bæbius Gemellus* gave a piece of Ground, as a Burying-place, for those to whom the Law deny'd Burial, and whose Memory was counted *Infamous*, viz. Bauds, or Whores, and Soldiers, that had been broken for Misdemeanours, and *Self-murderers*; the first sorts were Odious and Infamous among the Ancient *Romans*, a Warlike and Modest Nation; and with these Self-murderers are joyn'd in the same Note of Infamy, which was the greatest that they could lay upon any Offender after Death: But as the *Stoic Philosophy* prevail'd, these

* See the rest in Spons Miscell. Erudit. Antiquitatis. Sect. 7. p. 264.

Laws were either *favourably* interpreted, or quite *neglected*; and one while it was usual for 'em to ask the Senate leave to kill themselves, and not * allow'd otherwise.

And though many became their own Executioners by Blood letting, as this Author observes, yet this does not prove, that the *Romans* thought it either Natural or Lawful for any Man *whatever* to kill himself. They who did thus were *Condemn'd before*, it was reckon'd an Act of Grace from the Tyrants they suffer'd under, to let 'em chuse their own Deaths, which if they did not, some Officer was ready to dispatch them. Besides by this means they sav'd their Estates which were *Forfeited* when they were put to Death *Publickly*; which though *Tacitus* calls *pretium festinandi*, was but an *accidental* Advantage to Self-murderers, not a Reward propos'd for their *making hast*. The Law to deter the Committing of great Crimes, ordain'd that such as were put to Death by the Executioner shou'd forfeit their Estates, aswell as their Lives: They who kill'd them-

* *Quintil. Declam. 4. Qui Causas Voluntariæ Mortis in Senatu non reddiderit, insepultus abjiciatur.*

† *Tacit. lib. 6. Annalium. Promptas ejusmodi mortis metus Carnificis faciebat, &c.*

selves evaded this part of the Law, by not falling under any Publick Executioner; not that there was any positive Law that he that kill'd himself shou'd save his Estate, as some who are not acquainted with *Tacitus's* way of Writing have thought.

To summ up what has been said upon this Head, if Self-murder was not practis'd by the *Romans*, during the first six hundred Years; if this was the time wherein they were at the height of their Virtue; if not one of those, who according to the Opinion of the most Judicious *Virgil*, were the greatest Glory to their Country, did ever kill himself; if both he and *Cicero* were against it in their own Judgments; if there were several Laws by which it was severely Punish'd among them; then the Example of this great Nation is rather against Self-murder than for it: This perhaps may be further confirm'd by that which is to follow.

I mention'd just now the *Stoic Philosophy*, as one great Cause why Self-murder began to prevail among the *Romans*, in the decay of that Glorious Republick. The next Objection which rises in our way is grounded upon the Doctrine of this Sect, who being in great Reputation of Old for
their

their Learning, Wisdom, and strict Morality, and whose Books falling often into our Hands when we are young, and leaving lasting Impressions upon many People, require a particular Examination.

C H A P. X.

The Rise and Progress of the Stoics: A short Account of their Philosophy, particularly as to the Moral part; when, and for what Reasons it spread among the Romans: That Self-murder is inconsistent with their other Principles; this prov'd by some Instances from their greatest Authors, Seneca, Epictetus, Antoninus.

AFTER several of the Wits of Greece had spent their time in useleſs Gueſſes, and vain Diſquiſitions, concerning ſuch things, as whether falſe or true, cou'd ſerve very little to the influencing of Mens Actions: *Socrates* the moſt diſcerning and the leaſt corrupted Soul that ever ſaw by the Light of Nature, ſhew'd 'em a more profitable and more noble uſe of humane Reason, made it to look firſt into it ſelf, and to regulate thoſe Paſſions and Appetites, that were grown ſo great an Injury, and ſo juſt a Scandal to it: This was a very tender Point,

Point, and yet this wonderful Man, by the sweetness of his Temper, by his Easiness and Affability, by his acknowledging that he *knew nothing*; prevail'd upon a great many to hearken to him; and by *his Death*, which was more Glorious, more Exemplary, if possible, than *his Life*, won over many Thousands more.

What he thus successfully began had other Advantages from those two great Men *Plato* and *Xenophon*, who had been his Scholars, and who recommended their Masters Principles to the World with all the happy Advantages of Eloquence, in such a clear Method and prevailing Style as represented naturally the Calmness of his Mind, and the Sweetness of his Conversation: This made his Followers multiply and grow Famous by the Names of *Academicks* and *Peripateticks*, whose Tenents differ'd very little, under two great Leaders *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

But of those who heard *Socrates* with Admiration, one of the chief was *Antisthenes*, * who us'd to walk every Day forty Furlongs for this purpose, that which pleas'd his humour most was to hear him Discourse of Patience, Constancy, Forti-

* Diog. Laert. in Anthist.

tude, and Freedom from all Passion whatsoever; this hit so very much with his severe and crabbed Temper, that without regarding what *Socrates* Discours'd of *Meekness*, *Humility*, and *Affability*, and his continual *Example* of whatever cou'd be Excellent in *those Virtues*; he fasten'd upon the former alone, in a short time set up for himself, and became the Founder of the *Cynics*.

But the Doctrine both of *Plato* and *Aristotle* lost ground immediately after their Decease; they who succeeded *Plato* in the Academy, besides their want of his great Abilities, his Elevation, Sagacity and Politeness, came short of him in his Virtues, being guilty of Covetousness and great Enormities. *Aristotle* who died about Twenty four Years after him, enjoyn'd his Friend *Theophrastus* to conceal his Books, which was done carefully for many Years; during which time his Followers in the *Lyceum* taught only by Tradition, which made his Opinions liable to be Adulterated, and such as were Genuine to lose very much of their Spirit and Vigour: While the *Academy* and *Lyceum* were under these disadvantages, two very great Genius's appear'd much about the same time, *Epicurus* and *Zeno*; the first was for
advancing

advancing a new Principle of Morality, and indeed a very strange one, as commonly understood; which was *Pleasure*: And conformably to this he new dress'd up the Systeme of *Democritus*, and us'd the Gods worse by his manner of owning them, than *Anaxagorus* had done by discarding them entirely: In all Ages the *Natural Systeme* has been fitted to the *Moral one*, and where-ever you find *Libertinism* encourag'd, under the popular pretence of asserting the right of humane Reason, there you will meet with a world ready made to the purpose, and God, and Providence excluded, for fear of being injurious to the *Liberty* and *Property* of humane Nature.

But *Zeno* took a very different way, he had heard *Crates* many Years, yet cou'd not allow of the Brutality and Immodesty of the *Cynics*, and therefore went over to *Xenocrates* and *Polemon*, the Successors of *Plato*, these he followed very much in his Principles, but still retain'd the severity of the others in his Manners.

From *Plato* he taught the being of one God, Supream over many others, and that the World was Govern'd, and Mankind particularly, by his Providence: And though he and his Followers mention Fate frequently, yet this signifies generally only

ly that Series of second Causes, that Method which is observ'd by God in the Administration of that Providence.

He taught further, that the *first* Principle in humane Nature, was the *preserving of ones self*; that Nature recommended us to our selves in the strictest manner, as *Cicero* makes *Cato* speak at large; that the End of humane Life, and the measure of all our Actions, was the *following of Nature*. This Maxime was common to all the *Platonists*.

But *Zeno* resolving to set up a new Sect, though without any Reason, as *Cicero* proves excellently †; though he durst not reject this Principle which was so readily embrac'd by every body, yet he endeavour'd to give it a new turn, to weaken and obscure it by many Niceties and Distinctions, and so make way for several of his Principles, especially that of Self-murther, which were otherwise too plainly inconsistent with it.

And here I intended once to give a particular Account of this matter, but it growing unavoidably longer than I expected, and full of their Contradictory Subtle-

† *Lib. 4. definibus.*

ties and Absurd Distinctions; and having already stated || the true meaning of this Principle, I think it may suffice to direct such as are curious to *Cicero's 3d and 4th. Books de Finibus*, and to *Plutarch's Discourses against the Stoics*.

Having resolv'd then (I say) to retain this Principle, and yet in spite of it adhere to that of Self-murder also. They assign'd in the next place five just Causes (as they call'd 'em) for putting it in * Execution.

1. For ones Country,
2. ones Friend,
3. great Pain,
4. loss of Senses or Limbs,
5. incurable Diseases; some add extreme Poverty or Disgrace.

These are some of the Chief things which they call'd Indifferent, neither Good nor Bad in themselves; and therefore below the concern of their Wise Man, and yet they made these the chief measures of the Reasonableness of Self-murder.

Furthermore they taught that their *Wise Man*, i. e. any one that followed their Principles strictly, * cou'd not possibly be deceiv'd in his Opinion, therefore never ought to repent or change his Mind;

|| Cap. 2. & 7. sup.

* See Diog. Laertius. it Cicero. pro Murzena. it li. 3. & 4. de finib.

that all Mankind, except themselves, were Madmen and Fools; and equally so, inso-much that there wou'd not have been the least difference between *Socrates* and *Anytus*, had they liv'd after *Zeno*, and neither of them been *Stoics*; but as for themselves, they were all *Kings, Wise Men, Rich, Beautiful, above the World, and equal to the Gods*. To fortifie themselves in this strange *Vanity* they taught further, that a wise Man ought always to observe the same Method, keep the same Manners, Looks and Appearance; that all Faults were equal, that all Passions were alike blameable, therefore that a *Stoic* ought neither to ask Pardon, nor grant Forgiveness.

And that their Manners might be answerable to their Opinions; they added that a wise Man ought to be austere; that Truth was the more wholesome, though less pleasing for its roughness: This *Zeno* retain'd from his first Masters the *Cynics*, and encourag'd in opposition to *Epicurus*, and withal to prevail upon the People by the old yet still successful Cheat of Plain-dealing; as if it were necessary for Sincerity to be Savage, and a Philosopher must unavoidably forgoe his Humanity in order to be Virtuous; nay, as if Virtue to recommend her self to the World, wou'd

chuse rather to appear in a *Brutal* than a *Humane* form.

This fullen contracting of themselves, stiffen'd 'em by degrees into *Stubbornness*, instead of *Constancy*, and whilst by the vain Rants in which they celebrated their own *Merits*, and madly mixt the *God* with the *Beast*, whilst their Pride, I say, made 'em undertake and profess what they cou'd not compass and maintain; as soon as they met with any great Calamity, they forgot all their *fine Harangues* of *Patience*, *Honour*, *Courage*; turn'd short and fell upon themselves in a Rage, and seem to have reserv'd this Principle of Self-murder as a *back Door*, to use their own *Metaphor*, by which they poorly stole away, when they cou'd not carry on the Cheat any longer.

Thus we see the Rise of this Sect, Compounded of the Principles of the *Platonists* and the Manners of the *Cinics*, and how contrary Self-murder is to their Doctrines of Providence, Self-preservation, things indifferent; and pretended *Apathy*, and nothing but the effect of their Pride and *Stubbornness*.

As to its prevailing among the *Romans*; this was much about the time above-mention'd, when that Famous Republick arriv'd to the *highest-pitch of its Glory*, though
not

not of its *Power*: *Zenoflourish'd* about the 129th. *Olympiad*, the beginning of which was about the 489th. Year from the Building of the City; the first of his Followers that I meet withal, of any esteem among the *Romans*; was *Panatius*, who was the Master of *Scipio Emilianus*, the Younger *Africanus*, about Fourscore Years after *Zeno*.

To know the means by which it came to prevail, it will be necessary to consider the Particular Genius of the *Roman Nation*. After the *Expelling* of their Kings, the *Publick Good* seems to have been the *Universal End* of all their Actions: This they pursu'd with a noble Emulation, and with an equal contempt of *Danger* and *Self-Interest*; to this it was that they Sacrific'd not only their Ease, their Wealth, but even their * Children sometimes. † *Justice and Goodness prevail'd among them, not more through Law than Nature; whatever Quarrels and Debates they had: Were with their Enemies; they contended with one another about Virtue only; Magnificent in their Publick Devotion; Frugal at Home; Faithful in their Friend.*

* ——— gnatosq; pater, nova bella moventes,
Ad pœnam pulcra pro libertate vocabit ———
Vincet amor Patriæ, &c. Virgil says of Brutus, *Æn. 6.*
so Torquatus, *lb.* † *Salut. Bell. Cit.*

ships: All which was strengthen'd and confirm'd by their great and general regard to Religion, which continu'd till they fell into Avarice, Luxury, Bribery, and till the base Senate it self became saleable: 'Tis worth the while, says that excellent Historian, when one has consider'd the Houses and Villa's built now a days like Cities, to visit the Temples of the Gods, which were rais'd by our Ancestors, the most Religious of Mankind; but they adorn'd the Altars with their Piety, and their Houses with the Glory of their Actions; nor ever took away any thing from those they Conquer'd, unless the Power of doing Wrong. But now Oppression, &c.

Indeed no People in the World was ever so inclin'd to be *Religious*; all *Publick Business*, the meeting of their *Assemblies*, the choice of their *Magistrates*, the engaging with their *Enemies*, *depended upon Religious Observations*, which how *unreasonable* soever in themselves, were diligently consulted, and faithfully obey'd. Their *Generals*, their *Magistrates*, the greatest Men they ever had in *Peace or War*, had as much regard to these, (excepting one or two Instances) as the *common People*.

And here I cannot but observe by the way, what *awkard Imitators* of the *Romans* some People are, who study that Common-Wealth only in its decay; embrace the Vices and Opinions (as this of *Self-murther*) which occasion'd or attended the Ruin of it; and in the first place think it necessary to be Atheist's, in order to be good Republicans.

Conformable to this were their Manners, Plain and Sincere, Inflexible in their Resolutions, Grave in their Deportment, severely Virtuous; this was the *Masculine Air* which they gave, that noble Constancy, that Probity, that Honour, which distinguish'd 'em from the rest of Mankind, and made 'em *truly greater before* they Conquer'd the World, *than after it.*

The *Roman* Nation being of this temper, were naturally prepar'd to receive the *Stoic Philosophy*, especially not being prepossess'd by any other.

For though *Pythagoras* had liv'd and grown Famous in one part of *Italy*, yet the *Romans* who were given wholly to *Arms*, seem'd to have heard little or nothing *if him*, or to have minded any thing of *this nature*, till *Greece* being subdu'd and *Macedon* reduc'd into a Province, they

sent their Sons to Study at *Athens*, where by their Natural temper they soon chose out the *Scoics*, from all the other Sects, to follow.

At the same time *this Philosophy* appear'd in *Rome* it self with great Advantages, by *Panatius*, who was entertain'd in the Family of the *Scipio's*, and grew into much Veneration among the *Romans*, upon account of the great Virtues of *Scipio Æmilianus*, which were suppos'd to be owing to his Instructions, and Conversation; having mention'd this *great Man*, it will not be wholly foreign to my purpose, and perhaps some relief to the Reader, to make a little stand and take a short view of him. *P. Cor. Scipio* who defeated *Hannibal*, had but one Son, who was of a very infirm and sickly Constitution, which hindred both his meddling with publick Affairs, and his having any Children; but * attending his *Uncle* and *Father* in the Expedition against *Antiochus*, and being taken Prisoner by him, and Conversing with many of the *Learned Grecians* in his Court (where he was nobly us'd) was † one of the first of the *Romans* who had any

* See this at large *Livy*, lib. 37.

† *Cicero*, in *Cato* Maj.

taste of the *Politer* sort of Learning. At his Return, lest the Name of the *Scipio's* should fail, he adopted one of the Sons of *Paulus Æmilius*, who was the same Person we speak of, who had the *Courage*, and all the *other Virtues* of the first *Africanus*, as well as of his *own Father*; and after many Glorious Victories in *Spain*, in one of which he || kill'd the Champion of the Enemies in a single Combate; after the Destruction of *Numantia*; was chosen out for the Rasing of *Carthage*, that Ancient Rival of the *Roman Power*.

But all this while, after the Example of his *Father by adoption*, he mingled the *milder Studies of Letters* with those of *War*; his Tent entertain'd *Philosophers* as well as *Officers*; and *Panætius* and *Polybius* constantly attended him, the *one* the best able to regulate his *Actions* according to *Virtue*, the *other* the best qualified to *Record'em*. *Paterculus* * an Author of very great Wit and Integrity, when he did not write too near his own times, gives this Character of him, *that no Man ever laid out the Intervals of Business more Elegantly, that he was the most Eminent of his Age for all En-*

|| Appian, Alexandrin de bel Hispan.

♦ Paterc. lib. 1. cap. 12.

downments of War or Peace; that in his whole Life he never spoke, did, or thought a thing that was not Commendable. This Panaetius, though a profest Stoic, had nothing † of the Soverneſs and Sullenneſs of that Sect, and therefore did not corrupt the mild and generous Temper of Scipio and Lælius, but rather made 'em more Humane. He deſpis'd the Morofcneſs as well as the Pedantry of that Sect, was clearer in his Diſcourſe, gentler in his Carriage than the reſt of them, and had a reſpect for Plato, Xenocrates, Ariſtotle and Theophrastus: 'Twas with this Panætius, with Polybius, with Lælius, and with Terence, that this great Man us'd to retreat out of Town, in his latter Days, to avoid the Corruption of the Times, then begun and ſpreading apace; and when I conſider him thus, ſo well ſkill'd to make the beſt uſe of Life in all Events; Bold and Active in War, Gentle and Studious in Peace, retiring from the noiſe of his own Fame, encompass'd by the moſt ingenious Friends, and the moſt able and faithful Counſellors; and Virtue and Modeſty carefully chæriſh'd, in the miſt of the beſt Senſe and the greateſt Courage; when I conſider him in theſe

† Vid. Cicer. de ſoiſ. lib. 4. in item oration. pro Muræna.

Circumſtances,

Circumstances, I cannot but think him the Wisest, the Best, the Happiest of all the *Romans*, and that in some respects; the Retirement of *Scipio Emilianus* is to be prefer'd before the Court of *Augustus*.

Thus did the *Stoic Philosophy* come recommended to the *Romans*, and appear'd at first so Beautiful in these Men that it cou'd not well be resisted; but if it *then* prevail'd through *choice*, it quickly grew *necessary* for them afterwards; for they were forc'd to call it to their assistance, in its *roughest* and most *frightful* shape, in the dreadful Calamities which they fell into, under the Bloody Tyranny of *Marius*, *Sylla*, &c. || as I observ'd before; then was it that *Self-murder* began to be in *vogue*; then was it made use of by the Luxurious and Cowardly, as well as by the Brave; all seeking for ease, by voluntary Death, from the horrid Barbarities of those Times, and though the *Stoic Philosophy* lost some Ground in the Calm and Peaceful Reign of *Augustus*, yet it regain'd it again with greater Reputation than ever, under *Tiberius*, and continued so to do under his immediate Successors; for then the greatest part of the People of Quality (as a

Modern Critic * observes) turn'd *Stoics* to enable themselves to support with Constancy, the incertain Humour of that *Jealous Dissembler*.

But the chief Advantage which the Principle of Self-murder had in that Age, and which remains very dazzling to this Day, in some Mens Eyes; it drew from the Writings of *three* great Men, that were *Stoics*, *Seneca*, *Epictetus*, and *Antoninus*; all well stor'd in other Respects, with excellent Rules for the improvement of Mens Manners, with noble discoveries of Reason, and great encouragements to Virtue; it will be necessary to compleat the removal of this *Prejudice*, to take a short view of *each* of these Persons, and shew by a few Instances drawn out of their Books, how *inconsistent* this *Doctrine* of *Self-murder* is with *those other things which are there deliver'd*.

Seneca is the first in time, and who by the Ingratitude and Injustice of *Nero* in his Death, as well as by his *Writings*, has acquired great Reputation; but how justly upon this last *Account*, that great Judge *Quintilian* will tell us; † *He was not very exact*

* *Rapin. Reflex. sur la Philosophie* cap. 11.

† *Quint. lib. 10. cap. 1. Ex industria Senecam, &c.*

in his Philosophy; but a notable Prosecutor of Vice: He has many excellent Sentences, and many things worth the Reading, relating to Morality; but most of them are corrupted by his Style, and that the more dangerously, because he abounds with pleasing Faults. You would heartily wish, says he, that he had written with his own Wit, but then that it had been guided by another Man's Judgment. He is so very fond of every thought, that he always forgets his Argument to drop his Wit, and yet through Affectation of saying things prettily, he says a great many very sillily; for Instance, * *Injuriousum est rapto vivere, at contra pulcherrimum rapto mori*; here the Wit is as flat as the Argument is false; for what is *raptum* can never be *pulcrum*; sometimes indeed he has something noble, but it seems to be against his will. While he aims at something extravagant which he is not able to reach: His thought becomes reasonable and just by chance; 'tis lofty, but he intended it to be out of sight; 'tis regular and great, but had he succeeded in his aim, it had been Monstrous and Gygantick; while he is speaking of the most solemn parts of Philosophy, and has just wound you up into a Veneration of him, he often falls

into a Frolick of a sudden, and starts aside in some jirking Period, and makes you ashamed of the Attention you have given him: In a Word to declaim against *Luxury* in a *persum'd stile*, to talk of nothing but *Mortes meras*, as he says of himself in *Effeminate Harangues*, to offer a few *Points* instead of *Arguments*, may entertain perhaps for a while, but never, never persuade: Nay, there seemsto be a great deal of Reason in what a Modern Author says of him, * *I never read his Writings without an Opinion quite contrary to that which he would recommend to me; if he would persuade me to Poverty, I long for Riches: His Virtue frightens me, &c.* It would not be difficult if this were a proper place to make this Good by several Instances; but my Subject confines me to such alone as are Contradictory to Self-murther. First let us hear him, as to matter of Extreme Pain; *He denies that a wise Man can ever be otherwise than Happy though in greatest Torments; that since Happiness consists in being Virtuous, and Virtue consists in bearing Pain or Torture well; he that does so, which a Stoic always will, must be Happy. Epicurus, he tells us, says, That a wise Man might cry,*

* St. Evremonts *Essais*, part.

in * *Phalaris's Bull*, *How sweet is this?* The same wrote to his Friend upon his Death Bed thus, † *This is the last and most happy Day of my Life*, and yet he was Tormented at that Moment, with the *Strangury* and an *Ulcer* in his Bowels; upon which he reflects, *this Voice was heard in the very shop of Pleasure*. Why should this then seem incredible among those that profess to obey, not Pleasure, but *Virtue*?

In another place || he admires one *Demetrius* for calling a *Quiet Life*, without any incursions of Fortune, a dead Sea; to have nothing to stir you up, to whet and try the firmness of your Mind upon, is not, says he, *Tranquility*, but being becalm'd. *Attalus* the Stoic us'd to say, *I had rather be in Fortunes Camp, than in her Lap*: Suppose I am *Tor-sur'd*, I bear it bravely, why then tis well. I am put to Death, yet still I suffer valiantly, why that is well too. *Epicurus* would tell you 'twas delicious; but I will not apply so effeminate a Word to so glorious a thing. I am *Burnt*, but not *Conquer'd*; why then should not this be *Desirable*, rather than *Dreadful*? I do not mean the being *Burnt*, but the being *Unconquerable*: Nothing is so admirable, so lovely as *Virtue*; whatever she commands us to suffer

* Ep. 66. † Ep. 92. || Ep. 67.

is not only Good but Desirable. This is one of his most common Topics; and yet extraordinary Pain is one of the chief Causes which *Stoics* assign for the reasonableness of Self-murther.

If we consider him also as to the Gods, sometimes we find him very Reasonable and Submissive. Thus * *I do not obey God so much, as assent to him: It is by choice and not necessity, that I follow him. Nothing shall ever befall me that I will receive discontentedly, or with a melancholy look. There is no kind of Tribute, but what I will pay readily; yet all the things which Men use to groan under, and tremble at, are but the Tribute of Life, &c.*

† *'Tis best to endure what you cannot mend, and follow that God without murmuring, who orders all things: He is but an ill Souldier that with groans obeys his General; wherefore let us receive his Orders Cheerfully, and cry out in the Words of Cleanthes:*

*Lead on O Destiny! and thou O Jove,
Whatever you ordain, behold I move.
I follow gladly---should I shrink--- yet still
Lead on: I follow though against my Will.*

* Ep. 96. † Ep. 107.

*So let us live (says he) and so speak, that Fate may find us prepar'd and chearful; that Mind is great indeed which resigns it self up to God, but that is little and degenerate which is always struggling, always thinking amiss of the Government of the World; and will be for the correcting of the Gods, rather than it self. This is very solid, take it alone, but joyn the Principle of Self-murther to it, and it can mean nothing; but he does not always keep in these Bounds, to give one Instance only. Speaking of Philosophy, * By this, says he, you shall not only excel all Mankind by much; but the Gods shall not much excel you. Wou'd you know the only difference between you and them? 'tis this, they will live longer.—— Nay there is something in which respect a wise Man (a Stoic) exceeds God: For his Wisdom is owing to his Nature not himself: How glorious a thing is it to have the Weakness of a Man, and yet the Security of a God—— Such stuff as this is very Consistent with Self-murther, for when a Man has lost his Wits he is accountable for nothing. But how very unlike himself is this Man? How full of Palpable Contradictions, and therefore how little to be regarded?*

The next eminent Stoick among the Romans was *Epictetus*, a Man of an humble Mind, and most virtuous Life. As much above *Seneca* in all other respects, as he was below him in his Fortune: For he was a Slave, lame, and exceeding poor; and yet had sufficient amends made him by Providence for all these Evils, by the Greatness of his Understanding, and his Virtue, as two ancient Greek Verses, design'd for his Statue, tell us,*

*A Slave I was, and in my Body maim'd,
As I was poor; yet by the God's esteem'd.*

Tho' the Principle of Self-murder is scatter'd up and down those Discourses, which are collected by his Followers; we may from hence observe that he labour'd under three of those things at once, Poverty, Lameness, and Slavery; which the Stoicks reckon'd to be reasonable Causes for killing ones self, yet he liv'd to a great Age: And this seems owing very much to that lively sense which he had of God's Goodness, and that perfect Submission wherewith he receiv'd all the Dispensations of his Providence: Thus *Arian* represents

* Apud Aul. Gellium, lib. 2. cap. 19.

him breaking out into a Rapture of Gratitude.

* If we had any Common Sense, says he, what shou'd we do else, either in Publick or Private, than sing Hymns to God, magnifie and praise him? Ought we not when digging, plowing, or eating, to do this? — And since most Men are too dull or ignorant to do so, shou'd there not be some one that shou'd discharge this Office for the rest? — What then can I do better, a lame and decrepit Old Man, than celebrate my God? Were I a Nightingal, I wou'd do as a Nightingal, or a Swan, what became a Swan; but as I am endow'd with Reason, I will always Praise God. This is my Duty, and this I will perform while I have my Being, and to the same Employment exhort you all. If a Cripple, a Beggar, a Slave cou'd do thus, who can ever be excusable for being Ingrateful to Heaven?

Thus too as to Submission to God: Did I ever murmur at the Methods of thy Providence? I was Sick (so were others too indeed) when thou thoughtest fitting; but I was so willingly: I was Poor too, as thou wou'dst have it, but I was so gladly. I never bore any Office, and because thou wou'dst not have me, I never desired it; but didst thou ever know me Discom-

* Arrian Epiet. lib 1 cap 16.

tented upon this Account? Did not I always approach thee with a chearful Countenance, ready to obey thy Commands? Wouldst thou have me be gone, I am ready to obey. I render thee all thanks imaginable that thou hast vouchsafed to let me thus long behold thy Works, and concur withal the Dispensations of thy Providence: O may Death find me meditating upon these things, Writing or Reading such things as these.

* Dare to lift up thy Eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter however thou pleasest; I am of the same mind with thee, and perfectly indifferent as to all Events. Lead me wherever thou thinkest fitting. Give me what part thou pleasest to Play, whether a Magistrate or a Private Person, a Rich or a Poor Man, at Home or in Banishment: I will defend thy Providence before Men, in every one of these Events, and demonstrate the Nature and the reasonableness of them. O wondrous force of Reason! What brighter Beams were ever darted from the Light of Nature? but alas to what purpose can they shine when joined with the Principle of Self-murther? What force of Eloquence can ever Reconcile Resignation and Rebellion, Dependence and Despair?

To these let me add the Emperour *Antoninus*, who was one of the wisest and the best, as well as one of the greatest Men of all Antiquity; there is a Natural Sweetness and Goodness which runs thro' all his Writings, which *softens* the rough air of *Stoicism*, not but that they always retain the dignity of his *Quality*. Sometimes he exceeds *Epietetus* in the Solidity of his thoughts, always keeps up to him, and never falls into the Rants or Levities of *Seneca*: One of the chief things that he thanks the Gods for, was the *doing good to others*; this was his Study as much as the Improvement of himself. And this not only the meanest of his Subjects, but his worst Enemies found, as soon as he could be made sensible that he had any, for although he was ever fond of forgiving Injuries, yet he was one of the last that discover'd them: * *The best way of Revenge*, says he, *is not to become like him who Injuries you: Delight and please thyself in this one thing alone, the passing continually from one Act of doing good to Mankind to another, after God's Example*. Did God ever intrust so much Power so well, or was he ever Represented better? but let us hear him in Relation to the Subject in Hand,

Speaking of what he had learnt from his Relations, Friends, or Masters: * *Apolonius*, says he, taught me to be always free, to be unalterably Constant, to have regard to nothing else, no not in the least, but right Reason, to be evermore the same in acutest Pains, loss of Children, or tedious Diseases.

|| Remember thou art old, says he to himself, and suffer not thy Reason, thy Principal Part, to serve any longer; to be mov'd backward and forward by any Passion; nor to take ill thy present Destiny, or decline thy future.

† Let every Action and every Thought be such as if thou wert just leaving Life, and if there be Gods to leave it can be no harm; for they cannot intend their Creatures any Mischief; If there be not Gods, or if they take no care of humane Affairs: To what purpose is it to live in such a World, as is without Gods, or without Providence; but there are Gods, and they do take care of Mankind, and have put it into their Power not to fall into any of those things which are really Evil, &c.

* Be thou (my Soul!) like unto some Promontory, upon which the Billows beat continually; but that remains unmov'd, and forces 'em to fall off on either side, and slide gently into a

* Lib. 1. Sect. 5. || lb. Sect. 16. † Lib. 2. Sect. 8.
 * Lib. 4. Sect. 31.

Calm. Shall I cry out poorly, Unhappy me, whom this or that befalls; and not rather say, Happy me, who am able to bear it; who am neither shockt with what I feel now, nor frighten'd with what may come hereafter; such an Accident might have happen'd to any one as well as me, but nobody cou'd have born it so well as I. Why shou'd I call any thing Unhappiness, which cannot reach or injure Humane Nature? Search into thy self impartially, Can that which has befalln thee, make thee less Temperate, less Modest, less Knowing, or less Prudent? Can it hinder thee from being Just or Generous? If not, remember when any Accident inclines thee to be discontented, Remember I say, that the thing which befalls you is really no Unhappiness in its own Nature; but that you are able to support it undauntedly is a real and great Happiness.

** He that runs away from his Master is a Fugitive: The Law is our Common Master, he that declines obeying that runs away from it; and thus does that Man who Murmures, Rages, or Trembles at what has been, is, or shall be done; by him who Governs all things; who is that Law which distributes, to every one of us, the several parts of our Obedience. I cou'd easily produce more Instances, for they*

* Lib. 10. Sect. 23.

are to be met withal in almost every Page of his Book; if I did not think these sufficient to shew how Inconsistent Self-murther is with the other things which he Teaches.

But it is observable, that this great Man seems to be sensible of this himself; He never inculcates this Principle with that *Heat and Violence* which the others do: He cou'd not quit it wholly, as he was a *Stoic*, it being the Characteristic of that Sect, yet he mentions it but *twice or thrice*, I think in all his Book, and that too in so short and slight a manner, that he seems to be asham'd of it, and to be Conscious how Contradictory this was to that Submission to Providence, that Magnanimity and Constancy in all Events, which he recommends continually, and indeed it was impossible that it should take any root in so excellent a Temper: His great Regard to the Gods, his Natural Goodness and Moderation, made his Mind yield readily to all the Dispensations of Providence: Whereas the Vain, the Stubborn and Obstinate Mind, as it is quickly incens'd, so it snaps short immediately, and breaks rather than yields, even to God himself.

Thus

Thus I have given an Account of the *first Rise* of the *Stoic Philosophy*, shew'd the *Time when it began* to appear among the *Romans*, the *Causes* of its *Progress*; how the Principle of *Self-murder* in particular, come to be in Request, and to be put in Execution; how *Inconsistent this is* with the other Principles of that *Seet*, and particularly with what *is taught* by those *Three Authors*, whose Authority has Recommended it so much to the World; and if what has been said is true, as any one that Questions it may easily find if they will Examine the Authors which I have referr'd to, which I intreat them to do; then this great Prejudice, grounded upon the *Doctrine* and *Example* of this *Wise* and *Virtuous* Seet, ought not to sway any longer with them.

C H A P. XI.

Cato's Case considered in Particular. His Character. His Enmity against Cæsar. The several Circumstances of his Death. What may most Probably have been the true Cause of it. And of the great Encomiums which were given him afterwards.

HAVING thus given some Account of the Roman Nation, and of the Philosophy of the Stoics, the way lies the more open to consider the Case of Cato's Death; who was so great an Ornament to both, and whose Example is so much pleaded in the behalf of Self-murder.

Nothing is more reasonable than that one or more ill Actions shou'd escape the Censure of Posterity; under the Splendour of a great many good ones; but the Perverseness of some People will not allow of this, who being given to think out of the way, and maintain dangerous Paradoxes, are always searching into the Lives of great Men, to pick out something to justify their Pretences.

Wherefore though it be a very ill office to disturb the Ashes of the Dead, and to call in Question those Encomiums, which have

have long since ripen'd into Glory, yet when such Authorities shall be thus dangerously abus'd, and great Names brought in instead of sound Arguments, it is absolutely necessary to enquire into the Matter of Fact, as well for the Vindication of the Dead, as the Information of the Living.

Of all the Examples that are brought for Self-murder, *Cato* is the most Considerable; wherefore in order to the making a right Judgment of this Matter, it will be necessary to do these things

1. To form a just and true Idea of him, by considering his particular Temper, and what it was that distinguish'd him from other Men.

2. To consider him as he stood in Relation to *Cesar*.

3. To Examine exactly the several Circumstances of his Death, and from these shew the true Causes of it: And when this is done,

4. To inquire into the Reasons usually given for its being so much applauded, and assign the true ones.

I. We are to form a just Idea of him,
 &c. To this End we are to consider in
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the first Place, That he liv'd in such an Age, wherein the Common-wealth was at the *very worst*; the lower sort as well as the higher were Drown'd in *Luxury*, and by their *Expensive Vices* lay open to the *Bribery* and *Corruption* of the Ambitious: The *Laws* and *Liberties* of *Rome*, the *Publick Good* which their Ancestors had Studied and Improv'd with *so much Glory*, were quite forgotten; and several Parties form'd to *usurp*, not *defend* the Government; Places of greatest Trust and Authority were *sold Publickly*, and they who bought 'em made haste to be whole again by *selling* Truth and Justice. Among these Corruptions *Cato* grew up untainted in his Integrity, not to be work'd upon by the *Impunity*, or rather the *Reputation* of these Crimes, nor to be frighted by being left single and *alone*; but bravely opposing himself against the Enemies of his Country, notwithstanding the Pride and Insolence of their Wealth or Power: Indeed never was there a more *sincere* Lover of the Publick Good; never did any Man incur *so many Dangers* to hinder the passing of Factionous and Destructive Laws: No body found out *so soon* the Ambitious Designs of *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, no one oppos'd 'em *so long*, though back'd by the *Bribed Senate* and

and *Multitude* at home, and by two Victorious Armies abroad. Notwithstanding he was sometimes pull'd out of the *Rostrom*, Pelted with Stones, threaten'd by the Soldiers, dragg'd towards Prison; he continued still to *upbraid* the *Magistrates* with their *Corruption*, and the *People* with their *Dullness*: In a Word, if we consider *Cato in private*, none was more Chaste, more Upright, more Studious of Virtue; if we behold *him in Publick*, none was more Courageous to *accuse* and *condemn* the *Guilt*, and to *Protect* the *Innocent*. Yet his humour was always Austere and Rigid, of which he gave very early Signs by his Voice, Looks and Actions; he was seldom observ'd so much as to *Smile* when he was a Boy; he was slow to Learn, Spoke little; was not to be terrify'd into any thing which he had not a mind to, as appear'd by his settled Look and sullen Silence; when one of his Uncles Friends held him out of the Window, and threatend to let him fall. *

This Temper prepar'd him so much for the *Stoic Philosophy*, that † one says very well of him, he was a *Stoic by Constitution*; and

* See Plutarch, in his Life.

† Le jeune Caton fut stoicien par pur temperament. Rap. Reflex. sur la Philos. cap. 10.

there-

therefore when he once came to Study it; he embrac'd it so eagerly, and overshot himself so much, while he aim'd to excel all others that Profess it, that this which improv'd others did him harm; and the *Philosopher* was plainly a Disadvantage to the Roman. For this made him *Obstinate* rather than *Constant*, *Morose* instead of being *Grave*, and *Soure* when he wou'd be most *Sincere*: His Humour was not only always overcast, but sometimes broke out upon his *best* Friends in indecent Passions; his Temper was rather *Stiff* than *Steady*, for he was as *Inflexible* in the *Wrong* as in the *Right*; he withstood *Compassion* as resolutely as *Bribery*, and avoided common *Decency* as much as *Flattery*; he would come into the *Forum* with nothing but his under Garment on, and that loose, his Bosom and his Feet bare, and in this Condition sit upon the Bench when he was *Prætor*; and pass Sentence of Death upon those of the best Quality: *Ptolemy* King of *Egypt* being at *Rome*, and desiring to speak with him, he sent back word, as he was upon the *Close-stool*, that he might come to him, if he had any thing to say to him. When he return'd from *Cyprus*, and the Consuls, *Prætors*, and all the Senate came out in Procession to the *Tiber* Bank, to receive him

him with the greatest Honour, he minded 'em not in the least, row'd by 'em, and Landed higher.

This gave a suspicion of his setting too great a value upon his Actions, and being liable to something of vain Glory, especially when upon *Cicero's* taking away the Tables from the Capitol, wherein that which had pass'd during the Tribuneship of *Clodius*, (who was advanc'd to that Office *unduly*, and who was the most *Infamous Wretch* of that Profligate Age) was Recorded; he made him return 'em again, because his Expedition to *Cyprus* wou'd otherwise have been forgotten; which says a Learned Historian *, he valued himself upon extremely, and desir'd of all things to have that confirm'd.

His opposing the *Agrarian* Law which *Cesar* pass'd, (by outrageous Violence) and yet afterwards *Swearing to defend it*, wou'd have made any one hope that he might have abated something of his rigid Humour *for the Publick Good*; but this he wou'd never be perswaded to, but reject'd the offer which *Pompey* made of *Mar-*

* Dion. Cassius. lib. 39. Item Plutarch. in Cicero. & Catone.

rying his Daughter, which wou'd have prevented his Affinity with *Cesar*, and the League with *Crassus*, which immediately followed : Afterwards, when it was still in his Power to make amends for this false step, and he own'd that *no way could save the Liberty of Rome but his being Consul* ; he refus'd to apply to the People in the usual manner as other Candidates always did, and for this very Reason † only, *lost it* ; by these Passages, and many others which I cou'd add, it must appear that this great Man had his Failings, that he was not altogether free from Vanity, that his Stubbornness was injurious not only to his Friends, but to his Country.

II. Let us consider him in the next place in relation to *Cesar* ; never were any two Persons in the World more contrary || in their Humours and Manners, *Cesar* was Polite, Affable, Courteous, desirous of Power by any means whatever, Praising, Giving, Helping, Obliging ; which opposition of Temper was enough to breed Enmity between any two Men,

† Dion Cassius. lib. 41.

|| See the Characters of these two great Men excellently drawn by Salust. Bell. Catilin.

engag'd often in the same Place, and about the same Affairs; but this was greatly encreas'd by Family Injuries, *Cæsar's* Intimacy with *Servilia*, *Cato's* Sister, being the talk of all *Rome*; this *Cato* himself was confirm'd in by an odd Accident: During one of the Debates concerning *Catiline's* Conspiracy, *Cæsar* receiv'd a Billet in the Senate-house; *Cato* who had insinuated before that he had been privy to their Proceedings, and thinking something might be in that Paper to that purpose, demand'd to see it; but only found in it something very kind from his Sister, which made him throw it at him in a Rage, calling him Drunkard: The hatred which was thus grounded, increas'd to such a degree afterwards, that he mov'd that *Cæsar* shou'd be given up to the *Galls*, oppos'd him furiously in every thing: *Cæsar* on his side writ a bitter Invective against him, wherein he ridicul'd his Austerity, and reproach'd him for several Vices. This, if we consider how desirous of Glory, and how very much inclin'd to Passion *Cato* was, (no Man ever more, notwithstanding his being so severe a *Stoic*) must needs have mingled his *private Enmity* with his concern for the *publick Good*; and out of this in great measure was it that he sided

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with

with *Pompey*, who he knew had the same Designs upon the publick Liberty which *Cæsar* had.

After the Battle of *Pharsalia*, he went into *Africa*, hearing that *Pompey* was retir'd that way, and meeting with the news of his Murther upon that Coast, consults with *Scipio* and *Juba* about opposing *Cæsar* in *Africa*; leaves them the Command of the Field, and puts himself into *Utica*, which he made a Magazine, and where he soon receiv'd the news of their defeat.

III. And now we come in the next Place to consider the *Circumstances of his Death*, which require particular Attention, in order to the judging of the reasonableness of it.

As soon as the news of the Defeat at *Thapsus*, was confirm'd by Letters from *Scipio* and *Juba*, he endeavour'd to persuade the People of *Utica* to resist *Cæsar*; but finding 'em averse to it, and not to be trusted, he gives 'em an account of the Stores; and upon this, Feuds encreasing between the *Italians* and *Africans* in the Town, and both being in danger from the *Numidian* Horse that had fled thither from the Battle, he endeavours to pre-
serve

serve one Party from another, beseeching some of the Horse, even with Tears, not to leave the *Roman* Senators, that were with him, to the Perfidiousness of the *Africans*.

I will not suppose that his great Spirit was broken upon this occasion, or that this *sudden mildness* of Temper, which never appear'd in his whole Life in Publick before, was the effect of any thing but kindness and good nature towards that People who had admitted him into their City; but it is plain that if he had then made use of something of that steady Resolution wherewith he had oppos'd *Metellus* and *Cæsar* in the *Forum* formerly, it might have been of greater benefit to his Party.

Afterwards hearing that *Cæsar* marched towards him and *Lucius Cæsar* offering to intercede for him, he refuses it; telling him, * *If I wou'd save my Life, I ought to go my self, but I will not be beholden to the Tyrant for any Act of his Injustice; and 'tis unjust for him to pretend to pardon those as a Lord over whom he has no Lawful Power.* This is full of Personal and Passionate hatred: However he perswades his Son to

* Plut. in Catone.

go to him. He took also great care to dissuade his Friend *Statilius*, who was a *Stoic*, a great Imitator of *Cato*, and a * known *Cæsar-hater*, (as *Plutarch* calls him observably) from laying Hands upon himself: After this he sups according to his Custom, but there arising a Stoical Question concerning *Liberty*, he maintains it with so much heat, as to give suspicion to his Friends that he design'd to Murther himself, which made his Son steal away his Sword: Afterwards retiring into his Chamber, he encreases their fears by taking leave of his Son and Friends, and embracing them in a more passionate manner than usual; when they were gone he takes *Plato's* Dialogue of the Soul, and Reading it, calls for his Sword, but no body bringing it, when he had ask'd for it twice or thrice, he calls for all his Servants, falls into such a *Rage*, and strikes one of them with so much *Violence* that he wounds his own Hand, and in such a manner too, that it hindred him from killing himself out-right afterwards; then he cry'd out aloud that his Son and his Servants had betray'd him to the Enemy, Naked and Disarm'd; upon which his

* Καταπαύειν πομπήν αὐτοῦ.

Son and Friends running in Weeping, and Embracing him, he starts up and looking fiercely upon them, crys, *When and where was it that I lost my Understanding? Why does not some body forsooth teach me what I ought to do, that I must be disarm'd and not suffer'd to take my own Measures? — And you dutiful, Sir! why do not you tye your Fathers Hands behind him, that Cæsar when he comes may find me Helpless and Defenceless? — As If I wanted a Sword, when I can die, if I thought fitting, by stoping my Breath a little, or dashing my Brains against the Wall; upon this his Son going out Weeping, he turns to the two Philosophers Demetrius and Apollonides, who only were left with him; And are you too of opinion, says he, that a Man of my Age ought to be forc'd to Live, and do you sit here to watch me, or do you bring any new Reason why Cato despairing of any other means of Safety, ought to accept it from his Enemy? If you do, let me hear it, that throwing off those Principles according to which we have hitherto Liv'd, and being made more wise by Cæsar, we may be the more beholding to him, &c. After this they going out, and the Sword being brought him, he cry'd now I am my own; Read over Plato's *Phædo* twice more, and about break of Day Stabs himself. But this not being suffi-*

ent to kill him, and the Wound being bound up he rends it open again, pushes back the Surgeons, tears his Bowels in peices with his own Hands, and Expires: That which is most strange in all this is, his Reading *Plato's Phædo* so often, because there is not one Passage in it to encourage Self-murther, but many *against it*; nay, the whole is so; for no one that admires the *Death of Socrates*, can ever die like *Cato*.

Montaigne quarrels with those who impute *Cato's* Death to fear of *Cæsar*, or to vain Glory; *Senseless People* says he, * he would rather have perform'd an handsome, just and generous Action, to have had Ignominy for his Reward, than for Glory. I do not think *Cato* indeed was ever capable of fear, his Courage was perfectly Roman, and never fail'd his Integrity, and if he was capable of vain Glory in some Passages of his Life, I cannot see any ground for the least Imputation of it in his Death. This was owing much to his inflexible Temper, and to that Sect which he profess'd even to Ostentation: But it is to be suspected that his hatred to *Cæsar* was the chief cause of it; that this mislead his Judgment, made him

* Lib. 1. cap. 36,

give all *for gone too soon*, and drove him into those *strange Passions* which he fell into *before* he Stabb'd himself, and that *furios Rage* in which he Expir'd *afterwards*: *Stattilius* who strove to imitate him in all things, is said to have been a *profest Cæsar-hater*, all his last Words are *full of Cæsar*, and I do not doubt but every one will grant that if *Pompey* had been in *Cæsar's* Circumstances, *Cato* would have *remov'd some whither*, and not have kill'd himself; and this was the thing *he should have done*, not surrender'd himself up to *Cæsar*, or sent to treat with him; this indeed had been below his Character, but retir'd and preserv'd himself for a better Opportunity of serving his Country; whereas by giving way to *his Passion* and *private Resentments* he contributed *greatly to the ruin of it*.

IV. This brings me to enquire into the Reasons which are usually given for his Death being so much applauded; and to assign the true ones.

It is generally supposed that *Cato* dy'd *for the Liberty of Rome*, and this is one of the chief Grounds upon which the Encomiums of him were rais'd in after Ages: But it prov'd quite otherwise, for next to *Pompey's* Death, *Cato's* was the greatest

blow that his Party ever receiv'd; upon the News of it, *Juba*, *Scipio* and *Petreius* kill themselves immediately, and *Afranius* surrendred, who was afterwards Slain. These great Men had a dependance upon his *Wisdom*, *Honour* and *Reputation*; their routed Troops offer'd to obey him; *Juba* cou'd have rais'd another Army immediately, or all of them might have gone over into *Spain* to *Pompey's* Son. *Cato's* Speech to the People of *Utica* is very Remarkable. That if they continu'd firm against *Cæsar* they wou'd avoid his Contempt, and the sooner find his Mercy; that *Cæsar* was perplext in many difficult Affairs; that all *Spain* had declar'd for the younger *Pompey*; that *Rome* had not yet taken the Toak wholly, but was ready to shake it off upon the first opportunity; that it had fallen lower and yet rais'd it self. This was all very true, but then it was as true to him as to them, and since they rejected it, he ought to have follow'd it: And if he had done so, how many more tryals might he have had for the *Liberty of Rome*, *Africa* had not been wholly lost at that time, the younger *Pompey* would have had more time to have strengthned himself, or had he gone to him with those excellent Commanders *Petreius* and *Afranius*, 'tis very probable that

that *Cæsar* might have lost that Battle, which was the *most doubtful* and *most bloody* that he *ever fought*; and which he gain'd only through the folly of *Labiens*; or after that he might have retir'd into some place unknown, for the *Roman Empire* was not extended to that degree then, or ever after, that there was no place to retire to, no means of evading Tyrants fury but Self-murder: And though he could not *have prevented Cæsar's greatness*, yet he wou'd still have been *a curb upon him*, and at least have made him use his Fortune more *moderately*; nor was it long before Opportunity did offer it self to recover again his Countries Liberty.

I do not think that *Cato* wou'd have been drawn into the Conspiracy against *Cæsar*; I believe his great Mind was not capable of consenting to the *Murdering* even of *his mortal Enemy* in *so base a manner*; but afterwards he might possibly have joyn'd with them, supported the Virtue of *Brutus*, and restrain'd the Fury of *Cassius* against *Anthony* and young *Octavius*, and wou'd have been in all respects a *great strength* to their Party, for notwithstanding *Brutus's Character*, his Ingratitude to *Cæsar* lost him many Thousand *Romans*, that would gladly have come in to *Cato*.

Where-

Wherefore if we consider these things impartially, though it is commonly said in Justification of *Cato's* Self-murder, that he dy'd *for the Liberty of Rome*, 'tis plain that he *stab'd it himself*; yet not *purposely* but *accidentally*, in such a manner as a Man that resolves himself a Mischief, might in his rage stab his own Father that cling'd about him.

There is one thing by which *Cicero* wou'd prove that *Cato* ought to have dy'd in this manner, and that is *Decorum*, * which is the same with maintaining a Character; a certain likeness between all our Actions, an unalterable equability of Life: And this is grounded upon the difference between Universal and particular Humane Nature, of which something has been said above; This *difference of particular Natures, which forms the several Characters of Men, is of that force*, says he, that *sometimes one Man ought to kill himself, and yet another in the very same Circumstances ought not*; For was † not *Cato's Case* the very same with those others who *surrendered themselves to Cæsar in Africa?* and yet per-

* *Cicero de Officijs*, lib. 1. Sect. 31.

† *Montaign* is very much pleas'd with this Passage, lib. 2. cap. 11.

haps it would have been blameable in them to have kill'd themselves, because their Manners were gentler and easier; but as Nature had given Cato an incredible Gravity, and he had confirm'd this by a perpetual Constancy, and had always remain'd unmoveable in what he had once resolv'd and undertaken; it became him rather to die than to see the Tyrants Face.

Here this great Man seems to give in too much to the Principles of the Stoics; upon which (though well corrected in other places) that excellent Treatise is founded: They laid down in the first place, that a wise Man *cou'd not possibly be mistaken*; upon this they advanc'd, That *such a Man ought never to change his Opinion, or way of Living or Acting, but be always the same*: Now if the *first* cou'd have been true, the latter wou'd have been *reasonable*; but alas! it is far from being so, the wisest and the best of Mankind may err in his Opinions and consequently in his Actions; and therefore nothing can be more *dangerous*, than to maintain that a Man *ought never to alter*. 'Tis true *Levity and Inconstancy* are great and *unmanly* Faults; but next to the not being in any Errour *at all* 'tis the greatest Wisdom to get out of it *quickly*; and the doing so is no more *Levity and Inconstancy*

Inconstancy than when a Man has mistaken his way, and is *running* upon a *Precipice*, 'tis Levity and Inconstancy to *turn back again*. To *persist* in an Errour is *Stupidity*; this is the *Constancy* the *Decorum* of Brutes; but to get out as soon as possible, not only becomes the Dignity of humane Nature, but improves it in the *highest manner*, since every Errour we leave the more we have of *Truth*, and consequently partake the *more of God himself*.

Decorum is the Beauty which is reflected from *Vertuous* Actions, the *first care* shou'd be concerning the Actions, that they be *Virtuous*, and the *Decorum* will follow *naturally*; but when People mind *this first*, 'twill be always of ill Consequence. To observe a Resolution *steadily* is so much the *worse*, if the Resolution be not *just*, and is no more than being positively in the *wrong*, wherefore it should have been prov'd first that Self-murther was *Lawful*, for if it be not so, no Plea can be *weaker* than that of *Decorum*, which in this Case is nothing more than *habitual Stubbornness* and *profess'd Injustice*; and as for the Evil which is pretended here for Cato's dying; Namely, the *seeing the Tyrants Face*; this was not *necessary*; he might and ought to have sav'd himself with the other Senators, and strug-
gled

gled still 'against all Opposition, for the Publick Good, as I said before; and then Rome might have receiv'd him with open Arms, as she did *Terentius Varro*, after the Battle of *Cannæ*, though lost by his Rashness, because he *did not despair of her Safety*; or if she had not, he had still observ'd *Decorum*, in the best the noblest way; for Duty will be always decent, and nothing else can be truly so.

This Passage of *Cicero's* puts me in mind of what I said concerning him above, when I brought him in against *Self-murther*: He is so directly in his *Somnium Scipionis*, as *Macrobius* shews sufficiently: * That Excellent Piece was written before *Cato's* Death; when his Judgment was Free. Afterwards *Cicero* being of the same Party that *Cato* was, and being carry'd away with that Torrent of Applause which that Age run into. He makes all the shifts he can to palliate and excuse his killing of himself, and is very hard put to it to do so, as may appear from the Instance which we have been just now discoursing of; and his making *Socrates's* Case and his the same, i. *Tuscul. quest.* than which nothing can be

* Chap. 9.

more unreasonable; but if any Body should be so zealous in this matter as not to be satisfy'd with this; his Authority shall be wav'd if they please.

To conclude this Point, if it be ask'd after all, What shall we say to those *Encomiums* which were given to this great Man? How could so many People be in the wrong? How could his Death ever have been so much Applauded if not Reasonable and Lawful? The true Causes of this great Applause were,

1. That he was a Man really of the greatest Probity, Honour, Integrity, Courage, the truest Lover of his Country that can be found in any History, that the Faults of his Life were fewer, and the Excellencies brighter than any other Example can afford.

2. That upon this Account the Character of the other *Cato*, which was very great, sunk into his, and in after Ages what was said of the Former was attributed to the Latter.

3. That as to his Death, there are some Actions which become Famous not for their *being Reasonable*, but for their happening at a *particular time*; *Cato* kill'd himself *just upon the alteration* of the *Roman Government*; He dy'd *with the Roman Liberty*

Liberty most certainly, whether he dy'd for it or no, and the more that *Liberty* was mis'd, the more was his Death Applauded; the two great *Revolutions* of the *Roman State*, the Birth and Death of that *Glorious Republick* was attended by the *Self-murder* of two most *Virtuous Persons*, which being Celebrated with so many *Encomiums*, has deceiv'd many People; but the *Virtues* of their *Lives conceal'd* the *Errours* of their *Deaths*, and the Publick being so far concern'd in them, ran away with their *Applause*, which Posterity has receiv'd from Age to Age without much Examination.

From what has been said I hope it doth appear, that as no Example of *Self-murder* ought to sway with us, either upon account of the *Romans Practice*, or the *Doctrine of the Stoics*, so this of *Cato* in particular ought not to be of any Authority in this Case.

C H A P. XII.

Concerning Courage, what the Nature, Proper Object and Use of it is. The mistakes concerning it, and the occasions of them. That Self-murder is not the natural Effect of true Courage.

Other Pretences there are for Self-murder which are grounded upon mistaken Notions of Courage, Honour and Liberty; the first of which is Courage.

In so Warlike an Age and Nation as this is, it might perhaps be taken amiss, for any one to enquire what Courage is: But that they who abound most in anything that is commendable, always bear the Examination of it best.

Here we meet with our Author again, who is more Lofty than usual upon this Occasion. **When I frame to my self, says he, a Martyrology of all which have perished, by their own means, for Religion, Country, Fame, Love, Ease, Fear, Shame; I blush to see how naked of Followers all Virtues are in respect of this Fortitude, &c. The Martyro-*

*Donne. pag. 51.

logy (as he calls it) follows consisting chiefly of Thieves, Minions, Gladiators.

As to the Causes of this Fortitude which he mentions here, to omit at present what relates to Religion, what concerns dying for ones Country, has † been spoken to at large, the Motive of Fame shall be consider'd in the next Chapter, as also that of Shame. But how the killing of ones self upon the account of Ease, Love, nay Fear too, shou'd be Instances of Fortitude is very strange.

By Fortitude here I suppose meant the same with what is call'd Courage. This being generally look'd upon as a great Virtue, and Self-murder believ'd to be an Effect of it: It will be necessary to make a particular enquiry into it, not only for the clearing of this Mistake, but several others rising from the same Root.

1. Let us see what is the Nature, Object and use of Courage, particularly as Rational and Humane.

2. What the Mistakes are concerning it, and what are probably the Causes of them. And this being done I shall shew,

3. That Self-murder is not the Effect of true Courage.

1. As to the Nature of it, Courage is only the Effect of an active and vigorous heat in the Heart as its Name imports in many Modern Languages, which Heat sends forth many brisk and lively Spirits which diffuse themselves through the whole Body and prompt it to Action; so that this is Common to other Creatures as well as Man; and therefore not any Virtue naturally, the Virtue of it depends upon the goodness of the Object, and proper use of it.

2. As to the Object: All Objects work upon Creatures which have Life either under the Notion of *Good*, or under the Notion of *Evil* (as to things indifferent our Passions are not concerned about them:) As to what is or seems Good, if this is easie to be obtain'd, the very Appearance of it is sufficient to make the Soul reach after it without any occasion for Courage; and if we cou'd imagine a Man to be wholly at ease, to abound in all things he can wish for, and to be secure in the enjoyment of them, such a one wou'd have no need of Courage, and therefore it wou'd languish and die away
by

by Degrees. But on the other side, if any thing presents it self as an obstacle in the way to that which we take to be Good, or if any thing which we take to be Evil threatens us with danger, then the Soul looks out and views the Enemy, and according as it finds its strength prepares to attack or resist it; from whence it appears that the proper Object of Courage is Evil. Thus a Modern Author, * *Fear is the Opinion of hurt from the Object, Courage is the hope of avoiding that Hurt by Resistance.* Or as another, † *Courage is a Power of the Soul which employs the Forces of the Mind to overcome Evils, or to put a stop to 'em.* From whence we also come to a knowledge of

3. The proper use of Courage, namely to Attack or Resist what is Evil.

What has been said hitherto may belong to Beasts as well as Man, the proper use of Courage, as belonging to Man, consists in the promoting that End for which he receiv'd Life; the use of Courage in Beasts is to preserve Life, but since Life was given Man to a more excellent End, as has been shewn; whatever Springs there are in Humane Nature, of which

* Hobb's Leviath. p. 1. chap 6.

† De la Chamb. Char. des Passions, vol. 2. cap. 1.

Courage is one of the Chief, must be suppos'd to be intended, as subservient to this End, and therefore the Justness and Regularity of their Motion, must be measur'd by it accordingly. First then humane Courage ought to be inform'd truly concerning its Object; to have a *right and certain* knowledge of its *being Evil*, which Reason will quickly discover: Secondly it ought to Attack or Resist that Evil in such a manner, limited and directed by such Virtues as may hinder it from interfering with any part of our Duty towards God, our Neighbour, or our selves. This makes Courage to be founded upon *Justice*, and directed by it, otherwise it wou'd be Evil it self.

It has been said already that Courage is twofold, either such as Attacks or such as Resists Evil. Let us bring both of them to these Rules.

1. As to that part of Courage which consists in Attacking Evil, the measure of this is, that the Evil be real which we attack, that it be attack'd with * Justice; from whence it follows that a Man's

* Ea animi elatio quæ in Periculis cernitur, si Justitia vacat, in vitio est. Itaq; probe definitur à Stoicis Fortitudo, Virtus Propugnans pro aequitate. Cicero de Offic. lib. 1.

Courage ought not to be the Instrument of his Ambition, his Covetousness, Anger, or Revenge; for these will make him not only fancy Evil where there is none, but attack it in such a manner as is most unjust: In this regard Beasts use their Courage better than Men, they always do it in defence of Life, to supply their Hunger, or to escape Death, when threaten'd some other way. But Man employs it against Man, when Life is far from being in danger, only to usurp over him; and therefore this kind of Courage is rarely employed by good Men, unless upon extreme Necessity; and yet even where such Necessity requires it, it must be always closely attended by Justice and Goodness, without which it would be nothing but injurious Insolence.

Yet commonly speaking there is seldom any thing in the World less regarded than Justice, by those who value themselves most upon this kind of *Courage*; pushing Courage as some call it, and what is most strange, although the World suffers so much by it, there is nothing that it is more apt to admire.

Hence it is that Impudence and Cruelty, Noise and Madness, want of Sense as much as Virtue, Oaths, Violence, Rash-

ness, Revenge, Injuring Man, and Blaspheming God is so often counted Courage.

These Mistakes begin early, they are some of the first Effects of the Baseness, and Degenerateness of humane Nature. Men either out of Cowardize, Worship what they fear, or else Admire it, because they find the same Principles in themselves, by which it usually Acts, as Pride, Ambition, Covetousness, Revenge; and would be glad to have it as an Instrument to compais such Ends as these aim at: This ill grounded Admiration is nourish'd afterwards by the Honour and Titles which are given to this successful Injustice, as such an one the *Conquerour*, or the *Great*; and by some Characters in Heroic Poetry. But Conquerour is generally a Fatal Title, the Badge of Absolute Slavery, and is generally felt more by the Heroes own Country than those which he adds to it.

And what should be meant by such an one the *Great*? The great Promoter of Arts and Sciences, the great Encourager of Virtue; No, the great Invader and Destroyer of Mankind: Or what are many of the Heroes of Poetry if stript of the Ornaments of Numbers, Wit and Eloquence, and consider'd in them-

themselves? Besides how oft is the Poet misunderstood and thought to Paint a *Demi-God*, when he intended perhaps a *Centaur*.

Thus *Alexander* himself seems to have been misled, when coming to *Achilles's* Tomb,*he is said to have cry'd out,*O happy Youth who hadst such a Poet as Homer to Record thy Deeds*. This false Admiration betrayed him into one of the worst Actions of his Life, the dragging the † Gallant *Batis* Governour of *Gaza* round that Town, as the other had done *Hector*, only for having defended it Faithfully and Honourably.

Homer indeed was an Admirable Poet, he always drew to the Life whatever the Original was; he represents *Thersites* Naturally, so does he *Achilles* too, but this was the worse for him; for *Achilles* was nothing but an insolent Bravo, Lustful, Passionate, Inexorable, Barbarous; *Homer's* design in that Poem was to shew, the ill Consequences of Dissention among Generals of several Governments in the same Interest. A lasting Lesson for *Greece*, which was divided into several little States. Not

* Cicero pro Archia Poeta.

† Quint. Curtius. lib. 4.

to draw *Achilles* for a Pattern to be Imitated; for his Lust and Insolence broke that Union, and was the Death of so many brave *Grecians*. Indeed few Heroes would be beholden to their Poets or Historians if they did 'em Justice. These are the Causes of the Mistakes concerning this sort of Courage, which imposes upon Mankind, first by its Noise and Splendor, and afterwards often enslaves them.

I have been the more particular in this matter, because this lawless Arrogance, which is often sown'd into a surly Brutishness, after it has been long Injurious to Man, and Insolent to God, when any thing happens cross to it, and it is Check'd or Controul'd by Providence, is very apt to fly out into Rage and Indignation, and because it cannot reach that, falls upon it self, and so becomes one of the most common Causes of Self-murther; which ignorant People take to be an Effect of Courage accordingly.

2. The other part of Courage consists in the resistance of Evil. And is that firmness and constancy of Mind, whereby it supports it self undauntedly under all Calamities, this is the more noble sort of Courage; because a Man cannot be unjust here towards his Neighbour, or towards

wards his God; for this consists in the bearing of all Events with Patience, whether they be Poverty, Pain, Loss of Senſes, Friends or Children, Diſgrace, &c. Some one of which, at leaſt, beſal moſt Men ſometime or other, and therefore every one ought to be provided with this kind of Courage, whatever he is with the other, becauſe there are much fewer Evils that require being reſiſted by Violence, than by Patience: This then is that Fortification which the Soul ſhould have always ready to retire unto, when it is ſurprized by ſudden Evils; and then it is, then chiefly that it has the moſt glorious opportunity of diſcovering it ſelf; for what nobler Idea can we form of humane Nature, than to conſider it beſet by ſeveral Evils at once, attack'd in its Body, Reputation, and Eſtate, and yet *undaunted*: And though left ſingly and alone, Arming it ſelf with Reſolution, Patience, and Conſtancy; whatever has been ſaid of the *Vulcanian* Arms of Old, ſuch as theſe are Impenetrable indeed, becauſe well wrought and tempered by deliberate Reaſon, by God himſelf, and beſtowed by him upon the greateſt and the beſt Men only. But alas! though this part of Courage is ſo neceſſary to Mankind, yet
it

it is least regarded, because 'tis against the wild Appetites and Passions which are indulg'd by the other; it has no Noise, Pomp and Ostentation, which glitter splendidly upon Corrupted Fancies; but is Calm, Easie, Regular and Modest, as all the Steps of Virtue, when guided by right Reason are.

If this is a right Account of Courage then,

3. Self-murder cannot be any Genuine or Natural Effect of it, in which of these Senses soever we take it, for,

1. That which makes the difference between Brutal and Humane Courage is Reason and Justice; now Self-murder has been shown at large to be highly against these, to be an Act of the greatest Injustice, and therefore in this Regard cannot be the Effect of Courage as Humane and Rational; nor can it be the Effect of Brutal Courage properly so call'd, because there is no Beast, though never so remarkable for Courage, that ever destroys it self; this will appear more plain if we consider,

2. The proper object of Courage which is Evil, I will not stay to show here how often Evil is falsely Represented and Magnified, or how many ways it is mistaken,
but

but supposing that to be really Evil which Men take to be so ; yet in the Case of Self-murder, the Soul instead of attacking or resisting what it takes to be Evil, flies away from it ; and therefore this Act is no more an Argument of true Courage than the rushing into a Torrent, the leaping down a Pit or Precipice in a Panic Fright, is so.

If *Courage* is the attacking or resistance of *Evil*, as has been shewn, then *Death* must be look'd upon as an *Evil*, before any Man can be suppos'd to shew his *Courage* by killing himself ; for where there is no *Evil*, there can be no occasion for *Courage*. Death can never be an Evil but when Life is easie and happy, and look'd upon as a great Good ; this makes it so honourable for People of Quality who abound in Wealth and Power, and all such things as make Life desirable, to hazard *theirs* for the Publick. But to them that kill themselves, Life cannot seem Good but Evil: And when Life becomes an Evil, through great Pain, Poverty, Disgrace, &c. then Death must be look'd upon as Good proportionably ; and if so, there can be no *Courage* in running to it. But on the contrary, 'tis the part of a brave Man, when Life becomes an Evil to him, not to fly

fly to Death, but to turn Head and engage with the Misfortunes of Life ; for here lies the Enemy as *Cæsar* told his frightn'd Souldier, An *unhappy Life* is the Field for true Courage and Magnanimity; whereas the killing of ones self is plainly to decline the Combat, to convey ones self away, out of the reach of the Enemy, to pass from a state of Misery, into a state of Ease or Indolency at least, as they suppose ; and this sure can be no great Argument of Courage.

That which is most apt to deceive People upon this Account, is the Notion which the World generally has of Death, as the greatest of all Evils, that it takes us through a Thousand Pains and Tortures from our Friends and Relations, our Projects and Possessions, and all the Enjoyments of the World : All which Terrours are increas'd by the sight of the Death of some dear Friend or near Relation ; for then humane Nature Starts and Trembles at the Ghastly looks and Convulsions of Expiration.

These are the things which make People grow up in a detestation of Death, and this is still augmented the more happy they are in their outward Circumstances ; Wherefore they who kill themselves may
seem

seem indeed to such People to have a great deal of Courage, because *these* run voluntarily into that which they abhor as the worst of Evils; whereas the Notion of Life and Death is quite contrary in such unfortunate Creatures; 'tis some Pain, some discontent that drives them to this Violence; upon account of which *Death*, as I said before, becomes the *Good*, and *Life* the *Evil*; therefore as it wou'd be true Courage in Health or Prosperity to *suffer Death*, rather than commit a *Crime*: So in Sickness or any Adversity it would be the same, to *undergo Life* rather than be *guilty of Self-murder*; for he who parts with Life, because he thinks himself Unhappy; parts with nothing but what he is *griev'd withal*. He only lays down his Burthen, quits his Virtue, his Arms, for fear of the Enemy, and where can be the Courage of this; even *Sardinapalus* and *Nero*, cou'd desert their Station in this manner; and why not with as much Bravery as any other can pretend to, In a Word, when the Heart gives way to Evils and Afflictions, when Hope is gone and Despair enter'd, Men may make themselves away out of tenderness and softness; there being little or no Pain to be felt in Voluntary Death; especially if

Men

Men will take but as much care as *Brutus* did, to place the Weapon right, or as the Emperour *Adrian* to have the Mortal Place mark'd out exactly.

What, shall we say then, that all Men are Cowards that kill themselves? No; but that this particular Act has naturally more of Cowardice than Courage in it, and is in those who have signaliz'd their Courage an act of Revenge or Indignation; and therefore though some Men of Courage have kill'd themselves, yet since the Nature of Courage consists in resisting Evil, and Self-murder is the flying from Evil; since many Women and Slaves, many Effeminate Men and Notorious Cowards, many for *Ease* or *Fear*, as our *Author himself* confesses, have kill'd themselves. Self-murder ought not to be look'd upon as the natural effect of Courage.

To confirm what has been said, I shall call several Persons of unquestionable Authority.

The Character of *Hercules* is certainly perfect as to Courage; and yet *Euripides* representing him in the greatest Affliction that ever Man could suffer through his own Fault; his Wife and Children lying Murder'd round him, by his own
Hand

Hand in his Madness: At first he has thoughts of killing himself, but immediately he checks himself with the Consideration; * *that he will not have his Courage question'd by doing so; that whoever cannot bear great Calamity will not dare to meet his Enemy in the Field. Wherefore he resolves to expect his Death boldly, and not to force it upon himself.*

† Another tells us, that to die wilfully for Poverty, Love, or any Grievance, is so far from being any sign of Courage, that it is meer Cowardice; for to avoid what is grievous, is nothing but Softness and Effeminacy; for no body chooses such a Death because 'tis Honourable, but because it frees him from an Evil which he cannot bear; and to be so affected is Cowardice.

‖ 'Tis the part of a brave Man, rather to despise Death, than hate Life. Cowards often undervalue their Being, only to avoid what is troublesome; but true Courage tries all things.

* Let me add one more, 'tis not law-

* Eurip. *Hercul. Furens*, Act. 4.

† Apollon. Rhodius *Nicom.* lib. 3. cap. 8.

‖ Quintus Curtius, lib. 5. Sect. 11.

* See Grot. de J. B. & P. lib. 2. cap. 19. Sect. 5.

ful nor becoming a Man of Courage to bend under his Destiny and not embrace whatever happens undauntedly; but run poorly away from it. This was the great Brutus who thus condemn'd Cato's Death, when cool and deliberate, and before he doubted whether Virtue was any thing but an Aery Name; * When he came to do so, no wonder that he kill'd himself.

Besides these, see Josephus's Speech, lib. 3. de Bell. Jud.

* Sen. Theb. Act 1. Sect. 1.

Non est ut putas *Virtus* Pater
Timere Vitam, sed malis ingentibus
 Obstare, nec se vertere & Retro dare.

—— Multos in summa pericula misit
 Venturi timor ipse mali fortissimus ille est
 Qui promptus metuenda pati, si cominus instent,
 Et differe potest ——— Lucan. lib. 7.

H A P.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Honour: That this is twofold, either Inward, a Principle of Virtue; or Outward, the Applause which follows upon it; That neither of these can ever require Self-murder: The mistakes concerning Honour, which occasion it. Objections answer'd.

THe next pretence for Self-murder is *Honour*. There is nothing I think that is more generally pretended to than this, excepting *Wit* only; and yet this seems to be as little understood as that; *Honour* People find is something that is commendable, though what it is they cannot tell; therefore every one being desirous to have their Actions pass for honourable; the Word is strain'd to as many Significations as they have Inclinations; often 'tis taken for some particular Quality, which is thought to belong more to one degree of Men, or to one Sex, than another: Thus in Women Chastity is Honour, in Men of high birth Truth and Justice, in Soldiers Courage, in Tradesmen punctual Payment; but since these several Qualities may be attended by great Vices: Since these things are truly

as commendable in one Person as another and equally required in all People, this is but a very imperfect account of *Honour*.

For this must be something which concerns all Mankind, and therefore humane Nature it self must be considered before we can come to any knowledge of it. The perfection of Humane Nature, and the great end of Humane Life has been shewn to be the *following of Reason by Virtue*; therefore what I said of Courage before, must be said of Honour now, that the excellency of it consists in the *promoting of this End*; now though whatever is an hindrance to this is call'd by the general Name of *Evil*, yet all Evil does not appear in its own natural shape, but often puts on the form of Good, and so works and insinuates it self into Man by his Passions and Appetites; wherefore Honour seems to be that Principle whereby the Soul is secur'd against both these kinds of Evil, in the quiet pursuit of the End of Life. And thus perhaps it may be describ'd.

Honour is an Elevation of the Soul, upon the sense of its Preheminence above the rest of the Creation, in regard to that great End of its being, the following of Reason by Virtue; a firm Reso-

Resolution to observe it; and a generous disdain of all Pleasure or Profit, all loss or danger, of whatever the World can promise or threaten; of whatever is dreadful or delightful in comparison of doing so—— So that this is the greatest excellency of Man's Nature, 'Tis a Spirit drawn off from the noblest parts of humane Reason, 'tis that God within us, as the Stoics speak; that divine Power which directs Man's Free-will, follows him diligently through every part of his Duty; Regulates his Knowledge and his Courage, and hinders the one from falling into Injury, and the other into Knavery.

1. This I take to be the first and most important meaning of the Word *Honour*, as it is an inward Principle of Action, and depends wholly upon ones self.

2. There is another signification of this Word *Honour*, as it depends upon other People, and is something of the same Nature with Reputation but above it, Reputation is esteem from supposed Excellencies, when we say such an one is reputed so and so.

Honour is Praise, Respect, Veneration, upon a clear Knowledge, a certainty of such Excellencies, and when this is given by many Men it is call'd Glory, so that Honour is twofold inward or outward:

But the last depends chiefly upon the Persons that are to bestow it.

The outward Honour which is truly Valuable, is the Image of inward Honour reflected back in the Applause of Good and Wise Men, upon a Man's observing faithfully the true end of Life, and making always a right use of those Powers by which he excells all other Creatures; in following impartial Reason by steady Virtue, what ever Dangers threaten or Pleasures flatter. Thus Cicero who understood this very well, though he was a little too forward to help himself to it, tells us that Glory (which is of the same Nature with Honour, though of a larger Extent) is * *something of substance, like solid Imagery, not the slight shadowing of fading Colours; 'tis the concurrent praise of Good Men; the impartial Verdict of such as are able Judges of Excellent Virtue.* So that where there is excellent Virtue for the Foundation, on the one side and where Men are qualified with Knowledge and Integrity on the other; the Honour which is given by such is solid and lasting, like the Statues of the Gods, and

* Gloria est solida, quædam res & expressa non adumbrata, ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta vox bene Judicantium de eccellente Virtute. Tuscul. Quest. lib. 3.

all other no better than the slight daubing of fading Colours which decays immediately.

But because the love of Honour includes the fear of Dishonour, and no Man can be desirous of Praise, but he must have a proportionable Aversion to Disgrace, it will be necessary also to observe from whence this comes, this must be from acting quite contrary to what was said above from forsaking the true end of Life, from refusing to *follow Reason by Virtue*, and deserting it wilfully to obey Vice; the result of this is first inward Disgrace, when the Soul abhors it self, and hates the sight of its own folly; and this when known, becomes outward Disgrace, which truly consists in the *concurrent dispraise of good Men*: But then we should take notice that though this is a great Evil, and though a Man may happen to fall into it, yet he may recover his Reputation or Honour again by taking the contrary Course; and following of his Reason by Virtue, and that the sooner, because good Men, upon whose Verdict Disgrace depends will be always ready to acquit others of blame upon reasonable Grounds, and glad to believe and proclaim their change.

If this then be an Account of Honour, how can it be pretended that it shou'd ever require a Man to Murther himself? for first as to inward Honour; if this be an Elevation of the Soul, rais'd upon a just sense of the Advantages which Man has above other Creatures, in the Powers of Knowledge and Free-will, and the excellent end which they are given for; and if it be a firm Resolution of pursuing that End, What can be more contradictory to this than Self-murder? What can it signifie to Man to have such Preheminences, nay to be made to any purpose at all, if the noblest Principle in his Nature shou'd teach him to decline that purpose; if that which was plac'd in him to support and improve his Being, shou'd require him not to be at all? Again if Honour be the generous disdain of whatever is Terrible or Dangerous in the way to our performing the true end of Life, and if it is always in a good Man's Power to perform this End? What Circumstances can be of such a kind, so Evil, so Painful, Dangerous or Dreadful, wherein Honour can put a Man upon killing of himself? Lastly if this be the guard which is to follow the Soul diligently through every part of its Duty, as to the chief Objects of it, God,
our

our Neighbour or our selves ; how can it ever perswade a Man to such an Act as is the highest Injustice to every one of these ? Whoever considers inward Honour which is the most worthy of a great or good Man's care in these respects ; he will find nothing more against Self-murder than this ; so likewise as to outward Honour, if this consists in the praise of good Men, grounded upon excellent Virtue, and if nothing is truly Disgrace, but what comes from the same Persons, for forsaking the true End of Life ; and if this though forsaken may be recovered again when the Party concern'd pleases, then how can any Man kill himself to avoid Disgrace, especially since killing himself is an Act of the greatest Injustice in the Judgment of the best Men ; and therefore the doing so must be increasing of Disgrace rather than avoiding it : Wherefore whether we consider inward or outward Honour, neither of these can ever require a Man to Murder himself ; and therefore I suppose that, whenever this is said to be done upon this Account, it is either meer Pretence, or else proceeds from some mistake concerning one or both of these kinds of Honour. Let us see then what these may probably be.

Some Men are deceiv'd by reckoning Honour nothing but a greatness of Mind, Elevation of the Soul, without considering upon what Grounds it ought to be rais'd, and by what Rules directed when it is so, from whence instead of any just Grandeur they fall into insolent Haughtiness, and this encreases upon the value which they set upon themselves, and that value is nourish'd by their choosing out some one Virtue affecting the observation of it in a more extraordinary manner than other People do, which makes 'em run over the bounds of what is fit and just, as far as the Idle or the Cowardly fall short of 'em: *Montaign* says very well, that * *the Virtue of the Soul does not consist in the flying high, but in walking orderly*. But these Gentlemen are contented with nothing but what is † *extravagant*; their Actions like the thoughts of young Poets are above the ken of Reason, too lofty to be Regular, too sublime to be Understood. Thus they become Prodigal instead of being Liberal, solicit Danger rather than resist it, and despise Justice as much

* *Essays* lib. 3. cap. 2.

† Honour is nothing but an itch of Blood,

A great desire to be extravagantly Good,
Mackenzys Moral Galantry. pag. 3.

as Cowardice: And this running 'em into great Inconveniences, making them to be obnoxious to humane Laws, or to fall into Poverty, Sicknefs or Disgrace; they know not how to be controul'd; repine under the ill usage which they think they suffer from God and Man, and foolishly imagine to be reveng'd of both by falling upon themselves.

Others again have taken up a particular Principle, proclaim'd it to the World, boasted of it at several times; as for Instance this of Self-murder, they have often maintain'd in Company, that it was reasonable in such and such Cases, and then falling into the same Cases themselves, think that they are obliged in Honour to put it in Execution.

But if Self-murder is unlawful in so many respects as has been shewn*, what can be more Absurd than for a Man to think it more Honourable to continue in the Wrong than to change for the Right*, and to be a *Martyr to Error* by his own Hand, only for the Reputation of Constancy and Perseverance in it.

But that which is the greatest occasion

* See more to this purpose, Chap. 11. concerning Decorum,

of Errour in this matter is the immoderate desire of Applause; the neglecting the Principles of Virtue upon which inward Honour is form'd, and aspiring impatiently to outward Honour only, and not only so, but mistaking the Persons who are to bestow it; and therefore endeavouring to please the *most* and not the *best*; the very same is done likewise in relation to Disgrace; this is that fatal Rock upon which many great Spirits have been cast away, and therefore there never was any considerable Moralist, but has cautiously warn'd People of it, and endeavoured carefully to recal them to consider the Dictates of Reason and Conscience, and *inward Honour*, to *Reverence themselves* and not the Multitude, and to do well for their own sakes without any regard to common Praise or Disgrace.

And indeed it might be enough to cure this, to consider attentively, how much a Man must undervalue himself in order to be rais'd in this manner; he that courts any one must endeavour to humour and please him; now this cannot be done but by being like him, by levelling a Man's self both to his Capacity and Inclination, by renouncing his own Judgment and following what he takes to be the
others;

others that is by counterfeiting both Ignorance and Vice: When any one of the Multitude is to be Courted. But who wou'd do this for publick Fame, who wou'd rake for Reputation so very low? This is no less than to invert the Nature of things, to make the Lees of Mankind the Fountain of all Honour, * and force its foul and heavy stream to mount upwards. And yet this is not the way of the World in matters of much less Importance than those which we are speaking of: Virtue and a good Conscience. In Building or Painting, in Musick or Poetry the sensible Artist does not appeal to the Multitude, but is contented with the Applause of the few skilful only: Shou'd not a Man then who has a just sense of his Duty, and who is conscious to himself of obeying his Reason faithfully by Virtue; shou'd not *such a one* be as well satisfy'd in *his* few Applauders as *he* that excells in any Art or Science.

Many Men indeed are apt to be 'deceiv'd by the noise, the bulk of a vast

* If Publick Honour were a thing of Value the Multitude would not have it to bestow; for it is not reasonable to think that Providence would deposit things precious in such Hands. It must chuse its Servants very ill, if these are its Stewards. Mackenzie ag. calum. p. 34.

Multitude; but can Number alter the Nature of things, or shall it be put to the Vote what is Good and Evil? A great many Men may be the stronger, as Beasts are when they gather into a Herd, but not the wiser nor the better Judges of Virtue, or Dispensers of Honour; and the best way to remedy this Errour wou'd be to take out the first Man that we meet withal in the Crowd we Adore, and to weigh his Education, Capacity and Honesty.

Wou'd you trust *such a thing as this* with a Secret? Wou'd you ask *his* Advice in any matter of Importance, the putting out your Money, disposing of a Child, &c? No certainly; and yet 'tis of *such Unites as these*, that the *Numbers* which are so courted, or so fear'd, are compos'd. 'Tis these whom Men would scorn to have Judges of their *Wit*, that they make the Judges of their *Actions*, and upon whose *Verdict* as to Honour or Disgrace they make their *Reason*, their *Consciences*, and their *Lives depend*. There is no Man that reflects upon this, but will allow how very much they are mistaken, who pay this strange deference to the World, it being almost impossible but that they who do so must be guilty of all other Enormous Crimes as well as Self-murther.

Where-

Wherefore let the distinction between *inward* and *outward Honour* be always carefully observ'd; let all good Men despise the *latter* in comparison of the *former*; for if this depends upon the Multitude, 'tis below their care; if it depends upon the best of Men, it does not want it; because it will naturally follow upon the acting according to the Principles of inward Honour, and if these Principles be faithfully observ'd, they can never lead to Self-murder; Because *inward Honour* is the guard of the great End of Life, and therefore can never prompt any Body to destroy it, it attends constantly upon impartial Reason, and follows it not by one but every Virtue, and therefore its Course is always Regular and even; it blesses the mind with a just and lasting Applause, makes it dear to it self, and generally to all the World, and therefore must hinder and prevent Self-murder rather than promote it.

But if this shou'd not be sufficient to give some Gentlemen satisfaction in this matter, I will suppose an Objection to this purpose. *A Man's Honour ought to be dearer to him than his Life; he may be abus'd to that degree as to forfeit his Honour if he shou'd bear it; and therefore he ought rather to kill himself; especially since Women themselves*

have done the same. Lucretia kill'd herself upon a Point of Honour, so did Cleopatra to avoid the disgrace of being led in Triumph; and both gain'd Immortal Applause for doing so. How much more shou'd any Man of Honour do the same; especially since there may be Cases much harder than theirs were: For Instance, a Man born Nobly, bred a Soldier, &c. — I will Answer first this Objection, with its Instances, and then consider the particular Case afterwards: 'Tis said here first, that a Man's Honour ought to be dearer to him than his Life, very True; if Honour be taken here for that inward Principle which secures Man in the doing of his Duty. Honour in this sense ought to be dearer to a Man than Life, that is, he ought to suffer the worst Extremities, even Death it self, rather than act against it; but then it is absurd for any Man to destroy his own Life upon this Account; because this kind of Honour is always in his own Power, and cannot be forc'd from him unless he consent.

If outward Honour be meant here, that is Reputation, this ought not to be dearer to him than his Life; because it wou'd then be dearer also than the great End of Life, Dearer than his Duty; and he must Sacrifice both his Reason and his Virtue to
maintain

maintain his Reputation; and that too among the worst of Men.

2. 'Tis said here, a Man may be abus'd to that degree as to forfeit his Honour if he shou'd bear it: This cannot be as to the *first sence of Honour*, for that will never be in danger if he be Innocent, how much soever he is abus'd; Power and Injustice may oppress Virtue, and a Man of the nicest Honour may be Unfortunate, but yet this Honour may be encreased by the manner of his bearing of his Misfortune, by his Deportment under great Injuries; to Kill ones self rather than bear 'em; is to be *unjust to God* in the *highest* manner, because another is *unjust* in a small matter *to me*; and this sure cannot be Honourable in the first sence; but indeed is nothing but an Act of Impotent Indignation and Revenge, of Pride, Cowardice and Despair, and therefore cannot be Honourable in the latter neither.

Nor is the Objection assisted by these Instances. The first of these indeed may justly raise Compassion in all that read her Story, and never had any Person more Statues rais'd to her; but it does not follow that because *Lucretia's* Death was much Applauded therefore it was *Lawful* or is to be *imitated*.

It

It was Applauded by the *Romans*, for being the accidental occasion of *Rome's* Liberty, and of the great Glory it rose to afterwards; and other Nations consented to this Applause, as they heard her Case, out of Compassion and Generosity, which is due most to those who fall into mistakes only through *too severe and nice a sense of Honour*: Far be it then from me to search farther into this matter. No, let the Garlands which have been hang'd over her Tomb by Chaste Wives and Virgins remain forever unshaken and unviolated: Let all the *Wit* that has been shewn in her Praise *pass for Reason*; but then let me entreat such as are most Zealous to vindicate the manner of her Death, to consider what has been said already, to prove such an Act *unlawful*, and withal to remember the Occasion of her using her self so; and allow at least, that it ought not to be imitated, but in just *the same Circumstances*; and then whether her living wou'd have been an Incouragement for Unchastity or no, (as the poor Lady thought) I am confident that her Death will not be any dangerous cause of Self-murther.

But for *Cleopatra*, she is very ill join'd with the other; the Example of *her Death*, ought no more to be followed than the Example

ample of *her Life*; she kill'd her self-as is commonly suppos'd upon a point of Honour: To be faithfull to *Anthony*, and to avoid the Ignominy of being led in Triumph.

As for the first Pretence, she was the utter ruin of that *Roman*, she engag'd him in a War with his own Country; lost the Fight at *Actium* by her flying away, when *Anthony* was as likely to Conquer as *Cesar*. Afterwards foolishly believing that *Cesar* was in Love with her, which she desir'd of all things, betrays *Pelusium* the Frontier Town of *Egypt* to him, and to make her own terms the better, occasions the Death of *Anthony* *purposely, by a false Rumour of her own; after this she endeavours to make *Cesar* fall in Love with her at an interview, which finding to be to no purpose she kills her self.

2 As to her killing her self to avoid being led in Triumph. Had she been careful of her Honour in the former part of her Life it wou'd not have suffer'd in this. That Custom of the *Romans* was Barbarous and Unjust, and the strangest Scene of Vanity, Licentiousness, and base Insulting, in the World; but the Dis-

• See Dion Cassius, lib. 51.

honour of it depended much upon the Character and Demeanour of the Person that was led in Triumph ; therefore it has not been always Ignominious to those who have been thus expos'd ; when *Ar-
sinoe*, *Cleopatra's* younger Sister, a Virtu-
ous Lady, was us'd so by *Julius Caesar*,
the Multitude was softened into Pity and
Compassion at the sight, and immediate-
ly reflected upon their own *Condition*, *
that they were in effect as much *Slaves* as
she ; and that great Man was never so
much overseen, both as to his Politicks
and Generosity, as in gratifying *Cleopatra*
at so dear a rate : So might it have been
with *Cleopatra* her self too, had she been
as Virtuous as she was Great. For where
is the Crime of being Oppress'd, or the
Shame of being Unfortunate ? How cou'd
the Multitude have ever dishonour'd her ?
Had not her own *Infamy* ran before her ?
What a strange niceness of Honour is it,
not to scorn to *commit* the foulest Vices,
and yet to scorn to *hear* of them : Honour
is truly lost when an ill Action is *commit-
ted*, not when it becomes *known*, and there-
fore it is very Ridiculous, though very
Common, to be easie as to the first, and

scrupulous as to the latter; for this is to make *Secrecy* the measure of Good and Evil; and no Vice *dishonourable* but only when it is *discovered*; where Virtue suffers publicly the Honour of the Publick suffers, this is Infamous to the State, not to the Person that is injur'd; whose Honour may be encreas'd by suffering as they *should do*: But where Honour is first blemish'd by enormous Crimes 'tis too late to be tender of it as to Publick Disgrace, or to think to redeem it by Self-murder; for this is not only a great Crime it self, but a Confession of all those which are laid to the Parties Charge. And though *Cleopatra* was so tender in this matter, yet other Persons of unquestionable Courage and Honour underwent the same Misfortune. Not only *Perseus*, but *Jugurtha*, whose Wit and Courage gave the *Romans* so much trouble, did so; nay *Ventidius*, the faithful Friend of *Anthony*, was first led in Triumph himself, and afterwards by a strange change of Fortune Triumph'd over the *Parthians*, the most dreadful Enemy the *Romans* ever had. But to oppose one Queen to another, *Zenobia* contended Personally with *Aurelian* for the Empire of the World, and fought with the same Spirit with which her Secretary

Longinus wrote. And yet when she had satisfied whatever Honour requir'd as to Action, she made use of it to bear her Adversity with as great a Mind as she did her Prosperity ; and therefore she did not Murther her self when she was to be led in Triumph ; but carry'd it so as to be consider'd with Admiration, and liv'd in Rome it self with great Respect many Years after.

Let me add one Instance 'my self, of great niceness of Honour, and that is *Sporns*. * He was married publickly to *Nero*, under the Name of *Sabina*, Saluted by the Titles of *Sovereign Lady*, *Queen* and *Empress*; nay the Cities of *Greece* (to their Immortal Honour) offered Sacrifice for their having Issue.

Yet this Person being commanded afterwards by *Vitellius* when he came to the Empire, to appear on the Theatre in the dress and manner of a Ravish'd Maid, chose rather to kill himself, because he cou'd not bear the Disgrace, as the * Historian says ; what niceness of Honour cou'd ever exceed this ? and how great a Credit was this Person, as well as his Husband *Nero*, to all Self-murtherers ?

* *Dion Cassius*. Liber 63, & 65.

Thus much to the first part of the Objection and the Instances brought to support it. Let us come next to the Particular Case that is brought to the same End, which is thus introduc'd. *How much more shou'd any Man of Honour do the same, especially since there may be Cases much harder than theirs were; (I have had one put to me much to this purpose) A Gentleman born Nobly, and bred a Soldier, having gain'd much Honour by many great Actions in his Countries Service, is afterwards by the Ingratitude and Jealousie of his Prince, accus'd falsely of some foul Crime, and Condemn'd to suffer a Publick and Shameful Death; the Question is, Whether such a one after he has stood his Trial, and done what he cou'd to clear and save himself, shou'd tamely expect the Death which he sees is Inevitable, let his Enemies have their Will over him, and be the Scorn and Derision of the Multitude: Or not rather disappoint their Malice and Contempt, and vindicate his Honour by killing of himself. I confess I am of Opinion that he ought not to do the latter by any means: For the Reasonableness of which,*

1. Let us see what may be the Character of a Man of Honour: (the Ignorance whereof so often misleads People in other Cases as well as this:) according to what

has been said above, *He is one who has a just and regular Elevation of Soul; whose Eye is always fixt steddily upon his Duty, and who disdains equally whatever Threatens or Flatters to draw him from it: One who is ever glad to be doing good to all Men, and abhors Cunning and Oppression as much as Cowardice. Or if we take Honour for Publick Reputation: He despises all but that alone which comes from Good and Wise Men; yet he prefers his Duty before this also; he values a Good Conscience above a Good Name, and therefore would be as Virtuous in a Desert, as in the midst of Prying Multitudes; nay would not be guilty of an unjust Action, though he shou'd be sure that it won'd be conceal'd from God as well as Man; much less to gratifie any Revenge, or to avoid any Disgrace.*

Now, though the Instance is given here in a Soldier, and many are apt to think, as well as those Gentlemen themselves, that *they* ought to be more concern'd to vindicate their Honour than other People are, I do not see any ground for this: If what I have said of Honour before, and also just now, (and chiefly to prevent this mistake) be duly observ'd; nay although Courage alone shou'd be the Standard of Honour, as some of them are inclin'd to believe,
and

and they shou'd think themselves bound to observe stricter measures in regard to this, than the rest of the World; yet this is not to be vindicated by Self-murder in the Case before us, as shall be shewn immediately.

2. The chief ground of this Plea is, *That such a one has stood his Trial, that he has done what he cou'd to clear himself, and for all that is unjustly Condemn'd:* But nothing of this alters the Case, this does not give a Man more right over his Life than he had before; and one sort of Injustice is not to be return'd by another: If Man is unjust to me, what excuse is that for my being unjust to God? *Socrates* was Condemn'd unjustly if ever Man was, yet he refus'd * to save himself by flying out of Prison at his Friends entreaty; because he reckon'd it against the Laws of his Country, and unjust to do so. How much more would he have thought it unjust to have evaded the Sentence by Self-murder; for this is an Act of the highest Injustice, and what is so can never be Honourable; wherefore a Man of Honour in these Circumstances, is not to be sway'd by Opinion, nor to be hurry'd away by Passion; but to

* See *Plato's Crito.*

enquire calmly and seriously what right he has to destroy himself. It has been shewn that he has none at all ; but supposing that he has ever had such a right, yet if he has stood his Trial, he will find this rather lessen'd upon this Account than encreas'd ; for in all Trials there is a tacit Agreement between the Party and the Court to stand the Issue, that if he be found Innocent he shall be discharg'd : If not, submit to^s Punishment : Wherefore upon the Prisoners being found Guilty in Capital Causes, his Life becomes the Publicks immediately ; 'tis forfeited by Compact as some Amends for his Crime, and therefore he must be unjust if he evades the paying of that Forfeiture by Self-murder : And what the sense of Civil Governments in this Case is, appears ; in that most of them, if not all, make no distinction between the Life of an Innocent Man, and the Life of an Offender under Condemnation ; but he that kills the latter shall as certainly be put to Death as he that kills the former. And though this perhaps may seem the less Crime because it prevents Death but a few Days or Minutes ; this makes no difference ; because the unlawfulness of Self-murder consists not in the hindering of a Person

son from living such or such a time; but in usurping a Power which we have no right to, in destroying that which is not our own, and so breaking the Laws of Nature; and this may be done as much by a Man's hindering himself from living a few Minutes, as many Years: In a Word, since what is Unjust cannot be Honourable, since Self-murder after Condemnation is rather more unjust than it would have been before. A Man of Honour cannot be oblig'd to kill himself, in defence of his Reputation in such Circumstances.

If it be said that *the Common People have not this Notion of Honour, that something is due to them* — truly I think nothing at all, much less Life it self, nay Honour too; for if a Man does an unjust thing to satisfy the Multitude, and to preserve his Credit among *them*, he sacrifices true Honour to an empty Name; and yet the Multitude it self, to do it Justice, is seldom so bad a Judge of Praise and Disgrace, as to reckon a Man's Honour, in such Circumstances as we have been speaking of, vindicated by killing of himself; for by Honour here must be meant either his *Innocence* or his *Courage*.

But

But as to the first, If a Man is Condemn'd unjustly, the best way that is left to prove his Innocence, is such a Behaviour as is the Natural Effect of it, a noble disdain of the Injustice which he suffers under, a generous indifferency as to Life or Death; and of what the World says or thinks; a perpetual calmness of Temper, settled Aspect, &c. These will prevail very much even upon the worst sort of People, whose Malice begins to be satisfy'd or tir'd at the time of Execution, and who are inclin'd then to believe both the Looks and Words of dying Men; and indeed there is such a Majesty in calm Resolution, such a Beauty in undaunted Innocence, as checks and controuls insensibly the rudest Insolence, and changes the Opinion of the most Prejudic'd Spectators; whereas he that kills himself under Sentence of Death, confirms the Justice of his Condemnation; and is look'd upon as Guilty by the Laws of most Nations and particularly our own.

As to the Second: Self-murder is not the proper way to vindicate the Reputation of Courage in such Circumstances, it being generally look'd upon as an Act of Despair: Humane Courage consists either in the offering of *just Violence*,
whereas

whereas this is the most *unjust* as has been shewn; or else in the *resisting* of great *Evils*, whereas this is the *declining* of them as has been also shewn; the greater the Evil is under which a Man Labours, the greater must his Courage be that resists or supports it; wherefore a Publick and Ignominious Death, being confest to be a greater Evil, to a Soldier especially, than any he has met withal before. His Courage must be shewn, if he places his Honour in this alone, in the resisting it accordingly. A Man may have been bred in War, been in many Battles and Seiges, and yet never have march'd to any certainty of Death, or rarely have been upon such Service, where'twas an even chance whether he came off or no: Besides upon these occasions the number of Companions and Spectators, the certainty of Glory if they behave themselves well, and the heat of the Action animates 'em mightily, and inflames their Courage. But to be dragg'd slowly along through the Rabble, Bound and Guarded; to be dragg'd thus to certain Death, to the Death of a Common Malefactor, is a very different Case; to undergo this with Constancy is the Test of true Courage indeed, and argues greater Bravery than can be shewn
in

in the Field. He who yields to Affliction, says the Author above mention'd, * shews that they that inflict it are greater than himself, but he who braves it; shews that it is not in the Power of any thing but Guilt to make him Tremble — This induces me to beleive that Passive Courage is much more Noble than what is Active; for one who Fights gallantly in the Field in the Front or View of an Army, is assisted by the Example of others, by hope of Reward of Victory, and needs not much to fear that Death which he may shun as probably as meet: But he who in a Noble Quarel adorns the Scaffold whereon he is to suffer, evinces that he can master Fate, and makes Danger less than his Courage, and to serve him in acquiring Fame and Honour: so that if by Honour be meant Innocence or Courage, this is much better vindicated by a Noble Carriage under Barbarous Injustice, than by killing ones self in order to avoid it. But suppose it shou'd not be so, suppose the Multitude shou'd insult and deride a Brave and Innocent Man; Will any Person that is Innocent or Brave, so Born, so Bred, as one that we are speaking of, vouchsafe 'em any regard? Will not his Mind be employ'd in a nobler way? And since

there must be a Place for the Reward of injur'd Innocence, since a Good Conscience affords the best Acclamations: What do the Words and Actions of the thoughtless and inconstant Multitude signifie; to mind what they do or say wou'd be as unreasonable, as to be concern'd whether it wou'd be foul or fair Weather at the time of Execution.

3. As to the remaining part of the Plea for Self-murder in this Case, *the preventing his Enemies having their Will over him, and disappointing their Malice;* this I am sure is no *Masculine* Reason: This I believe indeed is the Cause why many Men destroy themselves in such Cases: Anger, Despight, Rage, Envy and Revenge drive 'em to this unjust Action, and put 'em upon disappointing their Enemies Malice, with as much Malice of their own; an excellent temper of Mind to leave the World in! But if an Enemy shall not drive me to an *unjust thing* by any *Flattery* or *Reward*, shall his *ill usage* do so? This wou'd be to fulfill his Will effectually, to glut his Malice even to a kind of Luxury, for *his Will is*, that you should Fret and Torment your self under what he makes you suffer, his Will is, that People should think you Guilty; that the Credit which you
gain'd

gain'd formerly shou'd be lessen'd by your poor Behaviour at last, all which wou'd be gratify'd by Self-murder: But if you wou'd disappoint his Malice, (though alas that is but a base Motive to the doing any part of ones Duty) continue in the same Virtue which first rais'd his Envy and Hatred; march with the same steady Pace through the ingrateful Multitude, with which thou us'd'st to do against their Enemies,; Pity them with the same greatness of Mind wherewith thou didst defend 'em, and deprive 'em of a Triumph, by maintaining still the same Character, and being even in Death a Conqueror. So *Regulus* went to embrace certain Death amidst a Thousand Torments. With such a Mind *Scævola* expos'd his Arm to the Flames; and many others in this manner have turn'd their Persecutors Barbarity upon themselves, and shaken their ill gotten, or ill us'd Power more, by the calm Bravery of their Deaths, than Thousands cou'd have done in the Field: All Histories will afford Instances of this kind. In a Word, this is most certain, that there never was a great Innocent Man put to Death Publickly, but that the Power who caus'd this, wou'd have been heartily

ly glad, that he wou'd have prevented it by being the Murtherer of himself.

Thus I have gone through this Pretence also; more to comply with some particular Persons, than out of any real Necessity that there is of such Proofs; since all depends upon what was said at the beginning of this Treatise concerning Self-murthers being an *Act of Injustice*; and if so, whatever may be pretended upon the account of *Honour*: If *Honour* be any thing of a *Virtue*, it can never require that which is *unjust*, and consequently it can never be *the occasion of Self-murther*.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIV.

*Liberty, the last Plea for Self-murder examin'd.
Of that Liberty in General which Man has
over his Actions: That this can't be a just
pretence for Self-murder: That whatever
Calamities, what Grief or Pain soever af-
flict the Soul, or may be suppos'd to enslave
it, Man has no Power or Liberty to set it
free, in this manner: That it would be
in vain to attempt to do so, because it would
not be in a State of Liberty, but in a State
of utmost Slavery, afterwards. The Con-
clusion.*

WHen Cato was at Supper with
some of his Friends the Evening
before he kill'd himself, one of the Stoics
Paradoxes, *That a Good Man alone was Free,
and that all Bad Men were Slaves*, happen-
ing to fall into the Discourse, he maintain'd
it with so much Earnestness and Heat,
That Plutarch says, *Every Body perceiv'd
plainly, that he had resolv'd to free himself from
the Troubles he was in, by putting an end to his
Life in some violent manner: This would
not be a Paradox in it self, unless it were
join'd with Self-murder: Good Men alone
are free, and always free, while Good: They
main-*

maintain their Liberty by observing the Dictates of Reason, and following the End, for which they receiv'd Life, which gives Peace, Joy, and lasting Happiness; and this is true Liberty: On the other side, ill Men by deserting the same Dictates, and renouncing the same End, fall into Trouble, Anxiety and Remorse, which is the worst Slavery: Now if *Cato* himself was free in this sense, as to his being a good Man; then what occasion had he to die to obtain further Liberty? If he had occasion for it, then he must own that he was an *ill Man*, a *Slave*, or in unavoidable danger of being so, which a right *Stoic* cou'd never be. Or if by *being Free* be meant *the doing what one will*; an *ill Man* is as *much free* in this Respect as a *good Man*; nay *more so*, for a good Man wou'd not be free to do an *unjust thing*: And that Self-murder is an *Act of Injustice in the highest degree* has been shewn all along: Yet this is the thing which is continually pretended as a reasonable ground of this Action; and the Writings of the *Stoics* abound with Exhortations to make use of such Liberty. *Seneca* is the boldest and forwardest upon this Occasion. * *What-*

* *Seneca*, de Ira. Lib. 3. Sect. 15.

ever your Evils are (says he) look which way you will, and you may find an end of them. Do you see that Precipice there? that's the way down to Liberty: Do you see that Sea, that River, that Well? there's Liberty at the Bottom: Behold that blasted, wither'd Tree, every Branch of it bears Liberty. † The Eternal Law of Nature has done nothing better than that it has given us but one way of coming into Life; but many to go out of it. Why should I wait still the Cruelty of Man or. Sickness; when I can walk out of Life through the midst of Torments, and but shake my self and be free from all Adversity? This is the only thing we cannot complain of Life for; it stays no Body: Does Life please you? Live on: Does it not please you? Return to the place from whence you came: You have been let Blood to Cure the Head-ach; Your whole Body may be eas'd in the same manner; and even a little Lancet will open the way to great Liberty. This is as much as to say, that whatever we are able to do we may do, whatever is in our Power is Lawful: After this rate, all Right and Propriety, all Justice and Fidelity, can signifie nothing; for what is there that has been allow'd to be Evil, by the Consent of all Mankind, let it be Sacrilege, A-

† Epist. 70.

Adultery, Perfidiousness, Treachery, Theft; but may become Lawful (according to this) if we have but the opportunity of committing it: For Instance, Suppose a Man should be entrusted by a Friend with the management of a great Estate, and left in Possession of a Palace richly Furnish'd, many Jewels, much Money, &c. During his Friends absence, he falls into great Misfortunes, is very hardly us'd by those he has to do withal; and upon this grows Discontented and Melancholy; when accidentally some Philosophical Acquaintance comes in; and having heard his Case, talks to him to this purpose: Since the Soul affects Freedom naturally, why shouldst thou be a Slave to Poverty? Turn thine Eyes which way thou wilt, and the way to Liberty lies open: Do you remember where you are? Do you see this rich Furniture? All the Walls here are hung with Liberty: Do you see that Iron Chest? There's Liberty in the bottom of it: Do you remember such a Diamond or such a Locket? In how small a compass does great Liberty lie? You toil Day and Night to satisfy your Creditors: You must be a Slave to the Ingratitude of such a false Friend, or the Extortion of this and that Usurer, when Providence has plac'd Liberty so very near you, that no more is requir'd but to stretch out your Hand to accept of it. I do not

doubt but this would seem very strange to any honest Man; and yet where things are *equally unlawful* the Case is the *same*; Humane Life is *God's own Propriety*, 'tis entrusted to Man only for a certain End, and therefore *he has no more Liberty to destroy it, than to break any Trust, or commit any Act of Injustice whatsoever*; and Nature's having put it into our Power to go out of Life when and how we please, is no more an Argument that we may lawfully do so, than *her putting it into our Power to Steal, Ravish, or Murther any one else*. There must certainly then be some great Mistakes in this matter; and therefore in order to discover them, and shew how *inconsistent Self-murther* is with *true Liberty*, if rightly understood: Let us suppose this Pretence to be drawn up in this or the like manner.

Liberty is one of the most Glorious Attributes of God; Man is said to be like God in respect of this, Particularly; and therefore nothing ought to be more dear to him than his Liberty. If this be so, then when this Liberty is lost by any great Calamity, it must be extreme Cowardice, or extreme Dulness, to drag about a Decrepit Body, or an Afflicted Mind, and to chuse to continue poorly under this Slavery; when God and Nature still leave him so much
Liberty,

Liberty, as to set his Soul Free whenever he pleases.

Observe, The Word *Liberty* here is a very doubtful Term, having several Significations, the using of which promiscuously occasions great Obscurity and Confusion, which are the chief Advantages of this Pretence: Sometimes it signifies *that Liberty* which Man has over his *own* Actions by the freedom of *his Will*: Sometimes it signifies *the Liberty* of the Body as well as the Mind, and these two, as likewise the Slavery which regards each of these, are often us'd the one for the other. Sometimes again *Liberty* signifies some *Authority* or *Power* which Man is suppos'd to have to destroy himself in some particular Circumstances though he be ty'd up in all others. Lastly it signifies *that Ease or Freedom* from any Trouble, Grief or Pain, which the Soul is suppos'd to be *let out into* by Self-murder, according to which several Significations, I will consider,

1. That *Liberty* which is deriv'd from God to Man, in what Respects Man is like God in the freedom of his Will, and as to the Power which he has over his own

Actions, and shew that Self-murder is not warranted by such Liberty.

2. I will shew the difference between the Liberty and Slavery of the Soul and Body; and inquire whether any Evil, which oppresses the Body, can be destructive to the Liberty of the Soul,

3. That no Man upon the Account of any Calamity, particularly upon Account of any extreme Sickness or Pain, has any Liberty or Authority to destroy himself.

4. That by so doing, the Soul instead of enjoying any Liberty wou'd fall into a State of utmost Slavery.

I. As to the Liberty which is deriv'd from God to Man: 'Twas said that *this* is one of the *most Glorious* Attributes of God; and that in this Respect it is that Man is particularly like him: *God is absolutely Free*; for he is *Infinite*: *Infinity* must be *perfect Liberty*, because nothing can be more *Free* than that which has *no Bounds*. And yet the Liberty of *infinite Power*, is always attended with *infinite Wisdom*, and *infinite Goodness*, without these *Almighty Liberty* wou'd be only *Dreadful*; but these make it the Ground of our *Trust* and *Confidence*, and render it *Adorable*; wherefore if we consider God, not only in *his Essence*, but also
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in *his Works*; since every *Work* of his must be to some *excellent End* or other; the means he chuses to *Act by*, must also be *most Excellent*; and that *particular kind of Method* (if I may so speak) which he *observes* for the bringing what he intends to pass, must be a *kind of Rule or Law to him*. He cannot do otherwise than he *does*, because what he *does* is the Effect of *infinite Wisdom*, *measur'd* by the *rectitude* of his own Perfection: and therefore *always best*. Yet this sets *no Bounds to his Liberty*, because it is impossible that he shou'd ever *will* to do otherwise, than only *just as he does*; and he who *always does whatever he wills* must remain *always Free*.

But *Man's Liberty*, is very *different*, as he is a *finite Creature*; it can be perfect only according to its *measure*, and that measure must be *proportionable* to his *particular Nature*: Now the Nature of Man consists of a Rational Soul and Body, *his Liberty* therefore must be *twofold*; that which regards the *Soul*, or that which regards the *Body*: As to the *first*, which is our present Subject, this must be according to the *chief Faculties* of the Soul, *Knowledge* and *Will*; *Man's Will is free*, it has the full Power or Liberty, to *Act* without any *Necessity* or *Compulsion*; but since this *Will* can act on-

ly according to what Man *knows*, (it being impossible that any one should will any thing whereof he has no Knowledge) the extent of *humane Liberty*, must be proportionable to *humane Knowledge*. Again, the Objects of *humane Knowledge*, as it concerns Mans Actions, are moral Good or Evil, and the *Freedom* of Man's Will lies in *choosing* the one and *refusing* the other. Now since *humane Knowledge* is not only of *small Extent*, but liable to *Errour*, and to mistake Good and Evil, since also there are several Passions and Appetites which are apt to further this mistaking; God has fixt such Principles in Man as represent the Method of his own Acting, and are *self evident*. Wherefore Man's *likeness unto God*, does not consist in the *boundless Liberty* of his Will, but in his Will's being *conformable to the Will of God*; and then is his Will chiefly so when it *concurrs with those first Principles*, or Laws of Nature above-mentioned, That is *follows readily his Reason by Virtue*.

Yet still this is no lessening or restraining of Man's Natural Liberty. Infinite Liberty observes some measures for the attaining the Ends of Infinite Wisdom; the measures which are here given to Man to walk by, are the *same with those*, they are the Marks and Bounds of what is *fit and just*,

just, they represent the *Method of God's own Acting*, as I said before, and good *Method* always promotes the End it is concern'd about; it is the *nearest* and the *plainest* way to it; and therefore wou'd be the *choice* of every wise Man; and what is *choice* must be wholly consistent with *Liberty*; these Principles by reason of their Divine Original, and their Natural force and energy are frequently called the *Commandments of God* (even without regard to *Revelation*) the Obedience to which has been Celebrated by Philosophers as the greatest and noblest *Liberty*. Thus one * tells us, *That to serve God is not only better than Liberty, but than Empire it self.* † Another crys out, and he was a Slave too, *No one can have pretence to any Authority over me now; I am made free by God; I have learnt his Commandments, 'tis not in the Power of any thing upon Earth to enslave me.* If it be said that these very Men tell us, that || *Liberty is the Living how we Will*: By the Word *Will* they always meant the * *Rational Will*,

* *Philo Judeus. cxi. μov*

|| *Arriani Epictet. lib. 4. cap. 1.*

Item *Cicero Paradoxon. 5.*

* *Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 4. Voluntas est quæ quid cum ratione desiderat; quæ autem adversa Ratione incitata vehementius; ea libido est.*

the Irrational vehemency of it, they called Lust, (the doing what one lists) thus Cicero, in the Place above, *Who is he that lives as he will, but he that follows that which is right, and rejoices in his Duty.* Let us first will what we ought, and then we may safely do what we will; but to follow every first Impulse, every fall of hasty Passion, under the pretence of being free, always ends in lowest Slavery; for if we consider those who refuse being directed by any Natural Notions of Good and Evil, or to be obliged by any first Principles or Laws of Nature, while they are so nice of their Liberty as to refuse any Rule or Guidance: How many severe Tyrants do they blindly submit to? Though like some Lunatics in the midst of their Chains, they fancy themselves Sovereign Princes. Can any Man pretend to be Free while his Reason is made to Serve? And does it not serve most basely in such People, at the beck of every Lust and Passion; is it not forc'd to fetch and carry in more and more of the vicious Object; to be drudging always to Sensation; to provide to glut this or that Appetite, or to administer to this or that Passion; this is the glorious End of that Liberty of following their own Reason; which is so much affected by many People

ple, who will be *riding* over Hedge and Ditch, rather than be *impos'd upon* by a *beaten Road*, and throw away their *Rudder* and their *Compass* in order to *Sail freely*.

Arbitrary Power, which is so universally hated, is nothing but Lawless Liberty of Acting: When Princes usurp this, we call 'em *Tyrants*; and yet what we abhor in our Governours, we admire in our selves: When alas! if it be usurpt by particular Persons, *they* fall into worse slavery than Kingdoms do. Both are preserv'd free, not by being without *any Law* at all; but by acting steadily according to *such Laws*, as are the Dictates of right Reason. There is a remarkable Passage in * *Philo Judæus* to this purpose. *As among Cities such as are rul'd by the Arbitrary Will of one or few Men fall into Slavery; whereas such as have Laws for their Guardians and Governours continue free: So it is among particular Men; as many as Anger, Covetousness, or any other Passion rules over, are all Slaves; but as many as are Govern'd by Law are Free; I mean the unerring Law of right Reason, not such as is imprinted by this or that Man on Lifeless Paper, it self Lifeless; but*

☞ In his Treatise to prove, Πάρις Επιδότω. Dindorf.

*that which is Eternal, and engraven upon Man's Immortal Mind, by the Divine Immortal Nature : Wherefore I cannot but wonder (as he goes on) at the Stupidity of some dull Wretches, who will grant that whole great Cities, such as Athens and Lacedæmon, preserve their Liberty only by observing the Laws of Solon and Lycurgus, and yet will not allow that wise Men may preserve theirs, while they obey right Reason, which is the Ground of all Law. What this Excellent Author calls Stupidity and Dulness is to be met withal very commonly now a days among the greatest pretenders to Wit; Sense and Integrity, and most confident Asserters of humane Liberty; nor indeed have there been Creatures of this kind wanting in any Age. The Speech which the Tribune Dronius made to the common People of Rome upon the occasion of the Senates proposing some sumptuary Laws to restrain the extravagant Luxury of Entertainments, argues the same noble Zeal, * Romans, says he, we are now come to have Bridles put upon us, which are not to be endur'd; you are ty'd and fetter'd in bitter Bonds of Servitude : The Senate are passing a Law to force you to be Frugal; but let us abrogate this old rusty*

* Valer. Maximus. lib. 2. cap. 4.

Imposition; for what signifies Liberty, if a Man may not perish by Luxury if he thinks fitting. This was an admirable Advocate for one sort of Self-destruction; what the rest say is built upon the very same Grounds, and amounts in effect but to this: *Who has the Property of my Life but my self? And what does Property signifie if I may not have the Liberty to do what I will with my own?* The first of these has been shewn at large to be a mistake, and then it must follow of course that the latter is so. But certainly no two things in the World have ever been so much mistaken as *Liberty* and *Property*, as these are the tumultuous crys of the Rabble in *disorder'd* Governments; so are they the loud Pretences of wild Passions in *Irregular* Men: He that desires what he cannot, nay *ought* not to obtain; calls all Opposition (be it never *so just*) to those desires *Slavery*; and the breaking through this Opposition (though by ways never *so unjust*) he calls *Liberty*. Thus Men of free thought, that is, who despise any Rule or Guide to *think by*; must needs despise any Rule to *act by*; and consequently break all Laws Divine and Humane: But if *this is Liberty*, then how hard is it that Flames shou'd ever be abridged of their Natural Liberty, or that the Freedom of any De-
luge

luge shou'd be restrain'd by Banks or Shores; these wou'd not have worse Effects in the *greater World*, than the other has in *the less*; for not to number up all the Inconveniencies which the Publick suffers from these *free thinking* Gentlemen; what does this Liberty end in at last, as to themselves, but in Gouts, Palsies, Rheumatisms, &c. as to *one part* of their fancied Property; and in Shame, Anxiety, Fury and Despair as to *the other*, till at last being weary of a Life which they have so miserably misus'd, they as miserably destroy it.

That which has made me say so much upon this Head is, that this pretence is the Ground of most other Crimes, as well as Self-murder. But to sum up what has been said, and to apply it to *that* in particular.

1. Since God himself, who is absolutely *free*, chooses to act always according to some Method, which is a Rule to Himself, the same with right and eternal Reason; and yet *His Liberty* is not prejudic'd by acting so; then although Man is oblig'd to act by some Rules, Laws, or. Principles; yet since they issue out from the same Fountain of Eternal Reason; this is not any Prejudice to *his* Natural Liberty.

2. Since

2. Since it has been prov'd that these are some of those Rules, *viz.* That *the end for which a Creature is made, or has Life given him, ought to be observ'd; that Gods Propriety ought not to be destroy'd; that whatever may prove destructive to Civil Society, ought to be avoided.* And since the killing of ones self has been prov'd to be a direct breach of every one of these Rules; then it follows, that Mans Natural of Liberty, can be no just pretence for Self-murder. The same Argument will serve also against all unwarrantable hazarding of Life, and running into great and *unnecessary* dangers, especially by *Duelling*: Likewise against all Vices of Excess and Intemperance, which concerning a Man's own Person only, seem to be within the bounds of his Natural Liberty.

II. In the next place I am to shew the difference between the *Liberty* and *Slavery* of the *Mind* and *Body*; and whether any Evil that oppresses the *Body* can be destructive to the *Liberty* of the *Soul*;

As Man consists of a Soul and Body, his Liberty must be consider'd in Relation to both: Man's *Liberty* as to his *Soul* or *Mind* consists, in the free use of its Faculties, *Understanding* and *Will*, in such a manner

as was just now shewn; his *Slavery* as to his *Mind* consists in the *losing the free use* of these, and in their subjection to Irregular Passions and Appetites. Man's *Liberty* as to his *Body* consists in the free use of *its* Powers, as to Motion and Sensation; and his *Slavery* as to this, in the Abridgment of this Motion, or in its being at anothers disposal: In the decay of Sensation, or in its becoming greivous to him, in Pain and Torture.

Now if we consider the *Dignity* of Humane Nature, *Man's Liberty* must depend upon the *Mind* chiefly; for when all is done, the *Mind is the Man*; *Mens cujusque, is est quisque*; the *Body* is but of very small Consideration in comparision of the other; the *Body* may be enslaved without a *Man's* own fault; it being liable to outward force, as well as inward decays of Nature; but still the *Mind* may continue free: This cannot be enslav'd but by a *Man's* own fault, and when it is so, its *Liberty* may be recover'd again if the Person pleases; and therefore there can be no occasion of Self-murther upon this Account. *Plotinus* † gives admirable di-

* Vid. *Somnium Scipionis*.

† *Apud Macrobius, lib. 1. cap. 13.*

rections in this case. He tells us, that there are *two* kinds of Death, a *Philosophical* and a *Natural* one; that the *first* was in our Power, but *not the latter*; that if Men would be free from any Evils of Life, they may be so, by dying *Philosophically*; and this says he, is the *only voluntary Death*, that is *commendable*; that which we bring our selves to by *Reason*, not by *Poison*; by *Prudence*, not by any *Weapon*.

As to that part of the Question, *Whether any Evil that oppresses the Body may be destructive to the Liberty of the Mind?* This has been in part answer'd. The Liberty of the Mind consists in the use of Reason, some Evils of the Body, as extreme Pain and Sickness, may destroy the use of Reason; and cause *Madness*, and then the Liberty of the Mind is destroy'd indeed.

But while Reason remains, Liberty must remain also; the Mind cannot be enslav'd though beset by various Evils, till it basely surrenders up to 'em; no more than a City is enslav'd, when 'tis only besieg'd and defends it self valiantly; nay not so much, since the Avenues of Reason (in those who are adult especially) cannot be shut up; but on the contrary the greater the Evils are which beset

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the

the Body, the more may the Mind *enlarge* its Liberty, by the practising of several Virtues, which it would not have had the opportunity of exercising otherwise: All Virtues are the *different ways* of the Souls *exerting its Power*, according to the Dictates of right Reason: Wherefore if the Evils of the Body give it *greater opportunities* to exert *this Power*, and require withal, that it should be exerted with *greater strength and vigour*; then these Evils will be so far from *abridging its Liberty*, that they will rather *enlarge it*. For the more Virtues it has to practice, the more different ways must it have to move in, the *wider* must its *range and compass be*, and consequently the *greater its Liberty*.

And as to the Case of extreme Pain in particular, which is so commonly pleaded upon this occasion. The Liberty of the Body indeed may be lost, it may be confin'd, maim'd and tortur'd by Tyrants or Diseases; but unless this should cause *Madness*, it would not *destroy* the Liberty of the Mind: It must be confess'd the Union of the Body and Mind is very close, and all Perception ends in the Soul, and therefore the Pains of the Body may be very grievous to it; but though very *grievous*, yet rarely to such a degree as to prove *destructive*

Instructive to its Reason: Extreme Pain is the truest test of a great and upright Mind, but although it may force a Man to Lament, it need not to Rebel, it may affect him with Sorrow, but not cast him down into Despair; and where Reason struggles faithfully to retain its Power: Courage, Honour, Justice, Constancy, and great Examples, will be called in to help to resist what is sensitive Evil, rather than a good Man should fall into what is morally so; rather than he should be guilty of an unjust Action, to fly from Pain; when this is only Cowardice and Weakness, though colour'd over with the Plausible name of Liberty.

When Pain is encreas'd to such a degree as to destroy Reason, the dispute is at an end; but let Men have a care lest they should fancy or grant themselves to be Mad, only through Impatience, and indulg'd Passions; and then afterwards make use of their Reason to contrive their Self-destruction.

If you cry out as 'tis usual, that the Pain is too great to be endur'd, that you cannot possibly bear so much torture: What do you mean by this? that it will kill you, or that you have not strength and patience to undergo it. If it will kill you, what need of Self-murther? the more violent the Pain is, the

more short will it be; and if a Tyrant inflicts it, how much better is it, as Good *Darius* said, * *To die by anothers Wickedness than by your own?* If you mean the latter, trust *Nature*, she will assist you to bear: Pain is always most acute when new, the Powers of Sensation are blunted by degrees, by their Objects pressing too violently upon them, and continual labour under Pain will harden the sense of Feeling, and deaden Perception; No one can know his strength unless he will try it; the force of *deliberate* and *well weighed Resolution* is *incredible*, and has supported the *Weak* and the *Guilty* in the most dreadful Torments; Shall Women be able to suffer so much in Child-birth? Could the *Spartan* Boys bear whipping to Death before their Altars, without a Groan? Nay, have the greatest Villains mock'd their Executioners? Could such a Wretch as *Ravillac*, or he that shot one of the Princes of *Orange*, smile amidst all the Artifices of Torture? and shall not *Innocence* and *Virtue* be able to support a good Man, under the ordinary calamities incident to humane Nature? If submission to Providence, Perseverance in Duty,

* Forſitan mireris quod vitam non finiam : Alieno ſcelere quam meo, mori malo. *Q. CURTIUS*. lib. 5. cap. 12.

Constancy and Patience *are* Virtues; *when* are these to be practised *unless* in extremities? But it may be said, the *Disease is incurable*, the *Pain is without intermission*, and therefore *what good can a Man do by suffering on*, but only *expose humane Nature*, and render it *Contemptible*; not at all, but rather quite Contrary; who can pronounce a *Disease*, like to last, *incurable*? and how oft have the best Physicians been *deceived* in this matter? And as to *intermission*, suppose there should be none, where the *Pain* is intermitting; *Constancy* and *Patience* must be *intermitting* too, and return only by fits as the *Distemper* does; but when the *Pain* is continual, *Virtue* is *continual* also; and yet not in danger of being long upon *Duty*; because extreme continual *Pain* will quickly dissolve *Nature*, and discharge the *Soul*; and this *Consideration* might be sufficient to support a *Man* under such *Circumstances*, without *Diogenes's* Dagger to give him *Liberty*: For if the *Soul* be imprison'd and enslaved, when in a tortur'd or diseased *Body*, then let it look upon every *Pain* as a step towards its *Freedom*, as the bursting of some *Chain*, or the falling off of some *Fetter*; and as every *Limb* grows weaker, and every *Sense* decays, let it collect its forces cheerfully, and rejoice at these hap-

py beginnings of *Lawful and Eternal Liberty*. And as to *Contempt*, this is not worth Consideration in comparison of ones Duty, yet a good Man need not fear it; He will rather do credit to humane Nature, than expose it by his suffering: * *Seneca* says, *he will not leave his Body but when it begins to affect his Mind*, and then he will jump out of it as from a rotten falling House; this is a very low thought, and would not be pardonable, but that He make some amends for it in another place; † where he says, that *he who was great before he fell, is not the less great for being fallen, but is as far from Contempt as the Ruins of Temples are, which the Religious adore as much as when they were standing*: Though Holy Temples yield to Time, yet they cannot crush the God that was Worshipt in them by their fall; no more can a *decaying Body* oppress an *upright Mind*: And while the Mind is not oppress'd it cannot be contemptible. There is a Beauty in Constancy and Fortitude which shines through all the Deformities of Death; for at such times 'tis not the *Body*, but the *Soul* that is to be regarded; and therefore what if the *Body* be pale, weak and wasted away, yet if the *Mind*

* Epist. 58. † De Consol. ad Helviam.

continues the *same*, unshaken and undaunted; all the signs of *outward* Decay, are but the marks of *inward* Virtue, the Trophies of the Souls Strength and Victory, and more proper to cause Admiration than Contempt; Which of *Scævola's* Arms would an Ancient *Roman* have reckon'd most comely, that which was shrivel'd up, lame and deformed with Scars, or that which was whole and strong? Sure brawny Limbs and a good Complexion are not Essential to Virtue. Nay even the last Minutes of a great Man shall be beneficial, the very sight of his Calamities shall be full of Instruction, so that while he has Breath he shall never be past doing good.

All the excellent modern Buildings of *Italy* (if I may use this allusion once more) are owing to a few remains of the Ancient *Roman* Structures, which notwithstanding the injuries of many Years, and many devastations, retain still some thing of their former Beauty and Magnificence; the same use might be made of the Decays of great Men in extreme Age, or Pain, or Sickneſs: They are not indeed what *they were*, but still they are *more* than *others are*; what is left is regular and great, and sufficient to form in us an Idea of what is lost, and to teach

us by the Rules of Proportion, to improve our selves accordingly: But a great and good Man's Example is as necessary in *Death* as *Life*; we are to study as much how to *Die* as how to *Live*: Where then can we receive so much Instruction for this purpose as in the Deaths of such Men? and if so, when can they be ever past doing good? But I will not insist farther upon this: Let the *Stoics*, who are the great Defenders of Self-murther, be Judges in this matter, if we look into their Writings, we shall find it inculcated continually; the *Pains* of the Body can never have any influence upon the *Liberty* of the Mind. That their wise Man is above the taking notice of any outward Evil, that he is at perfect Ease in the midst of Tortures. Nay, they reckon it no less than a Crime to own the least sense of Pain, and indeed grant more in that respect than we desire, and yet after all make Pain by a strange Contradiction one of the chief Causes of Self-murther.

III. The next thing which I propos'd to speak to was, Whether any Man upon account of extreme, Affliction, especially Pain or Sicknes, has *Liberty* or *Authority* to Destroy himself.

Not

Not only the *Stoics* heretofore, but some others since, have been inclined to think that he has; thus one tells us, * *God gives us leave enough to part with Life, when he is pleased to reduce us to such a condition, that to Live is far worse than to Die.* The Rule which is here given, whereby we are to judge when we have this leave, is; *when God is pleased to reduce us to such a Condition, that to Live is far worse than to Die.* But this will be found very insufficient to this purpose; if we examine the Particulars; it supposes these two things.

1. That there may be some Condition of Life far worse than Death.

2. That 'tis God that reduces the Sufferer to such a Condition.

As to the first, before we can compare things rightly, we must understand exactly the terms by which they are represented: Life as Humane, implies the union of the Soul and Body; Death is the dissolution of that Union; the condition of Life, which is supposed here to make it far worse than Death, is *extreme Pain*; now the fallacy lies in not mentioning the *manner of this Dissolution* which may be Violent, or Natural, and the *consequences of it*: To a good

* Mont. lib. 2. chap. 3.

Man indeed, Life in extreme Pain, is far worse than Natural Death; and this is a proper Argument for *such Men*, not to fear *such a Death*: But the Death which we are speaking of, is a *Death of Self-murder*; which should have been particularly express'd, and then the Question would be, Whether a Life of *extreme Pain*, is far worse than a *Death of Self-murder*?

Now to judge truly of this, we should not only consider the time of the Dissolution, or the Pain that accompanies it, (which in *Self-murder* may be little or none) but also what is to follow: For if we should look upon Death here, only as the separation of the Soul and Body, without any farther prospect, then this Comparison, *that to live in extreme Pain is far worse than to die*, would be impertinent; because Death in this sense, would be no more than the ceasing to be, the utter end of all Sensation; and if so, what a notable discovery would it be to say, that the continuation of extreme Pain, is far worse than the cessation of it; or that it is far worse to feel great Misery, than not to feel any thing at all: Wherefore to give some ground for the Comparison, as Life supposes some State or Condition; so Death must likewise, and therefore that
which

which follows afterwards must be included in the Word. If this then be granted, let Life, be never so miserable, through extreme Pain and Torture; yet before a Man concludes, that this is worse than a Death of *Self-murther*, Let him consider seriously, Whether any thing follows after Death? Whether *Self-murther* is naturally unlawful? if it be, Whether it will not be punish'd hereafter? and if so, Whether that Punishment will not exceed both as to the degree of Pain and the duration of it; that particular Pain which he would avoid? Nor is it sufficient to say, upon this occasion, that you cannot tell whether there shall be any Future state or no; you never met with any demonstration from Natural Principles that there is, or that you do not believe any thing of it; this I say is not enough, the *Self-murtherer* ought to *demonstrate* that there is *none*; nothing can acquit him from an Action of this kind, but plain and undeniable Certainty, and this I am sure cannot be had; but rather the contrary: And in a Matter of this Consequence, it might be sufficient without any farther arguing, to stop any Man's Hand, to consider this alone: That the greatest part of Mankind, in all Ages, at least ten Thousand to one, has held some
Future

Future State. And then what a folly must it be upon the pretence of Incertainty, to run such a hazard against so much odds? To rush violently into Death unlawfull, when that which is lawful is so very near; (I mean in the case of extreme Pain or Sicknes) and for the avoiding a short time of Misery here, venture the being a Thousand times more Miserable hereafter.

But still they may insist, *That if God gives one leave this will not be ; and he gives me leave enough when he is pleas'd to reduce me to extreme Pain, &c.* This brings me to the second part of this Rule, namely, *that 'tis God that reduces Man to such a Condition*, that is, that he is the sole or chief cause of the Misery he groans under, by some extraordinary Effects of his Providence, without any fault of the Sufferer: To this I answer, 1. That this is very rarely so, but the sufferings of extreme Pain or Sicknes, especially in those who are most inclin'd to *Self-murther* are generally through their own fault. 2. That though they were not but the plain effects of extraordinary Providence ; yet no Man can conclude reasonably from hence, that God gives him leave or liberty to destroy himself.

1. It is very seldom that God is the only or chief cause of Man's suffering thus, or that he pleases to reduce him to extreme Pain and Misery, without any fault of the Sufferer, especially those who are inclined to Murder themselves; because their Passions are high and uncontrollable: They despise the Laws of God and the thoughts of a Future State, and therefore are commonly the chief cause of their own Misery; 'tis their own folly that puts such and such second causes into such a motion, as naturally produce such Effects, as great Poverty, Just Disgrace, Painful Sores, and Torturing Diseases; and then if Life becomes worse to any one of these than any Death; he must blame himself alone: Wherefore nothing can be more unreasonable than for such People to be always laying the fault upon Providence, and to pretend to quarrel with Life, crying out *'tis to no purpose to Live any longer; that Life is not worth the while in such Circumstances, &c.* Alas! they foolishly misuse Life, they waste their Bodies as well as their Estates; and when they feel the natural Effects of doing so, they wisely discover that *Life is not worth the while*; whereas this discovery comes too late; it might and should have been made much sooner; for to instance
in

in such a Life as has often ended in *Self-mur-
ther*: When every Hour was grossly a-
bus'd; when the Mornings were wasted in
Sleep, or sickly Qualms; when the After-
noons were thrown away in false Ceremo-
ny, inventing or spreading fresh Scandal, in
endeavouring to impose upon Virtuous
Women, or being effectually impos'd upon
by Lewd ones: When the Nights were spent
in Gaming, Prophaneness, Drunkenness,
Lust, Quarrellings, Murther; then Life
indeed was not worth the while, not
worth the being continu'd amidst so much
toyl of Folly, and so much drudgery of
Lewdness; but when nothing but the
common Effects of such a Life are felt in
Pain or Sicknes; for a Wretch to tell you
gravely, *that Life is not worth the while*, is
Absurd and Ridiculous; nay 'tis false too,
for even the sad remains of such a Life are
valuable if rightly employ'd; and that
very Evil, whether it be Sicknes or Pain,
for which they hate and despise it, may, by
forcing them to break off ill Acquaintance,
and compelling them to be Temperate
and Retir'd; give them time to think
(if they ever are capable of doing so) and
restore them by degrees, to themselves,
and to their God.

2. Supposing that Men were not the Causes themselves of such Evils falling upon them, but that they were the plain Effects of God's particular Extraordinary Providence; as when a Temperate Virtuous Man, born of Virtuous Parents, is taken suddenly, in a middle Age, with most violent Pains, falls into tormenting and incurable Diseases, breaks out in painful and loathsome Sores; and at the same time has violent fits of the Cholick or the Stone; supposing all this, I say, yet it cannot be reasonably concluded from hence, that these are any Signs or Tokens of God's giving him leave to destroy himself. For the Reasons following.

1. Though these great Evils are caus'd by God's particular Providence, yet they come upon the Party in a Natural way, they may have their Causes assign'd by skilful Men, without any recourse to Miraculous Power: If so, then since *Self-murder* has been proved to be *naturally unlawful*, no Event which is *Natural* can be a sufficient sign to assure any Person, that God gave him leave to do that which is against Nature. *

* See Chap. 6. p. 69.

2. *Pain* can be no certain sign of God's giving Men leave to Kill themselves, because there can be no degree of it fixt, no particular time settled, when they can judge assuredly that it is so; and therefore People must be left to their own Fancies, to destroy themselves when they think fitting, according as they are led by their Cowardice, or their Discontent: *Pain*, as I said before, is most acute at first, when the Disease struggles with Nature in its strength, and before it has actually overcome it, the Sensation of it grows less and less, as the parts affected are weakned, and it becomes Incurable: When then can a Man suppose that God gives him leave to Kill himself upon the account of *Pain*? when it is most Violent? but then 'tis Curable: When it becomes Incurable, as the *Stoics* taught? but then a Man is past the worst of it; and Natural Death draws nearer and nearer. Beside People feel *Pain* differently according to their different Humours, or Dispositions of Mind, the same Man will sometimes bear much more, when he has been pleas'd and his Affairs go on well in other Respects, then when he is cross'd by Accidents and Disappointments; therefore to make *Pain* the sign of God's giving a Man liberty to Kill himself,
and

and to leave every one to judge when it is so, is to leave Mankind to their own Fancies; and then one might destroy himself as well for a small fit of the Tooth-ach, as another for the most violent fit of the Stone. Add to this how many others have been in the very same Circumstances of Pain as you are; you will not deny but that some of them have been as Wise, as Learned as your self, and as desirous to die too; and yet *they* have not kill'd themselves, *they* have not taken extreme Pain to be any sign of God's giving leave to do so, and therefore how can you be ever satisfy'd that this is such a sign to you, which they could never understand to be so to them †?

But to give farther scope in this Matter; suppose that extreme Pain should not be only caused by God's Particular Providence, but also in a *miraculous* and *preternatural* manner; yet this would not be any sign that God gives the Sufferer any leave to destroy himself: Because,

1. This would imply a Contradiction in God's acting, 'twould suppose him to *will*, and to *will not*, the very same thing at the very same time. It has been already shewn*

† Chap. 6. p. 68. * Chap. 1. p. 7.

that the continuation of Life is as much owing to God, as the beginning of it ; if this be so, then as long as a Man lives, let it be in extreme Pain, Natural or Miraculous, or in what ill condition soever ; so long 'tis certain that it * is God's Will that he should Live : If it were not, that which is the cause of his Pain, would put an end to his Life, the first Moment it came upon him. How then can it appear from any Circumstances of Life, though never so dreadful, that God gives a Man liberty to destroy Life ? This must be impossible, because he alone continues that very same Life ; without him it could not subsist one Moment in Pain, any more than in Ease ; and therefore since it does so, 'tis plain that he Wills that the Person should Live on, not Kill himself. And a good Man would be apt to reflect thus with himself in such Circumstances ; as I at *first was* ; so I *still am*, by the Will of God alone : He continues my Life as truly in this Torment, let it be Natural or Miraculous, as he did heretofore : If He would have me die, I should do so instantly, without any need of my own Hand, or of his manifesting his Will to give me leave,

* Chap. 6. p. 61.

but since I do not, I find I have no such leave, and therefore I will struggle on, and whether in Life or Death conform my self the best I can, to the Will of God.

I might add farther, That extreme Pain, though brought upon a Man by particular Providence, nay even by Miracle, cannot be any sign of such leave; because by Providence is meant the *Wise and Regular course* of God's working; and consequently supposes him to work always for some End: That his working in this manner by extreme Pain, &c. cannot be to this End only, that Man should destroy himself, as by the last Argument appears; that there are other important Ends of such Events, namely the Punishment of the Wicked, the Improvement of the Good, and the Examples necessary to be given to the World of God's Justice on the one side, of Patience, Constancy, Humility, &c. on the other; that whatever the end of God's Providence is in this case; whether any of these, or any other, 'tis certain that very End is defeated by Destroying ones self; and therefore we cannot suppose that extreme Pain can be any sign of leave for so doing: But what has been said may suffice to shew the Unreasonableness of this pretended Rule for Self-murther, *viz.*

When God is pleas'd to reduce us to such a Condition, that to Live is far worse than to Dye.

And whereas 'tis said slightly, that God gives a Man *leave enough*: This shews their mistrust of what they say, and that they are conscious that no such leave can be prov'd; for what leave can be *enough* in this Case? Let any one that is thus tempted consider the Nature of the Fact in Question, and the Importance of it; that without this leave 'tis the Destruction of God's own Propriety, the Rebelling against his Providence, the positive Renouncing that end for which Life was given, the committing that which is Destructive to Civil Government, to Humane Nature; and withal that a mistake in this Case can *never be recover'd*: Let him consider this, I say, and what he has just now read, and then perhaps he will own that no leave can be *enough*, but what is given by direct and evident *Revelation*.

'Tis true after all, extreme Pain is the most dreadful Condition of Humane Life, and the severest Trial of a good and great Mind; 'tis true, it may be so excessive, that all Reasoning of this kind may be to no purpose, and Arguments concerning God's Propriety, or the End of *Humane Life*,

Life, or Civil Society, cannot be much attended to, in a violent fit of the Cholick, or the Stone; when Reason it self shall be often overcome, and the best Soul disturbed into Madness. All this is true, but the Question is not whether a Man may not lose his Reason through extreme Pain? if it were it would be readily granted; but the Question is, Whether a Man has *any Liberty* given him to destroy himself upon the account of extreme Pain, while his Reason still remains; This I suppose he has not for the Reasons above mentioned; Nay Madness it self has not this Liberty; for if a Mad-man kills himself, he is not Excusable upon account of any Liberty which he had to do so more than other People, but because he knew not what he did: Nor are these Papers design'd for the perusal of People in extreme Pain; but rather for those in perfect Health, to prepare them (if perhaps they are capable of doing so) to undergo it if it should be their Lot: And if they shall happen to be convinc'd when they are in Health, that *Self-murder* is unlawful even in extreme Pain; this will influence their Minds when they come to suffer it, they will not venture to do what they were once satisfy'd was unlawful, though they are not then

able to run through the several Particulars upon which their Conviction was grounded.

The last signification of the Word *Liberty*, is that Ease which the Soul enjoys after it is separated from the Body; in Relation to which I am to shew,

IV. That as Man has no Liberty or Authority granted him to destroy himself, upon account of extreme Pain, or Sickness, so if he presumes to put this in Execution, to obtain Ease or Liberty, the Soul instead of enjoying any such Liberty, will fall into a state of Great Slavery: This will require the making out these two things.

1. That there will be another State after the separation of the Soul from the Body, wherein it shall be accountable for its Actions, and as they are Good or Bad be Rewarded or Punish'd accordingly.

2. That *Self-murder* being one of the worst Crimes, shall be liable to a proportionable Punishment.

The first of these, *That there shall be a State, &c.* is very seldom deny'd by those who acknowledge the Being of a God; and is readily granted, nay vigorously maintain'd, by the Gentleman with whom

whom I have been chiefly concerned; however it is necessary for the compleating of this Design, to offer some Arguments for the Proof of it, and to remove some Objections which are usually made against it. Yet what shall be done to this purpose, shall be only what may be naturally drawn from those Principles which I laid down at the Beginning; for if *those* be true, then this will follow of course; if there is a God who reserves to himself the Propriety of Humane Life, the Supreme and Absolute Dominion over us: If Life is imparted and continu'd to Man for a particular End, and if Rules and Laws are given him for the pursuing and obtaining that End; if these Laws may be broken here unpunish'd, and a Man become the more unhappy the more faithfully he observes them; if a Man is capable of doing more good than he can receive an adequate Reward for in this Life, and if he is capable of Committing more Evil than he can receive a full Punishment for; if those Faculties which give him this Capacity, and which distinguish him from all other Creatures, suggest to him naturally Reward and Punishment, and fill him with Hopes and Fears accordingly: Then it will be allow'd by any

sensible and unprejudic'd Person, that it does appear, even by the Light of Nature, that there must be such a State hereafter; Let us consider each of these Reasons a little more particularly :

1. As to that Propriety which God reserves to himself over Humane Life, that Absolute Dominion which he holds and exercises over Man ; this (considering withal the Nature of Man,) is an Argument that he will take an account of his Actions hereafter. 'Tis true all other Creatures owe their Being and Preservation to God, as well as Man, and are as much subject to his Dominion as he is ; but the different Frames of Creatures shew that God will exercise his Dominion differently : Beasts act by Instinct not by Reason ; by Necessity, not Choice ; and therefore perform that End for which they were made, and their being so framed is a plain Declaration that God will not exercise any *Judicial Power* over them : But Man has Reason and Liberty to follow it, he knows his Duty ; has Natural Principles to direct him in it ; freedom of Will to chuse whether he will be so directed or no, and commonly refuses to be so ; and therefore acting

acting contrary to the End of his Being and doing so through his own fault; God who gave him such a frame, and who retains an Absolute Propriety and Dominion over him, must either do all this to no purpose, or else call him to account hereafter: Cou'd it be prov'd that God left us wholly to our selves, after he put us into the World, and that we had no Natural Rules to act by, or that we could maintain and prolong our Beings without his Assistance; there might be some ground for doubt in this Matter; but since it is quite contrary, since we have an * inseparable dependence upon him, since he has given us such Frames or Natures on the one side as prove us to be accountable, and has retain'd such a Propriety and Sovereignty over us on the other, as gives him a Right to require an account of our Actions; 'tis certain that he *will*, nay that he *† must* require it accordingly.

2. This will appear more Plain if we come to consider the next Principle which I laid down at the || beginning, *that Life*

* See pag. 6, 7, 8.

† See that Excellent Treatise: *A Practical Discourse concerning Future Judgment*, from pag. 6. to pag. 14.

|| Chap. 2.

was imparted to us for a particular End; for if Man is indispensibly oblig'd to pursue that End, then this Obligation is a proof that there must be a Future State, and that for these Reasons following.

1. Because every End supposes some Rules or Laws to be observ'd for the obtaining of it. Now whatever the End of Humane Life is, whether it be *the following of Reason by Virtue* or no, 'tis certain it is from God, and therefore the Rules or Laws which are necessary for the pursuing of it, must be from him likewise: Now any Law given to a free Agent, without any Punishment annex'd to it, or without proper Provision made for the Executing of that Punishment, wou'd justly call in Question the Wisdom of the Lawgiver; and therefore we cannot suppose that the Laws which God gives to Man by Nature, shou'd be defective in this Respect; and yet we see frequently that all such Punishment is escap'd in this Life: If we consider Man in the State of *Nature*, whatever Crimes he commits against himself; for Instance, as to any Excess or Intemperance, * no other has any right to punish: Nay, if we consider him as a Member of Civil

* Vid. pag. 20. Sup.

Society, Humane Laws cannot always reach that which is naturally Evil; for not to insist upon the many Designs and Contrivances of Lust, Envy, or Revenge, before they are put in Execution: How many evade Punishment after they have been Executed, [and that very insolently] by Interest or Authority? A Powerful Offender, or Corrupt Magistrate, may make the threats of Positive Laws, how just or how severe soever, to signify nothing: Wherefore, either there must be no *End* at all of *Humane Life*, or there must be no such Rules or Laws of *Nature*, as are necessary for the obtaining of this End; or these must be without any Sanction, or that Sanction must be to no purpose, or else there must be another State, wherein those who transgress such Laws now, without any Punishment, shall receive what is their due hereafter.

2. The different Events which befall those Persons which pursue or forsake the End for which *Humane Life* was given, shew also, that if we believe that there is a God, there must be a Future State: They who are least careful to pursue the true End of Life; or rather, who most industriously forsake it, are often most Happy, as to all Appearances, and grow Great and Wealthy,

Wealthy, and live in Peace and Honour: On the other side, they who pursue this End most faithfully, are exposed to great Sufferings; their Virtues are often to their Disadvantage; their Humility, Patience, and Generosity encourage Insolent and Violent Men to injure and oppress them; and their Constancy and Integrity brings them some times to Barbarous and Bloody Deaths. So that Man's indispensable Duty, and his Happiness as to this World, are often inconsistent, and therefore we must conclude, either that God is Unjust or Unwise in proposing such an End of Man's Being, as may make it Miserable, nay as may prove the Destruction of it; or else that there must be another State, wherein those who pursue or forsake this End most, shall be Rewarded or Punish'd more equally.

3. Man is capable of doing so much Good by the pursuing of this End, that he cannot receive an adequate Reward in this Life, and is capable of doing so much Evil by acting against it, that he cannot be made to suffer an adequate Punishment, and therefore there must be another State for both these Purposes.

As to the first, A Man may make so great a Progress in Knowledge and Virtue,

tue, and be so very Good himself, that by his Example and Instruction, especially if he have Interest and Power in the World; he may retrieve many from Ignorance and Vice; he may be the occasion of such good Laws, or of making such Provision for the Unhappy, as may extend to Future Ages: What a Blessing is a Wise and Good Prince, that faithfully employs his Time and his Power for the benefit of his Subjects? Now, what Reward can this World afford that can be any ways proportionable to such a Persons Virtue, especially if we consider, that the more Rational and Virtuous any Soul is, the more it must be above whatever belongs to Sensation, that is, whatever Wealth, Honour or Pleasure this World can offer it. 'Tis true the Pleasures of a good Conscience, look something like a proper Reward in such cases; but alas! what are these without the prospect of a better State; and how much must they be check'd and damp'd continually by the consideration of the shortness and uncertainty of this *only* Being?

As to the second, A Man may commit so much Wickedness; he may be guilty of so many Murthers; he may spread such pernicious Principles, as by destroying the
Belief

Belief of a God, and enervating the force of Humane Laws, may let loose the most furious Passions, and wildest Appetites; and this may end not only in the Misery of the Present Age, but infect the Future; and what Mischief is not a Vicious Tyrant capable of doing? The worst Punishment that can be inflicted in these Cases must end in Death; but how inconsiderable is that, though caused by the most exquisite Torments, if compared with such Crimes, and many others which may easily be supposed? Wherefore since Man is capable of doing more Good or Evil than he can receive an adequate Reward or Punishment for in this Life; we must either accuse that God who made him so, of want of Wisdom, Goodness, or Justice, or else allow that there shall be another State, &c.

If we consider also the vast Capacity of Humane Nature, the excellency of those Faculties whereby Man is qualify'd for pursuing his proper End; How much they set him above all other Creatures; how they suggest to him naturally Future Happiness and Misery, and fill him with Hopes and Fears accordingly; this also will afford us other Arguments to the same purpose.

1. As to that great degree of Capacity which Man has in regard to other Creatures, and the Excellency of those Faculties, by which he is distinguish'd from them *: To what purpose were these if there were no other Life but this? Instinct and Sensation would do the business of Self-preservation as well in Man as in Beast, without the great Endowments of Reason and Freewill, by the misuse of which Man has a possibility of making his Life both more miserable and short than they can theirs; so that these Powers which he values himself upon so much, would not be only Superfluous, but greatly to his Disadvantage; wherefore as the very placing of these Faculties in Man, by a Wise and Sovereign Being, shew that he was made for a greater End, than only to continue such a time here; so if we observe the Operations of them, we shall find that they aspire to something greater than this World can afford, that we have a Capacity too great to rest satisfy'd with the choicest Enjoyments here, that our Reason teaches us to despise them, and raises us to Desire more Noble Objects,

* Vid. pag. 13, 14. sup.

and more solid and lasting Happiness, *
 Had God intended this Life as the only
 Scene of Man's Happiness, he would
 have fitted and proportion'd his Capacity
 accordingly; he would have made him to
 acquiesce in such Enjoyments as he found
 here, and not have dispos'd him naturally
 to think of another State, and to long af-
 ter it; and therefore since he has done so,
 we may be assur'd, that there will be an-
 other State answerable at least to such
 Conceptions. *

2. This is also Evident from the Natu-
 ral Sense of Evil, and of Guilt upon com-
 mitting it, and the fears which attend it;
 otherwise Man would be the most wretch-
 ed of all Creatures to no purpose: There
 is no Creature that feels Remorse upon
 sense of Guilt, or that dreads Punishment
 accordingly, but Man alone; and since
 this dread may increase to a very great de-
 gree, by the niceness of his Reflection,
 and the tenderness of his Conscience; there
 is no Creature that can possibly be so mi-
 serable as Man; and if this is to no pur-
 pose, then there is not a Beast, an Insect
 that perishes, but has greatly the advan-

* See that late Learned and Ingenious Discourse Con-
 cerning The Certainty and Necessity of Religion in Gene-
 ral. Pag. 142, &c.

tage of this *Reasoning Creature*, this *Lord of the World*, as he has flatter'd himself to be for so many Ages: Since then it is certain that Man has such Notions; and that God who dispos'd the frame of his Nature in such a manner, as to receive 'em early, and retain 'em strongly, is All-wise, Good and Just: It cannot be imagin'd that he did this in Vain, or only to Disturb and Torment him; for as it would not be agreeable to Infinite Wisdom to do any thing to no purpose; so it would by no means consist with Infinite Goodness to fix such Principles in the Noblest of his Creatures, as must serve to no other End, but to make him more miserable than any of the rest.

These Reasons, I hope, may suffice to prove to any Unprejudic'd and Impartial Person, *who acknowledges that there is a God; the Necessity and Certainty of a Future State of Reward and Punishment, and that too according to Natural Principles.* As for those Objections that are usually made upon this Occasion, *That the distinction of Good and Evil depends only upon Humane Laws; that the Hopes and Fears of Future Reward and Punishment are not Natural, but the Inventions of Politicians to manage Mankind, and support Government; and that*

*this is prov'd by those, who having had the Sense and Courage, to assert their Natural Liberty, have never been troubled with any thing of this kind; nothing can be more Unreasonable than this; for first it is plain by the consent of Nations, that the distinctions of Good and Evil, (which are generally the same) are founded in Nature; that the force which they have upon Men's Minds is ancients than Government it self; as being from Right Reason, which is co-eternal with God: As Cicero tells us, "Nor, says he, * if there " had been no Written Law against Rapes " in Tarquin's Reign; would his Son Sextus, " when he forc'd Lucretia, have fin'd * the " less against this Eternal Law; because this " was Reason it self; rising from the very " Nature of Things, and prompting Us to " Good, and restraining Us from Evil accordingly; which did not then first become Law, when 'twas written down; but " oblig'd from its beginning, which was " the same with that of the Divine Mind it*

** Nec si Regnante Lue. Tarquinio nulla erat Roma Scripta Lex de stupris; idcirco non contra illam legem Sempernam Sext. Tarq. vim Lucretia attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à Rerum Natura, & ad recte faciendum impellens, & à delicto avocans; qua non tum demum incipit lex esse cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est, orta est autem simul cum mente divina. Lib. 2. de Legibus.*

"self. So that the Goodness of Humane Laws, depends upon their being deriv'd from this Eternal Fountain ; they do not of themselves *determine* what is Good and Evil ; but only *declare* what was so before ; to save People the pains of disputing about their Duty, and to promote it by the threats of immediate Punishment : But of all Pretences, *that* sure is the weakest, which would insinuate, that the Notions of Good and Evil, and the Hopes and Fears which are the effects of them, are owing only to the *Craft of Politicians*, and are not *Natural*, but meer *Fiction* : For this very Objection (which supposes 'em necessary for Government) proves the contrary ; for if Civil Government is absolutely necessary for Man's Happiness ; if such Government cannot be preserv'd without such Notions ; then we must either say *that* Man was made so imperfect as not to be furnish'd with such Notions, such Principles and Rules as are absolutely necessary for him ; *that* what was thus omitted by God, was supply'd by the Cunning of Crafty Men ; or *that* God suffers his Creatures to be impos'd upon by their Brethren, to be fill'd with vain Hopes, and tormented with vain Fears, and that too

often to their present disadvantage: Or else we must grant that these Notions, which are necessary for the general good of Mankind, and are also generally embrac'd by them, must be *Natural*. In a Word, nothing sure can be more reasonable than this; Man cannot be happy without Civil Society; Civil Society cannot be supported without Man's Passions and Appetites are restrain'd, these cannot be restrain'd without the Hopes and Fears of a Future State; these Hopes and Fears are generally entertain'd by Man, and do restrain him; and therefore as they are Natural, they must be True, and there is a Future State accordingly.

Nor does it signify any thing in this case to boast of Wit and Courage, Asserting of Natural Liberty, and the being free'd by these means from these Notions. What was the Opinion of the *Greeks* and *Romans* in this Case? were not these People as Famous for their Wit as for their Arms? and wou'd it not be as Ridiculous for any single Man to oppose his Sense as his Courage, against them; and how is Man's Natural Liberty endanger'd by these Notions, when it depends upon the direction and assistance of such Principles, as are founded on them, as has been shewn
in

in the first part of this Chapter : Or supposing that some Gentlemen, even that one in a hundred (which I am sure is many more than I need grant) had wholly extinguish'd any such Notions ; does it follow from hence that there is no such at all, or are those few a better Argument of what is Natural to Man, than so many Thousand of others ? What if there be some few that are Deaf or Blind, or that have be-fotted themselves by their Vices ; shall we conclude from hence, that Stupidity or Blindness are Natural, and that Seeing and Apprehending are signs of Mens being out of order ? Though a Man should be free from all sense of Evil and fear of Future Punishment ; this would be no better Argument, that such a Persons Soul was in its proper and natural State, than the Bodies being free from all Pain would prove that it was in perfect Health. Pain is the effect of some Violence offer'd to Nature, in order to put it upon its Guard ; as the Soul has an outward sense of it, by the Body, that it may resist or avoid whatever is hurtful to that, so it has an inward sense of it, in an ill Conscience, that it may avoid what may prove hurtful to *it self also* : Now as it would be very strange for any one, upon his loss of Feeling in any Part,

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from

from a Gangrene or Dead Palsy, to argue that 'twas unnatural for any Man to have the sense of Feeling in that Part; so is it no less strange for any one, that has lost these Notions of Good and Evil, Reward or Punishment in a Life to come, to tell you confidently that they are *unnatural*; for all that this proves is only, that such a Persons Mind is distemper'd, that it does not exert its Faculties in a natural way; that is, in the same way that the generality of Mankind do; for 'tis *from hence* that we must judge of *Humane Nature*, not from the *temper* or *report* of one or few Persons; and if so, then these Notions which are so *General* must be *Natural*, and therefore *certain*; because whatever is of *Nature*, is of *God*.

There needs no further Answer to the Objections against a Future State, or any further proofs for it, where the wisest of the Philosophers concur with us so Universally. The belief of this was the Foundation of those Excellent Discourses which were written by these Antient Sages; and therefore we may find the Immortality of the Soul, and a Future State continually Inculcated, by the greatest of them; this too was the ground of that greatness of Mind, that Justice, Courage, Temperance, and Piety

Piety of the *Greeks* and *Romans*: 'Twas this that gave *Socrates* that Calmness and Tranquility in his last Minutes, under the most barbarous Injustice; and made him as easie in his Death, as ever lawful Monarch was at his Coronation: And 'tis to those Excellent Authors, * which give an account of this Great Man, that I remit the Reader for further satisfaction; or if happily what has been said shall be sufficient, then there will I suppose be no great difficulty in the remaining Point.

2. That *Self-Murder* being one of the worst Crimes, shall have a Punishment proportionable; and consequently he that makes use of this to obtain Ease or Liberty, shall fall into a state of great Misery or Slavery.

To make this appear we need only to produce the Opinions of some of the Greatest Men in this Matter; and consider briefly the Grounds of Punishment and Reward in General, and the Nature of this Crime in Particular.

* *Plato* and *Xenophon*: See this also clearly, copiously, and solidly prov'd in the Treatise above-mentioned, viz. *A Practical Discourse of Future Judgment*. Likewise in the 2d. Part. Vol. 1. Chap. 5. Sect. 2. *Of the Christian Life*, by that Late Eminent Divine Dr. *Scot*.

For the First, *Virgil* describing the A-
broad and Condition of *Self-murderers* in
that Place above-mention'd, *shews it to
be unspeakably worse than the Evil which
they fled from; while he crys out,

— *Quam vellent, æthere in alto
Nunc & pauperiem, & duros perferre labores !*

This was according to the Doctrine of
Plato; and therefore *Macrobius* discourfing
upon that Passage of *Cicero*, which I quo-
ted before †, That there could be no entrance
into a State of Happiness for those who Kill'd
themselves; says || it was the Opinion of
Plotinus, an Eminent Platonist; That no
Death could be Rewarded but what was Natu-
ral; and that Death alone was Natural, where
the Body left the Soul, and not the Soul the
Body. Besides (as he adds farther) the Soul
shall be Rewarded according to that Perfection
which it arrives to in this Life, therefore Death
is not to be hastned, because it can never be so
perfect, but that it may receive addition; tho'
a Man may have risen to a very high Pitch of
Goodness and Virtue; yet he may rise higher
still; wherefore he that cuts off his Life, cuts
off his Improvement; and so despises the Re-

* *Æn.* 6. † p. 22, Sup. || *Macrobi.* lib. 1. in *Som. Scip.*
Cap. 13.

ward which is propos'd to him, which being a great Contempt of the Proposer, must be the occasion of severe Punishment. To these let me add an Excellent Author* of our own, who makes the first Man (upon his Wife's advising to kill themselves in their great Distress) to argue thus from the Light of Nature.

---If thou covet Death, as utmost End
Of Misery, so thinking to evade
The Penalty pronounc'd, doubt not but God
Hath wiselier Arm'd his Vengeful Power
than so
To be forestall'd: much more I fear least Death
So snatch'd will not exempt us from the Pain
We are by Doom to pay; rather such acts
Of Contumacy will Provoke the Highest
To make Death in us live; then let us seek
Some safer Resolution.---

But the Reasonableness of this will be more plain, if we consider what must be the Ground of Reward and Punishment in General; and the Nature of the Crime before us. What is it then that shall make the Soul to be admitted into a State of Liberty, Ease or Happiness; but the endea-

* Milton's Paradise Lost, lib. 10.

vouring faithfully to fulfil that End for which Life was bestow'd, by performing every part of its Duty towards God, our Neighbour, or our selves; and this too notwithstanding the worst Evils and Calamities which can possibly befall us: On the other side, what shall expose the Soul to the *Slavery* of extreme Torment, but the forsaking of this End, the refusing to submit to the Will of God, the Injuring our Neighbour, and encouraging others to do so; now if the doing *any one* of these things must make a Man liable to Punishment, what must it do to *be guilty of them all*, and much more by *Self-murder*. For this is the *design'd* destruction of God's particular Propriety, the Positive Renouncing that End for which he gives Man Life; the doing what is *destructive* to Civil Society, the *Overthrowing the Laws both of God and Man*; to Rebel against Providence, and break out into Eternity: *Self-murder* is the doing all this, and what is still *more*, the doing it *wilfully* and *advisedly* and therefore what Punishment shall be due to it?

I hope the greatness of this Crime appears so plain by this time (every Argument which has been us'd for the proving it unlawful, proving this also) that no new Arguments will be requir'd of me to demonstrate

monstrate it; and therefore I shall only confirm this by these two Considerations.

1. That this is the least *capable of Repentance* of any ill Action whatsoever; or rather 'tis the *positive renouncing of it*: *Repentance* has been allow'd as a most reasonable and necessary Duty, by the Light of Nature, by which 'tis plain also, that it consists of *Sorrow for something that is past*; and of *Resolution of not doing the same thing for the time to come*; but the Gentleman with whom we have had so much to do, after he has brought in a main'd account of Repentance, under the covert of a venerable Name, *viz. * This is true Repentance, to do no more, to speak no more, those things whereof you Repent; and not be ever Sinning, and ever asking Pardon*; tells us, *such a Repentance as this our Case is capable enough of*: Was ever any thing so trivial? What kind of Repentance? Why a Man is capable of keeping the Resolution of Killing *himself no more*, after he has *once done so*: Can this be in earnest? but this is absurd as to *both* parts of Repentance, for this is either *Sorrow for what is past*, supposes some thing to have been done amiss; whereas here Repentance goes beforehand,

and the Person is reckon'd to have confess'd the Crime before he has committed it; or else 'tis Resolution *against doing* something that is Evil; but how can this be, when the Person is Positively *resolv'd for it*; this is strange trifling with a Mans Own Conscience, and with God; and what can be more provoking than to *know* the Evil of an Action, to foresee that it *wants* Repentance; to be sensible that it ought to be *abhorr'd and avoided*, and yet to do it for all that. If it be said that a Man may have time to Repent *afterwards*, and that he may possibly *contrive* his Death accordingly: Alas? what hopes can he draw from hence? to *design* first *positively* to commit that which one *acknowledges to be Evil*; and to *design* to ask *forgiveness* when 'tis committed, is an *undeniable Evidence*, that a Man transgresses Presumptuously against the Light of his own Reason; for the more necessary that he thinks Repentance is, the more clear sense must he have of the Evil of the thing which he is about to do, and therefore the greater must his Punishment be.

2. The Person who is guilty of *Self-murder* can receive no Punishment in this World, which he can be sensible of; and therefore shall be punish'd the more hereafter.

after. I have shewn already * that among other things which prove the unlawfulness of *Self-murther*, 'tis a greater Crime in respect of the Publick than the Murther of *another Man*; because some satisfaction may be made for that, especially to the Publick, by the forfeiture of the Persons own Life, and by the terrour of his Example: But in *Self-murther* there can be nothing of this; the Offender evades all sensible Punishment; he makes no Satisfaction considerable for despising and breaking the Laws of his Country, and encouraging others to do so: He brings Horror, Confusion, Infamy, (and Poverty often) upon his forsaken Family, and yet does it often upon this very Account, *that he cannot be Punish'd here*, and therefore will undoubtedly suffer in a more dreadful manner hereafter.

Thus I have considered the several Significations of the Word *Liberty*, as a pretence for *Self-murther*; and shewed what that *Liberty* is in *General*, which Man has as to his own Actions: That no Evil which oppresses the Body can be destructive (while Reason remains) to the Liberty of the Soul: That no Sickness or Pain what-

* Sup. pag. 26, 27,

soever can be any sign that God gives the Sufferer *Liberty* to destroy himself: That he who does so to obtain *Liberty* or *Ease* from any such Evils, shall fall into a state of greater *Slavery*; and therefore that *Liberty*, in what sense soever, is an *unreasonable pretence for Self-murder*.

And now I have gone through what I propos'd, laid down the Principles upon which I take *Self-murder* to be unlawful: Answer'd such Objections as I thought most strong against them; and withal examin'd those General Prejudices by which People are usually misled in this Matter: I will not trouble the Reader with any more particular view of what has been said; If he wants this, he may have it by turning back to the Contents.

But hitherto we have been led only by Natural Reason; if the Principles which we have argued from, were brought to what is revealed to us in the Holy Scriptures, the unlawfulness of this Act would quickly appear more Plainly: For as to *God's Propriety in Man*: There we may find in how wonderful a manner this is *increas'd* by the *Death of our Crucifi'd Lord, who purchas'd*
us

us by his Blood, made us *Members* of his Body, uniting us to Himself by his Holy Spirit: Thus too, as to the end of *Humane Life*; there our Reason is instructed what to believe, and our Wills what to do, and encourag'd to obey accordingly by the assistance of the same Spirit: And although we may see there, that the best of Men, in the following of this End, shall be expos'd to great Afflictions, to Poverty, Sickness, Disgrace, nay sometimes to Death it self; yet we may see also the great advantages of such Sufferings, by the improvement of our Souls, and the increase of our Reward: And above all, for the enabling us to undergo them in their worst Extremes; we have there set before us the most *Excellent Example of Patience, Constancy, and Humility in the meek and forgiving Son of God*: What Contempt or Disgrace, what Torture of the Body could ever equal what He Suffer'd in his Death? What Sorrow and Anxiety, what Torments of the Mind, could ever be compar'd to what He felt in the Garden, and yet with what Duty and Resignation did He submit to all? O my Father, if it be possible let this Cup pass from Me; nevertheless not as I will but as thou wilt. These Blessed Words alone, if rightly consider'd, might

might afford, in what Circumstances soever, the most Sovereign Preservative against this dreadful Crime of *Self-murder*. But Arguments of this kind may (if it be found necessary) be insisted upon more conveniently hereafter.

FINIS.
